日本企業はグローバル市場で競えるのだろうか…?(7) 日本の経験不足の新興企業がグローバル市場で競争でできるのか?

The Beijing offices of Japanese law firms are staffed with only two or three Japanese lawyers. Their job, says Givens, is to talk to Japanese clients who don’t feel comfortable doing so directly with a Chinese lawyer. Freshfields, on the other hand, is a non-Japanese global law firm that has 40 or 50 lawyers in Beijing, many of them Chinese. Says Givens, “They work together like the team from Goldman Sachs.” He poses the same question raised about Nomura and Dentsu − “Why would any non-Japanese company use a Japanese law firm in China?” He believes there is no reason to do so if you speak English or are happy dealing directly with Chinese lawyers. “Would Prada use a Japanese law firm as its lead counsel for its global IPO?” asks Givens. “No. The kinds of Japanese companies that use a Japanese law firm in China are those that want to raise their overseas sales ratio from 20 to 30% and who don’t feel comfortable dealing directly with Chinese people. It is too ‘mendokusai’ (troubling, bothersome).”

日本の法律事務所の北京オフィスは、たった2,3人の日本人弁護士しかいない。Givensが言うには、彼らの仕事は、中国の法律事務所と直接やりとりすることに慣れてない日本人クライアントと話すことだ。それとは対照的に非日系のグローバル法律事務所であるFreshfieldsは、北京でその多くが中国人である40,50人の弁護士を雇っている。「彼らはゴールドマンサックスから来たチームのように一緒に働いている。」とGivensは言う。彼は野村や電通の時に持ち上がった質問を取り上げていう。「なぜ非日系企業は中国で日本の法律事務所を使わないのだろうか?」 もしあなたが英語を話し、中国の弁護士と直接取引するのが良いのなら、日本企業を使う理由はないと彼は考えている。「プラダは世界的なIPOを行なうための主任弁護士として、日本の法律事務所を利用するだろうか?」とGivensは尋ねる。「それはない。中国で日本の法律事務所を使うほとんどの日本の企業は、海外売上比率を20-30%から高めようとしているが、彼らは中国人と直接取引することに慣れていない。それはかなり「めんどくさい」(厄介で、煩わしい)のである。

Givens ends his global competitive analysis by raising a concern shared by Beacon Reports: How is this going to play out? “I don’t think we’re going to see Japanese companies transforming themselves into an AB InBev, a Goldman Sachs or even a Freshfields,” says Givens. “Rather I ask, ‘How much longer will it be before foreign global firms penetrate the Japanese market?’ I think the day is coming, when the barriers get low enough, that the Japanese may lose control over the very domestic markets they had assumed were theirs.”That day may arrive sooner than many realize.

GivensはBeacon Reportsが持ち込んだ懸念点を取り上げて、グローバル競合企業の分析は終わりにした:つまり、この懸念点がどのように展開するのだろうか?「我々は、AB InBevやゴールドマンサックス、あるいはFreshfieldsのような企業へと変貌を遂げる日本企業を見る事はないだろう。」とGivensは言う。「寧ろ私は”外資系のグローバル企業が日本市場を浸食するまでに、残りどれくらい時間があるのか”と尋ねたい。障壁が十分に低くなり、日本企業が自分たちの物であると思っていたまさにその国内市場の支配を失うかもしれない日が近づいていると私考えている」。そのような日は恐らく多くの人が認識しているよりも早く訪れるかもしれない。

(Data and charts, based on company financials, are provided courtesy of Stephen Givens.) 

Steven Givens 
Steven Givens Pic

これはBeacon reportだ。

POSTED ON October 20, 2013 
Japan’s ‘hidden champions’


Main Pic4



In an earlier article titled, ‘Can Japanese firms compete in global markets?’ we examined the struggle that well-known Japanese firms have competing for global market share. How are Japanese entrepreneurial mid-sized companies fairing globally?


