BrexitはEUにとって最善かもしれない。 ロンドンの中心で、ヨーロッパ統合デモ行進の最中に、EUとイギリスの旗が国会議事堂にはためいている。(3)

More downside for UK financial markets and the economy
A weaker sterling, with higher inflation: We think the pound sterling will likely weaken further as the illusion of a good deal fades. The Bank of England is unlikely to offer much help, both because it does not have the foreign-reserve fire power to defend its currency, and as the Bank will likely maintain an accommodative monetary stance to support growth in the face of rising inflation. A potential loss of reserve currency status would further hurt sterling, which currently makes up 4.5% of global FX reserves. With the UK importing nearly 46% of its energy and 50% of its food, a weaker sterling will lead to higher import-led inflation.

FX reserve:外国為替準備金

A growing public deficit: Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Hammond’s spring budget effectively ignored the consequences of Brexit, predicting a decline both in borrowing and debt-to-GDP by 2021. The budget is predicated on unrealistic expectations of declining unemployment, falling inflation and steady growth. The reality is that the government may need to increase fiscal spending to support the economy, leading to a further widening of the fiscal deficit, currently at -3.8% of GDP. 

public deficit:公共財政赤字

Lower consumer spending will hurt retailers: The Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts that UK household debt-to-disposable-income will rise from 143% in 2016 to 153% in 2022. This will likely result in households having lower disposable income, at a time of higher inflation. UK retailers are likely to be squeezed by lower revenues and higher costs due to import-led inflation. 

The Office for Budget Responsibility:予算責任局 - イギリス財政の持続性に関する検証と報告を行う機関

Negative real returns for savers: With the Bank of England likely to maintain low rates despite rising inflation, Britons will suffer from negative real returns on their savings, which are already precariously low. According to a study by Money Advise Service, over 16 million Britons have less than £100 in savings. The property market is unlikely to provide sufficient protection, with markets already showing cooling signs given lower demand from foreign investors. 

Money Advise Service:金融管理局


An uncertain future
Brexit is a symptom of Britain’s deeply rooted economic imbalances: a growth model too concentrated on finance and services and dependent on foreign goods, human and financial capital; record-high social and wealth inequality; a lack of investment in infrastructure and education; and monetary and fiscal policies that have helped create a property bubble and excess household debt. 


In their attempt to create a fairer and more equal country, Britons sought to sever ties from what they saw as a weakened partner. The reality is that Brexit will likely make Britain weaker and, ironically, is making the EU stronger.





月曜日。 本日はコクヨの元社長の黒田さんとの会食がある。この連休は英語の本を書く。ではまた明日。

swingby_blog at 21:28コメント(0)トラックバック(0) 


BrexitはEUにとって最善かもしれない。 ロンドンの中心で、ヨーロッパ統合デモ行進の最中に、EUとイギリスの旗が国会議事堂にはためいている。(2)

Deal or no deal?
The reality instead will be a hard Brexit: Britain’s bargaining position is weak. Europe’s incentive is to give the UK a bad deal to set an example for other countries, yet not too bad to backfire. Britain’s incentive is to take it. 


Brexit Secretary David Davis recently admitted to not knowing the cost of a no-deal. His thinly-veiled threats to walk away from negotiations bear little credibility: Britain depends on the EU for half of its exports, while Britain accounts for only a third of Europe’s. For Britain, this means any deal would be better than none at all. 

thinly-veiled :薄く不透明な

The irony is that by running away from a European Union they thought was about to fall apart, Brexiteers have instead made it stronger. Voters in France and the Netherlands are rejecting populism, and politicians in Brussels and Berlin have switched gears towards reforms and pro-EU spending measures. 


An unclear strategy
Theresa May, self-appointed leader in this historic negotiation, has so far revealed little about her strategy. We do not know whether beyond this secrecy lies a feasible plan. But one thing is sure: the prime minister has already weakened Britain's negotiating position. 

