2017年08月

2017年08月19日

北朝鮮はグアムへの脅しに焦点を当ててきた。

Aug 10, 2017 | 21:10 GMT
North Korea Gets Specific With Its Guam Threat

北朝鮮はグアムへの脅しに焦点を当ててきた。

The city of Tamuning is on the island of Guam, a U.S. territory in the Western Pacific.
The city of Tamuning is on the island of Guam, a U.S. territory in the Western Pacific.(ROBERT TENORIO/AFP/Getty Images)

Besides North Korea and the United States, the country to watch for developments in this developing situation is South Korea, which finds the prospect of war unacceptable. The threats made by North Korea are conditional, emphasizing that the United States should avoid any military provocation. It still isn't clear that the Hwasong-12, the missile listed in the announcement, is reliable enough for such a demonstration.

North Korea has released specific details of its plan to strike the U.S. territory of Guam. According to comments attributed to Gen. Kim Rak Gyom, commander of the Strategic Force of the Korean People's Army, the military is drawing up plans for a four-missile salvo of Hwasong-12 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to fly over Japan and land about 17 minutes later 30-40 kilometers (18-25 miles) from the island of Guam. Once prepared, the plan will be presented to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un by mid-August, after which Pyongyang will "keep closely watching the speech and behavior of the U.S." 

salvo:一斉発射

The specificity of the North Korean threat has raised concerns, and it follows a statement by the Strategic Force a day earlier by that they were "carefully examining the operational plan for making an enveloping fire at the areas around Guam" as a response to the frequent flights of U.S. strategic bombers from Andersen Air Force Base on Guam to the Korean Peninsula. The statement said North Korea would consider a launch of missiles as "a serious warning signal to the U.S." Both statements — and the purported preparation of the new operational plan — come shortly ahead of the annual large-scale Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercises between South Korea and the United States, which begin at the end of August. 

specificity:特性・特異性
enveloping fire:包囲射撃
purported:という趣旨の
exercises:軍事演習

A few things are important to note about the series of North Korean comments. First is that many countries draw up operational plans — it is a standard and necessary practice for militaries, and these are frequently reviewed and updated during times of heightened tensions. Second is that the current comments are clearly conditional threats — something emphasized by Pyongyang's assertion that the United States "should immediately stop its reckless military provocation against (North Korea) so that the latter would not be forced to make an unavoidable military choice." 

Finally, while Pyongyang is very specific in its numbers ("They will fly 3 356.7 km for 1,065 seconds and hit the waters 30 to 40 km away from Guam"), the Hwasong-12 has had only a single successful launch after a series of back-to-back tests earlier this year. It is not clear that this missile is reliable enough for such a demonstration, even if the North felt it was necessary. 

back-to-back test:相次ぐ

There are several additional questions to assess and potential signals to watch as we monitor the escalating rhetorical and military tensions between North Korea and the United States. 

1. Why make the threat? North Korea's revelation of its operational plan for Guam could simply be a rhetorical response to U.S. talk about preventive action, fire and fury, or "separating" Kim Jong Un from the North's nuclear weapons. However, we cannot simply assume the North is only about bluster. Pyongyang may be signaling to the United States that it does have realistic options and capabilities that would increase the likelihood and cost of conflict. Such warnings of expanding missile launches may also enhance the drive by Seoul, Beijing and Moscow to stem any U.S. move toward war and instead push for dialogue with the North. 

revelation:驚くべき新事実
bluster:どなりちらすこと
drive:衝動・決意
stem:取り除く

Beijing has suggested several times a dual freeze plan to ease tensions: The United States would temporarily halt major military exercises in South Korea and in return the North would stop its missile tests. While the United States does not appear amenable to such a temporary suspension, South Korea may be tempted to explore such an option, if it can reduce the likelihood of conflict on the peninsula. 

amenable:進んで受け入れて

2. What are the risks to such a launch for Pyongyang? 
Were Pyongyang to launch a salvo of four missiles toward Guam (with the intent of landing near, not hitting, the island), there are several possible risks. Given the track record of the Hwasong-12, one or more of the missiles could fail, demonstrating the weakness of the North's claimed deterrent. A failed missile could fall on Japan during overflight, though Pyongyang may have intentionally listed the single-stage Hwasong-12 as opposed to a dual-stage missile to reduce the likelihood of debris falling on Japan during a successful launch. 