To answer that question, Beacon Reports turned to Dr. Stefan Lippert, a former McKinsey & Company consultant who teaches business studies at Temple University in Tokyo. Dr. Lippert researches ‘hidden champions’ – entrepreneurial firms which have a clear business focus and that go global early in their lives. There are about 2,700 such firms worldwide, including 230 in Japan, which form the core of Dr. Lippert’s interest.

この質問に答えるために、Beacon Reportsは東京のテンプル大学でビジネスを教えている前マッキンゼー&カンパニーのコンサルタントだったDr. Stefan Lippertのもとへ出向いた。Dr. Lippertは「隠れた王者」—1つの明確なビジネスの目的を持つ、創業間もない時期にグローバル進出をしている新興企業を研究している。世界中にそのような企業は約2,700社、日本企業は230社が含まれており、そうした企業がDr. Lippertの興味の中心となっている。


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The story again is repeated in insurance. Eighty-one percent of Tokyo Marine’s $31 billion in sales comes from Japan. This compares with the much larger AXA, whose $119 billion in global sales is also regionally balanced. Givens reports that Tokyo Marine too is trying to grow its overseas sales from about 20 to 30%.

こうした話しは再び保険業界でも繰り返されている。東京海上の310億ドルの売上の81%は日本から生まれている。これをより巨大な企業であるAXAと比較すると、 AXAの1190億ドルの全世界の売上もまた地域的にバランスが取れている。東京海上も海外売上を20%から30%に伸ばそうとしているのだとGivensは報告している。

Axa vs. Tokio Marine (2012 Revenue) 

Axa vs. Tokio Marine Chart 8

What about investment banking? The story is no different. According to Givens, Nomura thought it could go head-to-head with Goldman Sachs in the wake of the Lehman shock by raising their overseas sales ratio to 70 – 80%. Then, Nomura lost money in Europe. They have since scaled back plans to increase their overseas sales to 30%, focusing on the high-growth markets of Southeast Asia.

go head-to-head with:対峙する、直接対決する
in the wake of〜:〜の影響が残る


Givens refers to the Prada $2.14 billion initial public offering of June 2011 to explain why Japanese firms might feel ‘challenged’ outside of Japan. “This is what globalization looks like,” says Givens, holding up a photograph of a group of internationally looking, smart, aggressive, investment bankers from Goldman Sachs based in Hong Kong and London who were involved in the deal. “Prada, an Italian company, launched the IPO together with this international team of people. My question is, those smart people in London and Hong Kong – ‘Why would they ever want to work for Nomura? Would Prada ever consider using Nomura as the underwriter for its IPO?’ ”

initial public offering:株式公開


Moving to the industry he knows best of all − legal services, Givens asks the rhetorical question, “Can Japanese law firms hope to be global players in the same way that Nomura hoped to be a global player?” He feels the question answers itself − “There is no way.”


Professional service firms like PwC, Deloitte and McKinsey are increasingly becoming global. They are doing big deals for global clients, much in the same way that WPP does global work for global clients. Within the legal profession, however, Japanese law firms are small compared to their international rivals. They often employ only one or two people in major cities such as New York and Beijing, providing only limited services.

the legal profession:法曹界



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Global Incumbents vs. Rakuten

Rakuten vs Incumbents

Givens is concerned that large global players will infiltrate Japan and take market share away from Japanese firms. Mixi used to be the social network of choice by Japanese youngsters. Recently, there has been a massive flight away from mixi to Facebook. The problem, according to Givens, is that branded products and the advertising that goes with them are inherently culture-based. “To expect Japan, which has its own unique insular culture, to both understand cultural values outside the country and to project itself effectively overseas, may be asking more than it is currently able to achieve.”

take A way from:〜からAを奪う
go with:持っていく
unique insular culture:独特な島国文化
expect A to do:Aに〜することを期待する
project itself:伝える、印象を与える


That has not prevented one company, Dentsu, from trying. Dentsu is Japan’s largest advertising agency. Before its acquisition of Aegis in March of this year, 83% of Dentsu’s sales came from Japan. The remainder in overseas sales came largely from Japanese clients. Post-acquisition, Dentsu’s overseas sales ratio jumped to 42%. But Givens says that when you consider the overseas clients they acquired, Dentsu still does not have the size or geographic balance to compete effectively with the world’s largest advertising agency, WPP. (Omnicom and Publicis will replace WPP as the world’s largest ad agency when recently announced merger plans are finalized.)