First, she wrong-footed the start by threatening to walk away and to make the UK a Singapore-style tax haven. Second, she has made unrealizable promises. Keeping substantial access to the single market and having strict immigration controls are mutually exclusive for the EU: achieving both is highly unrealistic. Third, the prime minister has not been honest about the true cost of Brexit. May said repeatedly that Britain could walk away without a deal and be fine. Instead, a painless exit without a cliff-like effect on trade is only possible with a transitional arrangement. To obtain that, the UK will likely have to pay the €60 billion it owes from its past years of membership, as well as a membership fee for access to the single market. 

cliff-like effect:貿易で崖っぷちに立たされるような影響

Brexiteers have bought into the illusion of shaping a fairer and more independent country. Soon they will realize that the politicians’ promises are just empty words. They will have no one to blame but themselves. 


Brexit game theory: A bad deal is better than no deal
May officially triggered the Article 50 exit clause on 29 March and set out the UK’s negotiating letter to the EU. In our view, the four major points of the negotiations will be: 

1. The “divorce bill”: how much the UK still needs to pay the EU after leaving 
2. Free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU 
3. Immigration policy 
4. Transitional agreement 

From a game theory perspective, we think the Brexit negotiations are likely to lead to a bad deal for the UK, which it will eventually have to accept. 


On the one hand, the EU has an incentive to offer a bad deal to the UK, so as to set a tough precedent for other countries: the political costs of appearing too lenient will outweigh the benefits of maintaining benign trade relations with the UK.

benign :温和な

On the other hand, the UK is economically more dependent on the EU; 44% of its exports go there and 48% of its foreign investment comes from them. This is not to mention the potential damage from a loss of passporting rights to the services sector, which makes up for around 79% of UK GDP. Hence we think the UK may try to act tough at the start of negotiations, but eventually will have to compromise to avoid bigger economic fall-outs. 

fall-outs :抜け落ちること

As we illustrate below, the equilibrium scenario based on both sides’ incentive structures will be the EU offering a bad deal which the UK will accept. 

The EU has an incentive to offer a bad deal, and the UK has an incentive to take it.

Negotiating the divorce, while still seeing the kids
The first negotiating point will be to settle the divorce bill which the UK owes for its past years of membership. Beyond that, the key will be for Britain to secure a transitional agreement and avoid a cliff effect on trade. However, to reach a deal and to have access to the single market, the UK may have to compromise on immigration and potentially pay a fee. Both would require May to take a softer stance, something that is currently politically difficult given the split within the Conservative Party. 

The “divorce bill”: European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and the EU’s chief negotiator for Brexit Michel Barnier have said that the UK has to pay an exit bill of around €60 billion, and the bill would need to be agreed before beginning negotiations on an FTA or transitional agreement. The UK’s Brexit secretary David Davis so far ruled out paying for a hefty bill, as it would be politically challenging given that Brexiteers campaigned on a promise of “saving £350 million a week from Brussels”. Ultimately, we think the UK and EU will agree to a bill, but that this will only be paid after a trade deal is finalized. This would allow negotiations to continue, while not appearing as a defeat for May. 

In our view, the complexity behind the Brexit bill calculation means there is room for the UK to negotiate when it comes to the EU’s current estimate of €60 billion. The exit bill itself mainly comes from the UK’s budget commitments for 2019-2023, which it still needs to pay post-Brexit, unfunded pension liabilities for UK staff who worked in the EU’s institutions, and other contingent liabilities. According to estimates by the Centre for European Reform, the bill could range between €24.5 billion and €73 billion, depending on the calculation methods and what will be covered. 


A protester holds a blackboard outside Parliament after Britain's Prime Minister Theresa May triggered the process by which the United Kingdom will leave the Euopean Union, in London, March 29, 2017. REUTERS/Hannah McKay  - RTX337CF
A protester holds a blackboard outside Parliament after Britain's Prime Minister Theresa May triggered the process by which the United Kingdom will leave the Euopean Union, in London, March 29, 2017. 
REUTERS/Hannah McKay - RTX337CF 

Free trade agreement: May aims to achieve a “bold and ambitious free trade agreement” with the EU and start negotiations early, as expressed in her letter to President of the European Council Donald Tusk. May has downplayed the challenge of achieving an agreement by stressing that sectors like the auto industry and financial services may adopt existing single market agreements. 