deterrent:抑止力

The U.S. and/or Japan could decide to engage the missiles with their missile defense system and, if fully successful, demonstrate the weakness of the north's deterrent. The North's missiles could overfly their targeted water and actually strike Guam, triggering a military response from the United States. While a completely successful launch could alter the perception of Pyongyang's capability and seriousness, any of the failure scenarios not only could set back Pyongyang's deterrence but also trigger the conflict that Pyongyang is seeking to avoid. 

conflict:葛藤・矛盾・板挟み

3. What would be the risks of the United States and/or Japan attempting to intercept a North Korea launch? 
The United States and Japan would first consider which flight path would constitute a threat requiring a missile defense response. This may be a 12-nautical-mile ring around Guam, or certain flight paths over heavily populated parts of Japan. Once a "must intercept" locus is identified, it would be a matter of estimating the likely flight paths from North Korea, and ensuring sea- and land-based assets are positioned and prepared. Should the United States choose not to intercept the missiles (assuming they are determined NOT likely to hit Guam), it could then make an even stronger case to China and the international community that Pyongyang is an active threat and needs to be reined in immediately. 

locus:軌跡

Pyongyang would clearly be seen as the aggressor and escalator. Shooting down the missiles if they are not headed directly for Guam poses a risk to the United States. While U.S. missile defense systems have improved in recent years, there is still concern that, in a live fire scenario, they will not be 100 percent effective. If the defense system fails to take out all targets, it weakens the perception of U.S. strength and deterrence. 

aggressor :攻撃者

If they succeed when the missiles are not aimed directly for Guam or heading off course toward U.S. or Japanese territory, it could trigger a further escalation by the North, moving from a tense situation to the escalation toward war. While the most likely course is to only attempt an intercept if the missiles are headed toward specific, designated areas, there is the longer-term political risk of being seen as weak and as unwilling to defend regional allies. 

4. How do the neighboring countries view the escalating tensions, and what steps may they take? 
Although North Korea's threat is clearly aimed at the United States, the neighboring countries are also acutely aware of the risks of rising military tensions. Japan does not want to see Pyongyang break its self-imposed moratorium of flying missiles over Japanese islands. The potential for an accident, particularly given the uneven track record of North Korean missiles, is fairly high. China has long seen a destabilized North Korea, or a North Korea moving toward unification with the South, as a higher risk than a North pursuing nuclear weapons and missile technology. 

acutely:ひどく
self-imposed:自ら課した
moratorium:一時停止
uneven:一様でない

But if the tit-for-tat threats and hyperbolic statements move from rhetoric to reality, that standing calculus shifts rapidly. Worse than the status quo or even a nuclear armed North Korea is military action on the Korean Peninsula. China's attention is on trying to ease back the U.S. threats and actions, pushing its double freeze plan, and calling on Washington to refrain from escalation. The double freeze not only would serve to at least delay an immediate crisis, but it could also fit with China's longer-term goal of easing back the U.S. military presence in Asia, where China is asserting its right to be the central power. But China's options with Washington and Pyongyang are limited, and it may be that Beijing's primary action outside calls for talks is to beef up its defense forces along the North Korean border and prepare for the worst. 

tit-for-tat:しっぺ返し
hyperbolic:大げさな
calculus :微積分
beef:強化する

Russia has played a bit of a spoiler role of late in North Korea by selling fuel, hiring North Korean labor and buying up North Korean fishing rights to ease the impact of sanctions. And Moscow is in talks with the United States over numerous global and regional issues. But it is unclear whether Moscow has much positive leverage to exert on Pyongyang. Perhaps the most important country to watch, aside from the United States and North Korea, is South Korea. Seoul has made it clear it cannot tolerate another war on the Korean Peninsula. But neither is Seoul ready or capable of simply cutting off its defense ties with the United States or undermining its strategic relationship with Washington. 

spoiler:妨害候補者
exert:行使する

South Korea is trying to balance its national security through its military alliance and through engagement with the North. Pyongyang is playing hard to get, putting more pressure on the South to take actions to soften its active defense exercises and displays with the United States in order to open dialogue. For South Korea, there are few good options, and the debate in Seoul is intense over just how to avoid a war without undermining South Korea's security. 