WPP vs. Dentsu/Aegis (2010 Revenue)

Dentsu vs WPP

Given surmises, “If Budweiser or Kraft want to conduct a global campaign, WPP is the place to go. WPP can help you. It has an evenly balanced presence across the world.” He feels Dentsu has succeeded in extending its global footprint, but falls short of the mark. “When you put the two firms together, Japan still represents 58% of its revenues, rather than mirroring Japan’s 8.8% of world GDP.”

falls short of the mark:標準に達せずに下落する


The same sorry tale repeats itself in banking, where Japanese banks have failed to gain a global toehold. Seventy-eight percent of Mizuho’s $25 billion in sales come from Japan. This compares with global competitor HSBC, whose $75 billion in worldwide sales are regionally, evenly distributed. Givens believes Mizuho is iterating the same doomed-to-fail strategy of aiming to raise foreign sales to 30% of revenues through M&A, largely by targeting firms in Southeast Asia. He asks, “Have we heard that strategy before? Yes. Just like with Dentsu − when Mizuho works overseas, it works for Japanese clients − the same Japanese clients that are buying companies in Southeast Asia. They’re going out there together with the same strategy.”

repeat itself:繰り返す


HSBC vs. Mizuho (2011 Revenue)

HSBC vs. Mizuho


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Kirin’s Senior Management Team

Kirin's Management Team

Kirin’s senior management may be smiling, but Givens feels there is little to smile about. They are up against a multi-cultural global competitor that has both global economies of scale and an intimate understanding of the local culture in the markets in which they compete, he says, noting that Kirin’s return on equity is 0.83% while AB InBev’s is 16%. Kirin’s sales are stagnant too, while AB InBev’s continue to grow. “I just can’t see Kirin reinventing itself as an AB InBev,” says Givens. “That takes a whole different mindset.”

are up against A:直面している
return on equity:自己資本利益率
reinvent itself:自分の生き方を変える、変身する

キリンの経営陣は笑っているようである。しかし彼らは殆ど笑ってはいないとGivensは感じている。 彼らはグローバルの規模の経済と、参入しているその市場の地元地域の文化を深く理解している多文化を持つグローバル企業と対峙している。彼が言うには、キリンの自己資本利益率は0.83%である一方で、 AB InBevは16%であることが注目に値する。キリンの売上は停滞しているが、一方でAB InBevの売上は増え続けている。「私はAB InBevのようにキリンが変わるのを何もせずに見ていることはできない」とGivensは言う。「全く異なった考え方に持っていくことだ」。

Givens believes that Kirin’s management has been insulated from global realities within the Japanese domestic market. “They say their brewing craftsmanship and the emotional bonds they have built with Japanese customers are their key competitive advantages. They are not looking over their shoulder at the global competition knocking at the door.”

insulate from:から孤立する、隔離する
brewing craftsmanship:ビール製造技術
emotional bond:情緒的な結びつき


Givens further questions if Japanese managers have the requisite, intimate understanding of local cultures to succeed in overseas markets, noting there are already too few Japanese brands with a global footprint. Uniqlo was the only well-known domestic brand mentioned on a Fortune 500 list containing 60 consumer brand names that included Kraft, JELL-O, Miracle Whip, Velveeta, Oscar Mayer, Ritz, Oreo, and so forth. 

