A number of policy prescriptions follow, including the adoption of policies designed to produce more robust economic growth in the United States; new trade arrangements in Asia that exclude China; a stricter technology-control regime affecting exports to China; a larger, more capable, and more active U.S. air and naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region; more intimate U.S. strategic ties with Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea, India, the countries of southeast Asia, and Taiwan; and a considerably tougher set of measures to counter Chinese behavior in the cyber realm.



Interestingly, the report also argues for an intensification of U.S.- Chinese diplomatic contacts, recommending a discourse that is “more candid, high-level, and private than current practice.” The focus of such talks would be not on the internal political character of China, but on such issues as Asian security, and would possibly involve experienced external persons on both sides who would presumably be less constrained by the sorts of rigidities and conventional thinking normally associated with bureaucracies.

presumably 多分


It is clear, though, that this call for real dialogue is not motivated by any great optimism of what it can achieve. Indeed, the authors conclude by noting that “the most that can be hoped for is caution and restrained predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China strategic competition becomes the new normal, and even that will be no easy task to achieve in the period ahead.”

in the period ahead:今後において


Both authors anticipate that their analysis and recommendations alike will be controversial and generate substantial criticism, and they devote their conclusion to addressing what they see as the likely challenges to what they have written. I expect some readers will, as a result, be persuaded by what is said here; I equally expect that others will remain unpersuaded that what is being suggested in these pages is either desirable or feasible. But whatever the reaction or reactions, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China deserves to become an important part of the debate about U.S. foreign policy and the pivotal U.S.-China relationship.


Richard N. Haass
Council on Foreign Relations March 2015


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Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China

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owing to:のために


It has become something of a cliche to say that no relationship will matter more when it comes to defining the twenty-first century than the one between the United States and China. Like many cliches, this statement is true but not terribly useful, as it tells us little or nothing about the nature of the relationship in question.

something of a:ちょっとした
Nothing matters more to me than:私にとって何よりも大切なのは〜である
when it comes to:に関していえば
in question:問題になって


Some point to history and argue that strategic rivalry is highly likely if not inevitable between the existing major power of the day and the principal rising power. Others challenge such a prediction, emphasizing more the impact of domestic political, economic, and social developments within the two countries as well as the potential constructive influence of diplomacy and statecraft.

principal :最も重要な


Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis, the authors of this Council Special Report, reach a conclusion considerably closer to the first of these two propositions. “China represents and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come,” they write, judging that “the likelihood of a long-term strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington is high.” They also argue that China has not evolved into the “responsible stakeholder” that many in the United States hoped it would. To the contrary, Blackwill and Tellis see China as having adopted a grand strategy for itself that is meant to increase state control over Chinese society and, beyond its borders, to pacify its periphery, cement its status in the international system, and replace the United States as the most important power in Asia.

責任あるステークホルダー(responsible stakeholder)  :ステークホルダーは賭け金や係争物の保管人、事業の出資者や利害関係者などを意味する。昨年9月、ゼーリック米国務副長官が包括的な対中政策についての演説で「国際社会システムにおける責任あるステークホルダーとなるよう促す必要がある」と言及したことなどから、関心を集めた。


What flows from this assessment is nothing less than a call on their part for “a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.” The two authors acknowledge that this new policy “cannot be built on a bedrock of containment”; they also say that policymakers cannot simply jettison the prevailing policy of integration. But they do advocate what they describe as “crucial changes to the current policy in order to limit the dangers that China’s economic and military expansion pose to U.S. interests in Asia and globally.”

centers on:に重点を置く


Stated somewhat differently, the authors recommend a new U.S. policy of balancing China that would in effect change the balance of current U.S. policy, in the process placing less emphasis on support and cooperation and more on pressure and competition. There would be less hedging and more active countering.

in effect :実質的に



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中国の自殺の劇的な減少(3) 世界の上位銀行は商業地を変えている

Mr Yip and his fellow researchers wonder if this goes against a popular theory, based on the thinking of Emile Durkheim, a 19th-century French sociologist, that urbanisation, modernisation and socioeconomic gains lead to increased social alienation and a higher suicide rate. Some data support this view in the richer developed world, where suicide rates have been rising recently. The estimated global average has increased from 11.6 to as much as 14 per 100,000 since 2008. And China’s rich neighbours have significantly higher rates—South Korea’s in 2012 was 28.1 per 100,000, Japan’s was more than 21.