5. What are the options to ease tensions? 
At this point, the heightened situation is more rhetorical than physical. Revelations of U.S. assessments of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities are acknowledgements of past realities, not immediate breakthroughs by North Korea that have suddenly changed the status quo. There is always room for both sides to ease their rhetoric. But the core issue is that the U.S. intent and the North Korean intent still appear incompatible. Pyongyang has no intention of giving up its nuclear and missile program, and the United States still asserts that Pyongyang cannot be allowed to achieve its final demonstrable long-range nuclear-tipped missile. 

intent:意図
incompatible:相容れない

There is no middle ground. Barring a change in political position by one or the other side, there is little space for compromise. It may be that the United States ultimately determines that management of a nuclear North Korea is the more realistic and less costly option than military action, but this is a political decision that has yet to be made. 

6. What should we watch for to understand the direction of the crisis? 
Although both North Korea and the United States are always prepared for war, the United States does not currently appear fully prepared for a preventive strike against the North. During the upcoming Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercises, we need to watch what additional hardware and forces simple remain in Korea or in the theater after the exercise is over. While the United States has said it is not building up forces in Korea, there are ways to slowly and quietly add assets. One of the final triggers would be a drawdown of nonessential personnel in Korea, a fairly sure sign that conflict was on the horizon. 

preventive:予防するための
drawdown:減少

North Korea's testing cycle has been intense in recent months, but Pyongyang still has a few critical tests to conduct to finalize its nuclear deterrent. The North may no longer be able to rely on tests launched at steep angles to avoid overflying neighboring territory, and it may need to test its guidance system and re-entry capability over true distances. While Pyongyang has developed a flight path for its space launch vehicles that pursues a more southward trajectory, it has yet to test its strategic missiles along this path. We need to monitor Pyongyang's next series of tests to see how much closer the North is to finalizing its program, from ruggedization of the warhead to the program's targeting capabilities. 

ruggedization:高耐久化

China is preparing for the upcoming party congress, an important moment for Xi Jinping, and is already engaged in a low-level military standoff with India. Beijing will be working studiously to ease frictions at least until November. China has been relatively cooperative in the United Nations, but it has had limited intent or success in applying sanctions and pressure on North Korea. Beijing has also had very limited communications with Pyongyang, and we should watch closely for any high-level delegation between the two capitals, as well as Chinese dialogue with South Korea to urge Seoul to accede to the double-freeze proposal. 

studiously:熱心に・慎重に
accede:渋々同意する

South Korea will be particularly important to watch because it is caught between the risk of war and the risk of angering its strategic ally — that choice could not only have defensive consequences but could also play into the renegotiations of their free trade agreement. Seoul has walked a careful path under Moon Jae In, calling for dialogue with the North and easing restrictions on exchanges while also allowing an expansion of U.S. missile defense systems in South Korea and emphasizing the security relationship. The political direction of Seoul will be critical for any short-term easing of the current crisis. While it does not appear that Seoul will ease off the upcoming military exercises with the United States, any adjustment will be critical to watch for. 

今日も北朝鮮の話で、いろいろな関係者との動きによって今後どう変わるかということを説明している。とりあえずは北朝鮮はミサイルをグアムに発射するのを思いとどまった。韓国の大統領のMoon Jae Inはなんとしてもアメリカとの戦争を避けようとしている。北との対話が何も変化がないが、それでもその努力は必要だろう。中国は11月の全人代の結果までは動けない。北朝鮮が挑発してこなければ、このままのアメリカとの対峙の状態が続くだろう。中国は裏でどう動いているのか見えないが、必死に北朝鮮に行動を取らないように圧力をかけているに違いない。

日曜日。今日は下から二番目の愚息と母親の見舞いに行く。ではまた明日。

swingby_blog at 21:44コメント(0) 

2017年08月18日

北朝鮮はどのように応酬するのか?

Jan 5, 2017 | 09:16 GMT
Sratfor
How North Korea Would Retaliate

北朝鮮はどのように応酬するのか?