and so forth:同じように続く

Givensは更に日本の経営者達が海外市場で成功するために必要な現地の文化を深く理解するという必要条件を持っているかどうかに懐疑的であり、既にグローバルで占有市場を持つ日本ブランドがほぼ無いということに言及している。ユニクロが、Kraft、JELL-O、 Miracle Whip、Velveeta、Oscar Mayer、RitzそしてOreoなどのような60の消費者ブランドが名を連ねるFortune 500の中に名を載せる唯一の有名な日本ブランドであった。

Often well-known domestic brands are much smaller than their global competitors. One well-known Japanese brand is Ajinomoto. It competes with global competitors such as Nestle and Kraft. In 2011, Ajinomoto had sales of about $12 billion compared with Nestle’s $83 billion and Kraft’s $49 billion. The firm has plans to become a global competitor by making acquisitions. Givens wonders how a small firm like Ajinomoto is realistically going to accomplish that goal.

有名な日本国内企業は、彼らのグローバルの競合企業と比べるとかなり小さい。1つの有名な日本ブランドは味の素だ。味の素はNestle やKraftのようなグローバルの競合企業と競っている。2011年、Nestleの830億ドルやKraftの490億ドルの売上と比べて、味の素は約120億ドルの売上だった。この企業は企業買収を通じてグローバル企業となる計画を持っている。Givensは味の素のような小さな企業が、どのようにして現実的にその目標を達成するのか疑問に思っている。

Further highlighting how much smaller Japanese firms are to their foreign global competitors, Givens points to the e-commerce sector, where global companies Apple, Amazon and Google have close to half their sales outside the United States. Rakuten’s much smaller sales in comparison, come mostly from Japan. “Rakuten is so much smaller than Amazon,” says Givens. “One wonders what the heck they’re doing trying to go overseas.”

what the heck:一体全体 



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Take Kirin, for example. Seventy-three percent of Kirin’s sales come from Japan. The rest comes from Asia/Oceania and Brazil. It competes with the world’s largest beer company, AB InBev, whose sales are not only significantly larger than Kirin’s, but they are more evenly spread across the world. “To put things into perspective,” says Givens, “the beer market has become a truly global market over the past decade.” Ten years ago the top 10 global beer companies represented 34% of the world market. Today, they hold 74% market share. The global beer industry has consolidated, with local companies having been swallowed up by larger firms. Kirin is the 9th largest beer company in the world. Its beer sales, by volume, are 1/10th that of AB InBev’s. “Kirin is a small-fry in the global scale of things,” remarks Givens.

be swallowed up:吸収合併される、飲み込まれる

キリンを例として取り上げてみよう。キリンの売上の73%は日本で生まれている。残りの売上はアジア/オセアニアとブラジルである。キリンは世界最大のビール企業AB InBevと戦っていて、その売上げはキリンよりも著しく大きいだけではなく、キリンよりも世界中に満遍なく広がっている。「物事を総体的に判断してみると」とGivensは言う。「ビール産業はまさに過去10年でグローバルマーケットとなった。」 10年前のグローバルでのトップ10のビール企業は世界の市場シェアの34%を占めていた。 今日ではそれらの企業が74%の市場シェアを持っている。グローバルでビール産業は統合が進んでおり、巨大企業によって地元地域のビール企業が吸収合併されてきている。キリンは世界のビール企業の中でも9番目の大きさだ。キリンのビールの売上は生産量ベースでAB InBevの10分の1である。「キリンはグローバル規模では小魚だ」とGivensは述べている。

AB InBev vs. Kirin (2011 Revenue)

Kirin vs. AB InBev

Kirin is under pressure to globalize. Its domestic market is shrinking as Japan’s population ages and will further shrink as the population declines. Kirin went on a spending spree buying foreign companies over the past five years to carry out their strategy to increase sales by 30%. But, according to Givens, that effort was poorly executed and came ‘too little, too late.’ Kirin’s current $10 billion market capitalization amounts to roughly what they spent on their acquisitions, so they probably overpaid for them. Kirin also bought less than a controlling interest in the companies they acquired in China, Singapore and the Philippines. “This strikes me as being the worst of both worlds,” says Givens.

controlling interest:支配的利権 (会社経営の実権を握るための 50%を超える株式の保有)


AB InBev on the other hand, has sales in every major region in both the developed and developing world. It sells beer as ‘global brands’ in the same way that Kraft sells cookies, candies and cheese.