However the reality will likely be an extended period of uncertainty, as both sides may agree the broad terms of a trade deal before 2019, but leave the details and ratification for a later date. Additionally, as part of the broad terms agreed to, the EU and UK will need to agree on an institution to settle FTA disputes so as to give the EU assurances that following a trade agreement, the UK will not undermine the single market through regulatory dumping. 


Immigration: The Brexit campaign focused on the cost of net migration and promised voters fewer migrants if Britain left the EU. May will now need to deliver on this promise, as she highlighted in her January speech. While May has effectively ruled out the possibility of implementing a point-based migration system for EU nationals, the final deal may include a limit on net migration from the EU under a work permit scheme. 

Transitional agreement: UK-EU trade will need to be governed by a transitional agreement, between the date that the broad terms of an FTA is agreed and when the FTA comes into effect. Rather than negotiating separate terms for this transitional agreement, we think during this period UK-EU trade will remain governed under EU law and the European Court of Justice. Could the UK make a u-turn? 


A turnaround on the Brexit decision is very unlikely and would result in a split in the government and the Conservative Party. However, the rational strategy to avoid a bad deal or no deal would be a more friendly negotiation aimed at agreeing on a transitional agreement and avoiding a cliff-like effect on trade. 

Doing this, however, requires political capital. The prime minister's approach so far has been a tough one, partly to appease the hard-liners in the party. Negotiating a soft Brexit while appearing to be hard on the EU is a difficult strategy, and in our view it would take time and more signs of economic weakness before the UK is able to soften its approach. 




swingby_blog at 22:31コメント(0)トラックバック(0) 

BrexitはEUにとって最善かもしれない。 ロンドンの中心で、ヨーロッパ統合デモ行進の最中に、EUとイギリスの旗が国会議事堂にはためいている。

Brexit could be the best thing that happened to the European Union
EU and Union flags fly above Parliament Square during a Unite for Europe march, in central London, Britain March 25, 2017.  FT


EU and Union flags fly above Parliament Square during a Unite for Europe march, in central London, Britain March 25, 2017.

In June 2016, the British public voted to do the unthinkable: leave the European Union. For a while there was some uncertainty. After all, this was unprecedented, so it was anyone’s guess which way things would go. Almost a year later, the situation is starting to get a little clearer.

The financial impact of Brexit
After an eight-year recovery built on rising asset prices and debt but stagnant wages, the poor and the old will see their incomes and savings dwindle. The canary in the coal mine is the pound sterling, which already dropped from over 1.50 to 1.25 against the US dollar. For an island that imports half its goods and food, this means higher inflation. High street retailers are already feeling the pinch: expect even smaller portions and less fruit and vegetables on the shelves. 

stagnant :賃金水準の停滞
dwindle :だんだん減少する
High street retailers:High Street というのは、どこの町にもほとんど必ずある、両側に商店が連なる通り(一番にぎやかな通り)のことです。そこに出店している小売業者であるhight street retailerは、(大手の)チェーン店のことを指すものと思われます

Brexit uncertainty could also scare off some investment and push jobs away. In fact, some firms are already relocating elsewhere. This means Britain’s ultimate store of wealth and property could turn into a trap. With a fall in investment and demand from foreigners and interest rates already at rock bottom, London’s market has already cooled off. 

at rock bottom:どん底

There is little the government will be able to do this time around: schemes like Help-to-Buy, which helps people become home-owners, will have to give in to the reality of a 5% budget deficit and the need for lower spending. Higher taxes may be on the way too. While the last budget from Number 10 ignored Brexit, some local councils are already feeling the pinch and threatening to raise taxes. 

give in:屈服する

What do all these developments mean for the bottom line? According to our calculations, based on direct costs such as job losses from the finance sector, as well as inflation eroding incomes and savings, Brexit will cost Britain £140 billion (7.5% of GDP) or the equivalent of £300 million a week over eight years, 


It’s about more than the economy
But for a country deeply divided by economic and social rifts, leaving Europe was never about the economy. It was about finding unity. Polarizing public opinion against the EU and immigration and away from domestic issues was an easy political win. 