Handling a Nuclear North Korea: How North Korea Would Retaliate


This is the fourth installment of a five-part series that originally ran in May 2016 examining the measures that could be taken to inhibit North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The purpose of this series is not to consider political rhetoric or noninvasive means of coercion, such as sanctions. Rather, we are exploring the military options, however remote, that are open to the United States and its allies, and the expected response from Pyongyang. Part five can be found here.

inhibit:抑制する
noninvasive:非襲撃性の

North Korea is powerless to prevent a U.S. strike on its nuclear program, but retaliation is well within its means. The significant military capability that North Korea has built up against South Korea is not advanced by Western standards, but there are practical ways Pyongyang could respond to aggression. 

aggression:攻撃

The North Korean military's most powerful tool is artillery. It cannot level Seoul as some reports have claimed, but it could do significant damage. Pyongyang risks deteriorating its forces by exposing them to return fire, however, which significantly restricts their use. Less conventional methods of retaliation, such as sabotage or cyber warfare, are less risky but also limit the shock that North Korea would desire. 

artillery:砲撃
sabotage:破壊工作

After a strike, North Korea's most immediate and expected method of retaliation would center around conventional artillery. Many of the North's indirect fire systems are already located on or near the border with South Korea. By virtue of proximity and simplicity, these systems have a lower preparatory and response times than air assets, larger ballistic missiles or naval assets. Nevertheless, there are several critical limitations to their effectiveness. 

indirect fire:間接照明射撃
By virtue of :のお陰で
proximity:近接

Tube and Rocket Artillery
The biggest anticipated cost of a North Korean artillery barrage in response to an attack would be the at least partial destruction of Seoul. But the volume of fire that the North can direct against the South Korean capital is limited by some important factors. Of the vast artillery force deployed by the North along the border, only a small portion — Koksan 170-mm self-propelled guns, as well as 240-mm and 300-mm multiple launch rocket systems — are capable of actually reaching Seoul. Broadly speaking, the bulk of Pyongyang's artillery can reach only into the northern border area of South Korea or the northern outskirts of Seoul. 

ソウルの南部には届かない

All forms of North Korean artillery have problems with volume and effectiveness of fire, but those issues are often more pronounced for the longer-range systems. Problems include the high malfunction rate of indigenous ammunition, poorly trained artillery crews, and a reluctance to expend critical artillery assets by exposing their positions. 

pronounced:宣言する
malfunction:故障
indigenous:固有の
ammunition:弾薬
reluctance:気が進まない事
expend:費やす
exposing their positions:彼らの立場を無防備にする

Based on the few artillery skirmishes that have occurred, roughly 25 percent of North Korean shells and rockets fail to detonate on target. Even allowing for improvements and assuming a massive counterstrike artillery volley would be more successful, a failure rate as high as 15 percent would take a significant bite out of the actual explosive power on target. The rate of fire and accuracy of North Korean artillery systems is also expected to be subpar. This belief is founded on the observably poor performance of North Korean artillery crews during past skirmishes and exercises. Though inaccuracy is less noticeable in a tactical sense — especially as part of a "countervalue attack," where civilian areas are targeted — at the higher level an artillery retaliation rapidly becomes a numbers game.

detonate:爆発させる
volley:一斉射撃
subpar:標準以下
countervalue:一般市民への攻撃
numbers game:数あて賭博

Ineffective crews also rapidly curtail the potential for severe damage. Rate of fire is crucial to the survivability of artillery systems — the name of the game is to get the most rounds on target in the shortest period of time, lest your position be identified and destroyed before the fire mission is complete. Poor training translates to a greatly reduced volume of fire and a painfully limited duration of effectiveness.

lest:しないように
name of the game:重要なこと
get the most rounds on target:ほとんどの弾が当たること
painfully:ひどく

The Barrage Principle
Although North Korea could technically open fire on South Korea with all of its artillery systems at once, this would open Pyongyang up to significant counter-battery fire and airstrikes that could rapidly reduce the artillery force it has so painstakingly built up. Instead, as other studies have shown, only a portion of North Korean artillery would be used at a time. This is particularly true for the advanced systems that are most important to Pyongyang: long-range artillery that is able to strike at Seoul. The heavier, more advanced systems are not only difficult to replace, but they are also priority targets for counter-battery fire and airstrikes. Even when firing, artillery systems would be able to do so only temporarily before relocating or otherwise trying to hide the system's firing location to avoid destruction. 

painstakingly:細心注意を払って
counter-battery反撃の集中砲火

Aside from constraints on range and volume of fire, North Korea has to decide what targets to hit in South Korea. There are two realistic options: a counterforce attack or a countervalue attack. In a counterforce attack, North Korea would target South Korean and possibly even U.S. military facilities near the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and north of Seoul. A countervalue attack, on the other hand, is intended to shock South Korea by causing significant civilian casualties and damage to economically critical infrastructure. If North Korea opted for a countervalue attack, the lack of focus on South Korean and U.S. military targets would reduce Pyongyang's ability to limit any response. (Typically, the easiest way to counteract enemy artillery is to destroy it in place.) 