Yet China may be hitting a worrisome turning point as it ages and becomes more wealthy. Suicides rose slightly after the 2008 financial crisis, and may continue to do so if the economy slows more dramatically. The forces that shaped suicide’s decline in China—migration and rising urban living standards—are losing steam as well.

lose steam:勢いを失う/一息つく


Most worrying is that suicides remain high among the fastest-growing segment of society, the elderly, who kill themselves at rates ranging from 9.9 per 100,000 urban men aged 65-69 to 41.7 per 100,000 rural men aged 70-74. Suicide rates among the elderly generally dropped overall into the middle of the past decade—declining more in the cities than in the countryside—but the rates have been holding steady or resurging since 2008.


The urbanisation and atomisation of the extended family, which led to a decline in suicides among younger generations, have left the elderly with fewer caretakers in the countryside and with few familiar faces in apartment blocks in the cities. The one-child policy has compounded this effect and will only make the burden heavier for the elderly and their children, just as the stresses of modern life are becoming more pronounced. Twenty years from now, the story of China’s suicide rate could be grimmer than it is today. But rates seem unlikely to return to the levels of the 1990s.




Bigger big banks
Jun 30th 2014, 14:06 by L.P., R.L.W. and K.N.C.


The world's top banks are changing their strips

A DECADE ago, Europe counted five banks among the world's top ten. Today there is only one, HSBC. During that time Chinese banks not only made the list, but vaulted into the top two places, according to annual rankings by The Banker released on June 30th. Last year China Construction Bank shoved aside America's JPMorgan Chase to become second largest in terms of tier-one capital. ICBC (formerly known as Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) kept the top spot; with more than $200 billion, it is also the world's most profitable bank. Though Japan's Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group is close to leaving the list altogether, until 2007 its $117 billion heft would have made it the world's biggest bank. Despite regulations designed to keep banks' ambitions modest so that none are too big to fail, today's groups are larger than ever. Global banking profits are at a record high of $920 billion—a third from Chinese banks alone.

vault into:飛び込む
shove aside:押しのける

10年前、ヨーロッパは世界トップ10の銀行のうち5つを占めていた。今日、わずか1つ、HSBCのみだ。そのような時、6月30日に出版されたThe Banker誌の年間ランキングで、中国の銀行はリストに入るだけでなく、トップの2つの位置に飛躍した。昨年、中国建設銀行は、アメリカのJPモルガン・チェースを押しのけ、自己資本で世界第2位になった。ICBC(以前は中国工商銀行として知られていた)はトップの地位をキープした。2,000億ドル以上を持ち、世界で最も高収益の高い銀行だ。日本の三菱UFJ銀行グループはリストから完全に姿を消しかかっているが、1,170億ドルという規模は2007年までなら世界最大の銀行であった。大きすぎて倒産できない銀行がないよう銀行の野望を適度に保つことを目的とした規制にもかかわらず、今日の金融機関はかつてないほどに大規模になっている。世界的な銀行業の利益は過去最高の9,200億ドルを記録しており、中国の銀行だけでその3分の1を占めている。


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The most dramatic shift has been in the figures for rural women under 35. Their suicide rate appears to have dropped by as much as 90%. The Lancet study in 2002 estimated 37.8 per 100,000 of this age group committed suicide annually in 1995-99. The new study says this declined to just over three per 100,000 in 2011. Another study of suicides, covering 20 years in one province, Shandong, found a decline of 95% among rural women under 35, to 2.6 suicides per 100,000 in 2010—and a 68% drop in suicides among all rural women. 