Yet Brexit will not fix the shortfalls of the Anglo-American growth engine, which ran on credit and rising asset prices over the past few decades, disregarding rising inequality, a lack of inclusive access to education and declining social mobility. 

social mobility:社会的流動性・社会的地位

Britain’s richest and privately educated citizens account for 7% of the population yet makes up two-thirds of judges and around half of journalists and members of parliament, according to a government report. Meanwhile, the Child Poverty Action Group estimates that 3.9 million children live in poverty. The UK ranks second in the developed world for inequality, after the US. 

Brexit will not change that, nor will it make Britain more united: the English patient was sick long before the divorce from Europe. With an economy focused on finance and services, and highly dependent on foreign investment, the idea of creating a “truly global Britain” isolated from its closest trading partner is economic la-la land. 

la-la land:現実離れした世界




swingby_blog at 00:12コメント(0)トラックバック(0) 



Tillerson, Haley issue differing statements on future of Assad in Syria
By Abby Phillip and Mike DeBonis April 9 at 10:35 AM 


Haley:ニムラータ・ニッキー・ランダワ・ヘイリー(Nimrata Nikki Randhawa Haley, 1972年1月20日 - )は、アメリカ合衆国の政治家。現在、同国の国際連合大使。インド系アメリカ人で、所属政党は共和党。

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson on Sunday appeared to offer differing views on the future of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. 

Their comments highlight the degree to which questions remain about the nature of U.S. policy in Syria after President Trump authorized missile strikes against a government air base believed to have been involved in the deployment of chemical weapons against civilians last week. 

Haley indicated in an interview on CNN's “State of the Union” that the United States does not see a peaceful political resolution for Syria's civil war as long as Assad remains in power.” We don't see a peaceful Syria with Assad in there,” Haley said. 

The objective of U.S. policy, she said on NBC's “Meet the Press,” is “to defeat ISIS,” using an acronym for the Islamic State. 


“I mean, we've got to do that for peace and stability in the area. It's also to get out the Iranian influence, which we think is causing so much friction and worse issues in the area,” Haley said. 

“And then we’ve got to go and make sure that we actually see a leader that will protect his people. And clearly, Assad is not that person,” she added. 

But speaking on ABC News' “This Week,” Tillerson said the Syrian people will eventually decide Assad's fate. 


Tillerson emphasized the administration's priority in defeating Islamic State forces in Syria and said little about the United States' preference on Assad's future. 

“Our priority is first the defeat of ISIS,” Tillerson said. “Once we can eliminate the battle against ISIS, conclude that, and it is going quite well, then we hope to turn our attention to cease-fire agreements between the regime and opposition forces. 

“In that regard, we are hopeful that we can work with Russia and use their influence to achieve areas of stabilization throughout Syria and create the conditions for a political process through Geneva in which we can engage all of the parties on the way forward, and it is through that political process that we believe the Syrian people will lawfully be able to decide the fate of Bashar al-Assad,” he added. 

The apparent dissonance did not go unnoticed. Speaking later on ABC News, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.) criticized Tillerson for suggesting that the objective of defeating the Islamic State can be achieved as long as Assad remains in power.  “This idea that we’re going to get rid of ISIS and then we’ll hopefully use Assad and others to come up with a solution, it’s not going to work,” Rubio said. “There seems to be a difference between what Ambassador Haley is saying, and what she said last night that Assad really has no future, and what I heard this morning from Secretary Tillerson. 


“You cannot have a stable Syria without jihadist elements on the ground with Bashar al-Assad in power,” he added. “They're two sides of the same coin.” 

In a separate interview on CBS's Face the Nation, Tillerson said it was the goal of the U.S. and its allies to "navigate a political outcome in which the Syrian people in fact will determine Bashar al-Assad's fate and his legitimacy," citing in part "the United States' own founding principles are self-determination." 


Host John Dickerson said critics of that posture have noted that "the Syrian people are in no position to make a determination about the president because he's bombing a lot of them, millions of them have had to flee the country, and he's created a condition where there is no institution that can remove him from power." 