Engaging civilian targets and infrastructure would not only limit the effectiveness and sustainability of the North Korean artillery volley itself, but it would also open up Pyongyang to more significant counteraction targeting. A mix of both counterforce and countervalue responses may mitigate this risk but would in turn lower the overall effectiveness of the mission compared to full commitment. 

counteraction :阻止・相殺

Regardless of these considerations and constraints on the North Korean side, if Pyongyang embraces the worst-case scenario for Seoul — the indiscriminate targeting of the capital and its suburbs — the damage would still be significant. Some research claims that overall damage and casualties in Seoul would be minimal, but those studies have relied on very conservative data, especially regarding the effective range of North Korean artillery systems. 

indiscriminate:無差別の

Many findings do not take into account newly deployed, modernized 122-mm multiple launch rocket systems with extended range, or the much more capable 300-mm multiple rocket launchers. If projectile flight distances reach proven ranges (or commonly accepted ones) and involve these new systems, then the northern portion of Seoul could be saturated with fire. 

projectile :自動推進体
saturated:集中攻撃を加える

Even areas south of the Han River could be within range of 170-mm self-propelled guns, 240-mm multiple rocket launchers or 300-mm multiple rocket launchers, depending on their position on the North Korean side of the DMZ. If every one of Pyongyang's 300-mm multiple rocket launcher systems were directed against Seoul, their range would be sufficient to rain fire across the city and beyond. A single volley could deliver more than 350 metric tons of explosives across the South Korean capital, roughly the same amount of ordnance dropped by 11 B-52 bombers. 

ordnance:大砲

North Korea's Artillery Concentration
This is an extreme scenario, however, and one in which North Korea chooses to expose all of its most advanced rocket artillery systems simultaneously, suffers no failures, and chooses to direct all of them against Seoul itself. Yet in northern parts of Seoul, well within range of Koksan 170-mm self-propelled guns and 240-mm multiple rocket launchers, a more intense volume of fire could be achieved even if North Korea is prudent enough not to expose all of its capable artillery pieces. Infrastructure damage in Seoul, particularly its northwestern areas, would be difficult to prevent in the event of an immediate saturation of artillery fire. 

Concentration:重点研究

That said, underground shelters and concerted evacuation efforts, which would be initiated immediately in the event of an attack, could greatly reduce civilian casualties. It is also unlikely that North Korean artillery fire would be sustained at great volume. Even an initial mass volley imposes great risk to the artillery systems themselves, making them vulnerable to counter-battery fire. This means casualty rates would drop significantly after the initial barrage, limiting potential civilian casualties to thousands of dead rather than tens of thousands, as has been speculated in some instances. 

concerted:あらゆる
evacuation:避難

どんな攻撃でも、死傷者は数万人ではなく数千人だろう。

Ballistic Missiles
In addition to its conventional artillery capabilities, North Korea also has a large stockpile of ballistic missiles with much greater ranges. These missiles vary from older Scud variants to North Korean versions of the Russian-designed system. There are also a number of self-developed longer-range missiles in the North Korean arsenal. Even the lowest-range Scud ballistic missiles would be capable of striking anywhere in South Korea. The main factors constraining the use of these systems, therefore, are volume of fire, equipment failures and depletion of stockpiles. 

variants:変形
constraining:制約する
depletion:減少

Even subtracting the most dated portions of the North Korean stockpile — which may not be in operational condition — it still has more than 1,000 ballistic missiles that could strike across South Korea. These range from Scud-based Hwasong missiles to Nodong and Taepodong projectiles. The Hwasong and Nodong missiles are the most important for achieving volume of fire, especially considering North Korea's limited ability to launch Taepodong missiles. The Taepodong is restrained by Pyongyang's dependence on large surface infrastructure, found in only two locations in North Korea. The long preparation times before launch make the larger missiles extremely vulnerable to counterstrikes, and the Taepodong does not deliver significant advantages over the Nodong missiles. 

dated:時代遅れの

When assessing the damage that could be done by North Korean ballistic missile strikes, much depends on how they would be used. In conjunction with conventional artillery strikes, ballistic missiles could provide significant extra firepower directed at Seoul and surrounding areas. North Korea could also use these weapons to expand the indirect fire threat to the entirety of South Korea. This means that there would be less concentration of firepower as a whole but that a diverse spread of locations throughout the country would be subject to infrastructure damage or casualties. 