Scholars suspect that the number of suicides is underreported in official figures (the official suicide rate nationally was 6.9 per 100,000 in 2012) and they make adjustments for that in their calculations. But in several studies, as well as in official data, the long-term decline in suicides has been marked across the spectrum, in rural and urban areas and among men and women from almost all age groups. The only notable exception is the suicide rate among the elderly, which declined overall but has crept back up in recent years, a worrying trend in a rapidly ageing society. 

creep up:徐々に増える 


Two intertwined social forces are driving the reduction: migration and the rise of an urban middle class. Moving to the cities to work, even if to be treated as second-class citizens when they get there, has been the salvation of many rural young women, liberating them from parental pressures, bad marriages, overbearing mothers-in-law and other stresses of poor, rural life. Migrants have also distanced themselves from the easiest form of rural suicide, swallowing pesticides, the chosen method in nearly 60% of rural cases, and often done impulsively. The reduction in toxicity of pesticides has helped as well. 



Jing Jun, a sociologist at Tsinghua University in Beijing, notes that the increase in migration to the cities fits with the decline in rural suicides (see chart). Since rural dwellers accounted for most suicides, so the national rate has fallen, too. In 20 years, as the population went from mostly rural to more than half urban, the official national suicide rate dropped by 63%. 

more than half :とても/たいそう

北京にある精華大学の社会学者であるJing Junは都市への出稼ぎ労働者の増加は地方での自殺数の減少と一致していると述べている(図参照)。地方居住者が自殺数のほとんどを占めていたため、全国での自殺率も下がってきている。ここ20年で、人口がほとんどの地方から多くの都市に向かったのと共に、公式の全国的な自殺率が63%減った。 

Suicides among urban residents are also dropping, suggesting other causes, too. Chinese newspapers frequently carry dramatic photos of suicidal people being rescued from window ledges and rooftops (like the woman in our picture). But the University of Hong Kong researchers found that urban suicides had dropped to 5.3 per 100,000 between 2002 and 2011, a fall of 59%. The simplest explanation is that, in spite of concerns about pollution, food safety and property prices, living standards and general satisfaction with urban life have gone up. Mr Jing also believes that, as in the countryside, the atomisation of extended families has reduced the family conflicts that can lead to suicides. 

window ledge:窓台



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ホビーロビー社とオバマケア 再び中断された(3) 中国の自殺の劇的な減少

However the case is sure to have a wide impact. It directly affects women who work for religious employers. “Today, the Supreme Court ruled against American women and families, giving bosses the right to discriminate against women and deny their employees access to birth control coverage,” fumed Cecile Richards, the head of Planned Parenthood, a leading reproductive health-care provider. But the ruling also brings new problems for Obamacare. Republicans will seize the decision as yet another sign that the law is doomed. The ruling will also make it much harder to enforce the mandate that employers offer coverage, which has already been delayed. 



More broadly, the decision may make it harder for Congress to enforce the laws it passes. The Supreme Court’s left-leaning justices called the decision one of “startling breadth”. Companies, wrote Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.” If her prediction proves true, this ruling is bad news not just for Obamacare, but for acts of Congress in general. 

opt out of:免除してもらう/〜から抜け出る 



A dramatic decline in suicides 
Back from the edge 
The first of two articles on China’s suicide rate looks at the effect of urbanisation 
Jun 28th 2014 | BEIJING | From the print edition 



IN THE 1990s China had one of the highest suicide rates in the world. Young rural women in particular were killing themselves at an alarming rate. In recent years, however, China’s suicides have declined to among the lowest rates in the world. 


In 2002 the Lancet, a British medical journal, said there were 23.2 suicides per 100,000 people annually from 1995 to 1999. This year a report by a group of researchers from the University of Hong Kong found that had declined to an average annual rate of 9.8 per 100,000 for the years 2009-11, a 58% drop. 


Paul Yip, director of the Centre for Suicide Research and Prevention at the University of Hong Kong and a co-author of the recent study, says no country has ever achieved such a rapid decline in suicides. And yet, experts say, China has done it without a significant improvement in mental-health services—and without any national publicity effort to lower suicides. 