"It's important that we keep our priorities straight, and we believe that the first priority is the defeat of ISIS," Tillerson replied. "Once the ISIS threat has been reduced or eliminated, I think we can turn our attention directly to stabilizing the situation in Syria." 

Pressed to reconcile that seeming contradiction between the positions advanced by Tillerson and Haley, national security adviser H.R. McMaster suggested in his appearance on “Fox News Sunday” that there was little daylight between the two views. 


“What Ambassador Haley pointed out was, it's very difficult to figure out how a political solution could result from the continuation of the Assad regime,” McMaster said. “We're not saying that we are the ones who are going to effect that change. What we're saying is, other countries have to ask themselves some hard questions. Russia should ask themselves … why are we supporting this murderous regime that is committing mass murder of its own population and using the most heinous weapons available. 


“While people are really anxious to find inconsistencies in those statements, they are in fact very consistent in terms of what is the ultimate political objective in Syria,” he added. 

Pressed by host Chris Wallace to explain Tillerson's statements that destroying the Islamic State is the U.S. priority, McMaster responded, “That's exactly what we're saying.” 

“There has to be a degree of simultaneous activity, as well as sequencing the defeat of ISIS first,” McMaster said. “What you have in Syria is a very destructive cycle of violence perpetuated by ISIS, obviously, but also by this regime and their Iranian and Russian sponsors. 


“And the resolution of the conflict will entail both of the elements that you're talking about,” he continued. But the view of Assad's future as articulated by Haley was the one praised by Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.), a frequent critic of the Trump administration. “Ambassador Haley just said on your program, 'You'll never end the war with Assad in power,'" Graham said. “So that means regime change is now the policy of the Trump administration. That's at least what I've heard.” 





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When Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte took office last year, he challenged the country's defense relationship with the United States, arguing that close ties with Washington had undermined Philippine relations with Beijing without providing security against China's occupation and construction on disputed islets. Essentially, the Philippines lost economic opportunities with China yet failed to benefit from security guarantees by the United States. It was the worst of both worlds. Duterte has since pursued a policy far different from that of his predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, who doubled down on the relationship with the United States and took a largely confrontational attitude toward China. This is not to say that Manila has simply accepted the dual economic and security role for China in the region. It continues to assert its own rights, is expanding economic and security ties with Japan, and continues to engage with U.S. military forces in the region — and in the Philippines itself. 


South Korea is another case study in the dualistic policy of tying the economy to China and security to the United States, perhaps more overtly than most other countries in the region. South Korea has free trade agreements with both the United States and China. A quarter of South Korean exports go to China, a number that nears 30 percent when adding in Hong Kong. This compared with 14 percent to the United States. Meanwhile, China accounts for 21 percent of South Korean imports, while the United States accounts for just 10 percent. And China's role in the overall Korean supply chain, particularly with electronics, is masked in these baseline numbers. But when it comes to defense, the balance is entirely one-sided. The United States maintains 28,500 troops on the Korean Peninsula and retains operational control of South Korean forces in the Combined Forces Command, should hostilities with the North break out. 

break :勃発する

South Korea's decision to host the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system triggered a strong outcry from China. Beijing began complaining even before Seoul and Washington entered formal discussions about the deployment, and since a decision was made it has used unofficial measures to strike at the South Korean economy. Tourism flows to South Korea have slowed, Korean cultural and entertainment exports and tours in China have been curtailed, and Korean businesses are facing boycotts, spools of red tape and bureaucratic sluggishness. Washington, in return, has accelerated the pace of THAAD deployment, hoping to complete the placement of the systems before early South Korean elections, which are likely to bring a progressive candidate to power — one who could revisit the THAAD agreement. 

red tape:役所の事務的手続き
revisit: 再検討する

A Broken Consensus 
With U.S. participation in the TPP off the table, and U.S. defense seen as either insufficient to address regional concerns or, going to the other extreme, exacerbating economic challenges with China, there is a growing sense throughout Asia that the United States is simply not able to be counted on as a counterweight to China, at least not for the next several years. China's expanded military capability and activity is only reinforcing these views. The consensus forming is that the status quo balance between Chinese economy and U.S. security has already broken down. China's expansion was not effectively countered, whether by the so-called U.S. pivot (or re-balance) to Asia or by U.S. engagement with ASEAN and regional trade initiatives. For many in the region, it is not a question of what they prefer, but rather an acknowledgement of the shifting regional realities. When a country the size of China begins to assert its own interests, changes to the existing regional structure are inevitable. 