Estimated Range of Selected North Korean Missiles
Moreover, ballistic missiles could strike U.S. military positions beyond the Korean Peninsula, specifically in Japan. Whatever the targets, Pyongyang's existing ballistic missile stockpile could easily deliver approximately 1 kiloton (1,000 metric tons) of high explosives, as well as other nonconventional munitions — chemical, biological or even nuclear. Because of the inaccuracy of different North Korean missile systems, these strikes would most appropriately be used against urban centers or other wide-area targets. If employed against specific military facilities at longer ranges, a significant amount of misses would occur. 

munitions :武器弾薬

As with conventional artillery, North Korea will also be forced to show restraint in the use of these systems. Survivability may be less of a challenge because of the predominance of mobile launcher systems, but unlike conventional artillery munitions, ballistic stockpiles are limited — as is the ability to replenish them, which would draw on significant resources. Every missile spent by North Korea in an immediate retaliation scenario will diminish the leverage it maintains immediately after the retaliation. Furthermore, the high potential for failed launches, as demonstrated by frequent unsuccessful missile tests across a variety of platforms, could further damage Pyongyang's ability to influence through its ballistic missile stockpile. 

Survivability:生き残ること

The most significant threat from North Korea's ballistic missile stockpile is the potential for a nuclear strike. Some estimates indicate North Korea may have between two and five nuclear warheads at its disposal already, at least some of which could be made to fit on a Nodong missile. Even a single nuclear strike against a South Korean population center would result in catastrophic shock and incur an immense cost. Though a nuclear strike would not automatically guarantee Seoul's capitulation, South Korea and the United States factor the possibility of such a strike heavily into their considerations of a strike on the North's nuclear program. 

at its disposal :自由になる
capitulation:降伏

In the final installment of this series, we will explore other, unconventional retaliatory options open to North Korea and conclude with an assessment of the likelihood and severity of military action against Pyongyang. 

severity:深刻であること

この記事を書いたのは軍事に詳しい韓国人かもしれない。北朝鮮のが韓国に攻撃してきたときの彼ら北朝鮮の軍事力を詳細に語っている。通常兵器の場合にはソウルの北部しか被害が及ばないし、シェルターがるので、死傷者は数千人しか発生しないと言っているが、通常兵器でないものとして、化学、細菌、核があり、特に核攻撃がおこなわれたら、そうした報復を考える必要がある。といったようなやばいことを言っている。通常兵器の場合には目標に当たらない比率も低くないし、兵士も熟達しているわけではない。また古い兵器もあるので、使えないものもあるだろう。また攻撃する際には目標にヒットする確率が高くないと逆に攻撃されてしまう。攻撃目標が軍なのか一般市民なのかもその対応が異なってくる。

土曜日。今日は海野塾がある。今日は苑田の日本の精神とサントリーだ。ではまた明日。

swingby_blog at 21:48コメント(0) 

2017年08月17日

我々の壊れた経済、単純な図表が示している アメリカとロシアの歴史的な遺産 友人のErick San Juanから

Our Broken Economy, in One Simple Chart
By DAVID LEONHARDT
AUG. 7, 2017
The New York Times

我々の壊れた経済、単純な図表が示している

Note: Inflation-adjusted annual average growth using income after taxes, transfers and non-cash benefits. Many Americans can’t remember anything other than an economy with skyrocketing inequality, in which living standards for most Americans are stagnating and the rich are pulling away. It feels inevitable. 

stagnating:停滞する
pulling away:引き離す

But it’s not.

A well-known team of inequality researchers — Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman — has been getting some attention recently for a chart it produced. It shows the change in income between 1980 and 2014 for every point on the distribution, and it neatly summarizes the recent soaring of inequality.

The line on the chart (which we have recreated as the red line above) resembles a classic hockey-stick graph. It’s mostly flat and close to zero, before spiking upward at the end. That spike shows that the very affluent, and only the very affluent, have received significant raises in recent decades. 

図はうまく貼り付けられなかった。

This line captures the rise in inequality better than any other chart or simple summary that I’ve seen. So I went to the economists with a request: Could they produce versions of their chart for years before 1980, to capture the income trends following World War II. You are looking at the result here. 