香港大学の自殺研究・予防センター所長で最近の研究の共著者でもあるPaul Yipは、これほど急速に自殺を減少できた国はいまだかつてないと言っている。それにもかかわらず、中国はこれを精神衛生事業の大幅な改善をすることなく、また自殺を減らすための全国的な宣伝活動をすることなく達成してきていると、専門家は述べている。 


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ホビーロビー社とオバマケア 再び中断された(2)

Obamacare requires firms to offer their workers health coverage, including coverage of contraception at no extra cost to the employee. The Greens and Hahns believe that some of those contraceptives, which may keep a fertilised egg from implanting in the uterine wall, amount to abortion. Federal law defines pregnancy from implantation, not fertilisation. Nevertheless, the issue before the court was not whether the Greens’ religious beliefs were valid. Rather, the question was whether a company can be exempt from federal law because its owners have religious objections. 



The First Amendment protects the right to the “free exercise” of religion. A law passed in 1993, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, further requires that the government “shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless doing so is the least restrictive way to advance a compelling government interest. The plaintiffs in this case argued that Obamacare’s mandate violated their rights under the 1993 law. If Hobby Lobby did not provide coverage, the company’s lawyers claimed, it might face fines of nearly $475m a year, unquestionably a substantial burden. The mandate was surely not the least restrictive way to give workers birth control—after all, the government had already given exemptions to religious groups, such as churches, and provided an “accommodation” for religious non-profits, such as Catholic universities. The distinction between for-profit and non-profits was immaterial, the lawyers argued. They insisted that “Corporations frequently engage in religious exercise”. 

free exercise:自由な行使
Religious Freedom Restoration Act:信仰の自由回復法

修正第1項は、宗教の“信仰の自由”を保障している。1993年に可決されたReligious Freedom Restoration Actはさらに、そうすることがやむにやまれぬ政府の利益を実現するために最小限の規制手段である場合を除き、政府は個人の宗教的活動に大幅な負担を強いてはならないとしている。この公判の原告は、オバマケアが指示することは1993年の法律で規定される権利を侵していると主張した。ホビーロビーが補償しなければ、紛れもない大きな負担である年間4億7,500万ドル近い罰金を科されることになると、その会社の弁護士は主張した。オバマケアの指令内容は、明らかに従業員が避妊をするために最小限の規制手段ではなかった。やはり、政府は既に教会などの宗教団体を免除しており、カトリック系大学のような宗教的な非営利団体に“便宜”を図っていた。営利非営利の区別は重要ではないと弁護士は述べている。彼らは、“企業は頻繁に宗教的活動に関わっている”と主張した。 

The government countered that this was ridiculous. “While the Greens are persons who exercise religion, there is a critical separation between the Greens and the corporation they have elected to create.” The Greens do not personally employ their workers; Hobby Lobby does. A company has both rights and obligations that differ from those of its owners. That includes being subject to federal law, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act and, in this case, Obamacare. 

政府は、それは不合理だと反論した。“グリーン家は宗教を信仰する個人ではあるが、グリーン家と彼らが設立することを選択した企業の間には決定的な区別がある。”グリーン家は個人的に従業員を雇っているのではない。つまり、ホビーロビー社が雇用しているのだ。企業は、オーナーのそれとは異なる権利と義務の両方を持っている。それは、アメリカ人がDisabilities Actに従うことと同じように連邦法に従うことを含んでおり、今回のケースではオバマケアである。 

The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling five to four against the government. Writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Alito explained that the mandate to cover contraception violates the 1993 law. “Protecting the free-exercise rights of closely held corporations,” he wrote, “protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control them.” Just because the 1993 law applied only to a “person”, the government cannot claim that this excludes for-profit companies: “no conceivable definition of a ‘person’ includes natural persons and non-profit corporations, but not for-profit corporations.” 

for-profit company:営利目的の会社 

最高裁は反対し、4対3で政府に反対の判決を下した。Samuel Alito裁判官は多数派の意見として、避妊を補償するという指示は1993年の法律に違反すると説明した。彼は、“非公開企業の信仰の自由を保障することは、その企業を保有し経営する人間の宗教の自由を保障する”とした。1993年の法律が“人”にのみ適用されるということだけで、政府はそれが営利目的の会社を除外すると主張することは出来ない。つまり、“自然人と非営利法人を含むが、営利法人を含まないという想定が可能な‘人’に関する定義はない”。 

The conservative justices argued that their ruling would have limited effect. “Our decision in these cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate”, not all requirements for company insurance. Furthermore, the ruling applied only to “closely held corporations”. 



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