一方でAB InBevは先進国と新興国の両方の全主要地域で売上を上げている。AB InBevはKraftがクッキーやキャンディー、そしてチーズを売る同じ方法で、ビールを「グローバルブランド」として販売している。

AB InBev is the product of two mergers − a large European Belgian-based company that first merged with a South American brewer. It, in turn, acquired Anheuser-Busch − the maker of Budweiser. Its management consists of Belgians, Dutch, Brazilians and Americans all mixed together. “Senior management is not exactly a United Nations − but comes close to it,” says Givens. He asks, “Could a Japanese company ever be part of such an arrangement?” That most Japanese companies would have difficulty with the idea, Givens believes, is symptomatic of the problem Japan faces as it attempts to globalize.

symptomatic of:示す

AB InBevは2社が合併した企業だ—初めて南米のビール醸造所を買収したベルギーに拠点を持つ巨大ヨーロッパ企業である。次にAB InBevはAnheuser-Busch—バドワイザーの製造元を買収した。AB InBevの経営陣たちはベルギー人、オランダ人、ブラジル人、そしてアメリカ人など全てかき混ざった構成となっている。「上級管理職たちは国際連合までとはいかない。しかしそれに近いものになっている」とGivensは言う。彼は「日本企業はこれまで一部でもこのような構成になったことがあっただろうか?」と彼は尋ねる。大半の日本企業は、このような考えを持つことに障害があるのかもしれない。Givensは、こうしたことがグローバル化を試みる時の日本企業が直面する問題を示していると考えている。


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The corollary, says Givens, is that firms with a regional focus will struggle to compete in a global market. He points to what has happened to European car companies, many which no longer exist as stand-alone firms, as proof of this corollary. Their brands were bought by global competitors. “Renault is a regional company,” says Givens. “It has zero sales in the United States and zero sales in Japan. The market capitalization of Renault today is equal to its shareholdings in Nissan. That means the market values Renault at zero.” The logical conclusion is that regional players in a global market face at best an uphill battle.

market capitalization:時価総額
at best:せいぜい良くても
uphill battle:難しい戦い、困難な局面


That uphill battle is made more difficult by the existence of hard and soft trade barriers. Toyota and Volkswagen are global competitors of almost equal size. Yet close to half of Toyota’s sales are in Japan and close to half of Volkswagen’s sales are in Western Europe. Givens infers, “It is hard to go outside your home jurisdiction and equally hard for outsiders to come and play in your ballpark.”



Many well-known Japanese manufacturing companies successfully compete globally. Most built their overseas markets after WWII when Japan’s economy was manufacturing-based and export-led. Kubota is an example of a heavy equipment manufacturer whose revenue is more or less evenly spread across the world. It competes globally with the US based Caterpillar. Both make great products. Neither firm relied on M&A to secure their slice of the global pie.

more or less:おおよそ、大体


More recently, Japanese firms from less manufacturing intense industries have tried to grow their overseas businesses through M&A. Among them are branded consumer product and service companies, including Kirin (beer), Ajinomoto (food), Rakuten (e-commerce), Dentsu (advertising), Mizuho (banking), Tokyo Marine (insurance) and Nomura (financial services). None of these firms have a dominant overseas footprint. Each wants to expand its overseas business, typically from a current low-level to 30% of sales − nowhere near the 90% Given’s suggests is required to effectively compete in a global market.




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海野 恵一



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