a country the size of China:中国のような規模の国

The discussion now is about options. Simply accepting that China will be a regional hegemon is unlikely for most countries in the region. Even the Philippines, which has seen such a dramatic shift in its public policy, is looking for a balancer to China's regional power and influence, possibly in Japan. And South Korea is re-thinking its overreliance on the Chinese economy. Some countries that were in the expanded TPP are looking to maintain momentum even without the United States, hoping that together they can either shape China's economic behavior or perhaps lure the United States back into at least a modified version of the trade agreement down the road. ASEAN is pressing for the long-delayed Code of Conduct with China to try to curtail China's apparent expansionist tendencies. But few individually or together have the overall heft of the United States. 

shape :具体化する
Code of Conduct:行動規範

In Singapore and New Zealand, two countries that have successfully navigated their dual relations with Washington and Beijing for some time, there is a fear that they may be forced to choose. If a trade war breaks out between the United States and China, it will not be only about trade; it will be about regional relationships, about interpretations of the rights of passage through the South China Sea, about the options for dealing with North Korea — in short, about the whole of Asia-Pacific stability. China is facing deep structural challenges as it undertakes the painful transition from an export-based economy to a consumption-based one, and it will consider any strong U.S. economic action to be a clear attempt to disrupt the transition and contain China. The United States sees each further step by China to assert its military capability through the South China Sea as a clear challenge to a core interest of freedom of navigation and control of the seas. 


Stuck between these two powers lie the Asia-Pacific countries, adapting to the changing balance of power and fearing a dramatic break in the pattern. Their ability to play both sides, to use the bookend powers of the Pacific Ocean as counterweights, may prove untenable if the there is a substantial slide in U.S.-China relations toward the negative. Few in the region are eager to choose sides, all are assessing their limited options, and the pervading hope is that somehow Washington and Beijing will continue their uneasy dance, leaving Asia-Pacific countries space enough to cheer both on. 





swingby_blog at 05:49コメント(0)トラックバック(0) 


アジアの板挟み:中国のバターかアメリカの銃か? ナショナリズムが起こっているとしても、リスクよりもより大きな見返りがあるとしてグローバル化された世界をみている。

Asia's Dilemma: China's Butter, or America's Guns?
Geopolitical Weekly APRIL 4, 2017 | 08:00 GMT 
Trade is the lifeblood of the Asia-Pacific, and even as nationalism rises, the region still sees a globalized world as a greater reward than risk. (RODGER BAKER)
By Rodger Baker


Flying into Singapore's Changi Airport, one is struck by the fleet of ships lined up off shore, the tendrils of a global trade network squeezing through the narrow Malacca Strait. Singapore is the hub, the connector between the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Pacific. Since the late 1970s, with little exception, trade has amounted to some 300 percent of Singapore's total gross domestic product, with exports making up between 150 and 230 percent of GDP. Singapore is the product of global trade, and the thriving multiethnic city-state can trace its trade role back centuries. 


Having arrived in Singapore from Auckland, the contrast was stunning. It's not that New Zealand isn't heavily integrated into global trade networks — some 50 percent of its GDP is based on trade, and since its early days as a British colony it has been heavily dependent on distant trade partners. But whereas Singapore sits at the center of trade flows, New Zealand is at the far fringes, a remote outpost that has come to represent the leading edge of free trade agreements and calls for globally agreed-upon trade rules. 

whereas :であるがゆえに

Given the significance of trade to the two, it is perhaps no wonder that New Zealand and Singapore were both part of the P3 countries (alongside Chile) that initiated Pacific trade talks in 2002, which emerged three years later as the first iteration of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), adding Brunei as the fourth founding signatory. Only a decade earlier, in the 1990s, trans-Pacific trade had exceeded trans-Atlantic trade, marking a shift in global patterns established for several centuries. Trade is the lifeblood of the Asia-Pacific, and even with rising examples of nationalism, the globalized world is still seen here as a greater benefit than risk. Whereas colonialism was exploitative, globalism is seen as the provision of opportunity for growth and national strength. 