The message is straightforward. Only a few decades ago, the middle class and the poor weren’t just receiving healthy raises. Their take-home pay was rising even more rapidly, in percentage terms, than the pay of the rich. 

The post-inflation, after-tax raises that were typical for the middle class during the pre-1980 period — about 2 percent a year — translate into rapid gains in living standards. At that rate, a household’s income almost doubles every 34 years. (The economists used 34-year windows to stay consistent with their original chart, which covered 1980 through 2014.) 

In recent decades, by contrast, only very affluent families — those in roughly the top 1/40th of the income distribution — have received such large raises. Yes, the upper-middle class has done better than the middle class or the poor, but the huge gaps are between the super-rich and everyone else. 

The basic problem is that most families used to receive something approaching their fair share of economic growth, and they don’t anymore. 

It’s true that the country can’t magically return to the 1950s and 1960s (nor would we want to, all things considered). Economic growth was faster in those decades than we can reasonably expect today. Yet there is nothing natural about the distribution of today’s growth — the fact that our economic bounty flows overwhelmingly to a small share of the population. 

bounty:気前の良さ

Different policies could produce a different outcome. My list would start with a tax code that does less to favor the affluent, a better-functioning education system, more bargaining power for workers and less tolerance for corporate consolidation. 

consolidation:合併

Remarkably, President Trump and the Republican leaders in Congress are trying to go in the other direction. They spent months trying to take away health insurance from millions of middle-class and poor families. Their initial tax-reform plans would reduce taxes for the rich much more than for everyone else. And they want to cut spending on schools, even though education is the single best way to improve middle-class living standards over the long term. 

take away:奪う

Most Americans would look at these charts and conclude that inequality is out of control. The president, on the other hand, seems to think that inequality isn’t big enough. 

所得格差がどんどん拡大してきた。中間層と貧困層が更に貧しくなっていく。一方で、わずかの金持ちがさらに豊かになっていく。こうした格差に対して、更にトランプは拍車をかけている。こうした現象を阻止するためにトランプが選ばれたはずなのだが、どうもそうなっていないようだ。


US-Russia Historical Legacy by Erick San Juan August 8th 2017

アメリカとロシアの歴史的な遺産 友人のErick San Juanから

During a time of crisis in U.S.-Russia relations, it is not in vogue to talk about their shared history, a time when ideological and political differences didn’t prevent the governments and people of both countries from helping each other and contributing to bringing stability to the world order. 

vogue:流行の

The events of World War II should be another reminder that Russia and the U.S. have a common historical legacy and were close allies when they joined the anti-Hitler coalition. Under the 1941-1945 Lend-Lease Act, the U.S. provided the Soviet Union with more than $11.3 billion in financial aid. In addition, Washington sent a significant amount of food and provisions, in addition to 375,000 American trucks (one-third of all Soviet trucks), 15,000 planes, and 2,000 locomotives. The U.S. delivered the aid partly by its Arctic convoy through Russia’s northern cities of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk. 

provisions:経済的援助
Arctic:北極の
convoy :輸送車隊

Even though the Western front in Europe was opened only in June 1944, it was primarily the Soviet Union that had to withstand Nazi Germany and face a great number of casualties. However, it is historically wrong to claim that the U.S. didn’t contribute to the fight against Nazi Germany and just focused their efforts in the Pacific battleground. After all, the Lend-Lease program contributed to the Soviet fight against Germany, both at the front and behind the lines. 

withstand:持ちこたえる

Although Russians and Americans may assess the key events of World War II differently, the victory of 1945 was and remains shared. In fact, it is a matter of the common memory: the second front, the Lend-Lease program and even the famous American canned meat, which many Soviet soldiers saw as the best food in the world. The symbol of the Soviet-American alliance as part of the anti-Hitler coalition became and remains the April 25 historic link-up between Soviet and American soldiers at the Elbe River in 1945. 

canned:缶詰の

Meanwhile, World War II is not the only example when Russia and the U.S. cooperated closely. During World War I, they were allies as well and fought against Germany as part of the Entente, which also comprised the United Kingdom and France. (Through the lens of history: When Russia and the US were allies by Victoria I. Zhuravleva, May 9, 2016) 

comprised:構成する

And there were other wars and conflicts in history that the US helped Russia and vice versa in order to bring peace and harmony. But today, there are forces who wanted war between the two nuclear superpowers. 