P3 countries:Pacific 3  New Zealand Singapore Chile

It is interesting that the theme of the "easternization" of the global system — the assertion that China is set to usurp the leadership role of an inward-turning United States — is not nearly as pronounced in the region as it is in the West. With regard to Singapore and New Zealand, one could argue that British heritage and history may play some role, but discussions with businessmen and policymakers from countries around the region seem less focused on the so-called Asian Century than on ensuring that global multilateral trade pacts remain the norm. Asia may trade primarily within Asia, but that doesn't mean it has any interest in being isolated from the rest of the world. And aside from assertions in some sectors in China (perhaps reminiscent of similar ideas espoused in Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s), there is little expectation that Asia is ready to take the lead, except perhaps in the promotion of open trade. 


Growing Angst in the Asia-Pacific
Perhaps the most common theme I encountered in discussions in New Zealand and Singapore, and with individuals from around the region, was the future of the global trade environment — specifically, the implications of a potential trade war (or even a minor spat) between the United States and China. Like many countries in the Asia-Pacific, both Singapore and New Zealand have adapted to a basic post-Cold War regional status quo, one where economics center on China and regional security centers on the United States. But with the Brexit underway, the TPP gone, the United States flirting with a more nationalist rather than globalist trade policy, and China expanding its military activity throughout the region, there is growing angst that this unofficial balance will no longer be sustainable. 


This is particularly pronounced among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 10 Southeast Asian countries (nearly all post-colonial entities) that have for decades sought to strengthen their hand internationally through cooperation and shared negotiations. Nearly a quarter of ASEAN trade is within the bloc, but better than 19 percent is with China and Hong Kong. Overall, Asia and the West Pacific account for more than 66 percent of ASEAN's total trade. 

Just 10 percent is with the European Union and 9.4 percent with the United States. While economics is regional, security looks abroad. Two ASEAN members, Thailand and the Philippines, are formal treaty alliance partners with the United States, and several others have established or developing defense relations. There is little real complaint from the ASEAN states (or from countries including South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) of the United States' unofficial role as guarantor of freedom of navigation in the seas in the region. But there are growing challenges with China's expanding military activity and evolving assertion of its own role as the rightful regional security hegemon. 


So long as China was largely seen as a beneficial trading partner and a source of investment, but fairly innocuous when it came to involvement in local politics or security, the dualistic approach toward Washington and Beijing was seen as not only acceptable, but preferential. China's economic heft balanced the United States' military heft, and vice versa. A slight sense of competition for regional friends between Beijing and Washington could be exploited to ASEAN's benefit, and even South Korea, Australia and New Zealand — close U.S. partners — saw merit to the system. 


China would increase its offer of preferential investments or trade access, Washington would counter with offers of more trade but also keep China's broader regional ambitions in check. This semi-equilibrium has been breaking down over the past several years, with two apparent case studies being the Philippines and South Korea. 


この著者はNew Zealandの方のようだが、アジアの経済において、中国とアメリカの間でアジア諸国が今後、どのような経済活動をしていったら、いいのか悩んでいる記事だ。中国の経済力とアメリカの軍事力とのバランスが今後崩れてきう。そうした不安定な中で、TPPも含めてどうしたらいいのかという課題だ。




swingby_blog at 21:10コメント(0)トラックバック(0) 



海野 恵一



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海野塾のイベントはFacebookのTeamSwingbyを参照ください。 またスウィングバイは以下のところに引っ越しました。 スウィングバイ株式会社 〒108-0023 東京都港区芝浦4丁目2−22東京ベイビュウ803号 Tel: 080-9558-4352 Fax: 03-3452-6690 E-mail: clyde.unno@swingby.jp Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/clyde.unno 海野塾: https://www.facebook.com TeamSwingby

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