“The 'war party' in the U.S. is escalating to a fever pitch for war, not only with Russia but now also with China. While the media and the Congress continue making up new excuses to attack Trump, to subvert his effort to build constructive relations with Putin and Xi Jinping, the 'reptilians' and their assets in the U.S. have dropped any pretense of sanity, demanding preparation for a nuclear world war. 

subvert:覆す・損なう
reptilians:下劣なやつ
drop:止める
pretense:口実・見せかけ
sanity:平静さ

Secretary Tillerson today drew out the battle lines in a press briefing at the State Department. Asked about the new sanctions on Russia passed overwhelmingly by the Congress, Tillerson was direct: “I think the American people want the two most powerful nuclear powers in the world to have a better relationship.... Neither the President nor I is very happy about how Congress went about the sanctions bill, but we can’t let it take us off-track in trying to restore the relationship.” 

off-track:コンディションの悪い競争路

Some people in the Trump Administration did not get the message—or are out to wreck it. Vice President Mike Pence, speaking at a press conference July 31 in Estonia with the three Presidents of the Baltic states, spoke with the coldest of Cold War rhetoric: “A strong and united NATO is more necessary today than at any point since the collapse of communism a quarter-century ago, and no threat looms larger in the Baltic states than the specter of aggression from your unpredictable neighbor to the east.” Today in Georgia, Pence claimed that Russia was occupying one-fifth of Georgian territory (referring to Abkhazia and South Ossetia), then said: “We stand here today in the gap—on a front line of freedom, a front line compromised by Russian aggression nearly a decade ago.” 

wreck:台無しにする
specter:不安材料
aggression:攻撃・侵略

The same end-game confrontation is being launched by the Congress against China, going for the kill on Trump’s effort to bring the U.S. and China together in the New Silk Road process. And some strategic think tank are seeing the real agenda of Xi Jinping to allegedly go to war soon. 

end-game:最終局面

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), speaking on NBC this morning, said that “There is a military option to destroy North Korea’s [nuclear] program, and North Korea itself. If there is going to be a war to stop [Kim Jong-un], it will be over there. If thousands are going to die, they are going to die there, they’re not going to die here.” He claimed President Trump agreed, referencing Trump saying that China could stop North Korea’s nuclear program but wasn’t doing enough. 

Not to be outdone is the 'reptilian' imperial “divide and conquer” madness, Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY) sent a letter to the President calling for the suspension of “all mergers and acquisitions in the U.S by Chinese entities.” Keep in mind that Trump wisely invited China to bring its Belt and Road infrastructure development program to the U.S., to help restore the devastated infrastructure and industrial capacity of the nation. Schumer ranted: “It is my assessment that China will not deter North Korea unless the United States exacts greater economic pressure on China. The U.S. must send a clear message to China’s government.” 

outdone:出し抜く
ranted:わめきちらす

The message is clear indeed—the Congressional leaders from both parties will not allow the rebuilding of the U.S. economy, and would rather launch World War III than to see Trump’s plan succeed.” (EIR Daily Alerts August 2 and 3, 2017) 

With efforts of some countries to maintain peace in the world to achieve development goals in the process there are also war mongers who want war in order to destroy humanity. Now we really have to repeat the good part of history when US and Russia are partners and allies in keeping the world safe against evil-minded people. 

“It should remind people about the feeling of happy unity, which Soviet and American soldiers experienced in 1945. This unity should remain forever in U.S.-Russia relations despite the political environment in the Kremlin or the White House, no matter how different leaders try to reassess their common history. It is very crucial to withstand any attempts to distort history and pass over in silence the shining examples of a common past.” (Victoria I. Zhuravleva) 

Methinks Zhuravleva is politically and strategically correct. You can read and hear saber-rattling but the common denominator is their important interest of controlling the outer space. 

ロシアとアメリカの過去の協力関係を大きな歴史的な観点から見直すべきだろう。アメリカとロシアが協力すれば中国の問題も北朝鮮の問題も解決できるはずだ。確かにその通りなのだが、ロシアのウクライナへの侵略、アサドへの支援はアメリカは納得出来ないだろう。ただ、外交政策は友好関係が一方であり、敵対関係が他方であるということは常識なので、そうした対応も必要だろう。日本のように、親しいか敵対かと言った味方をする必要はないだろう。

金曜日。今日はEarly Birdsがあり、朝の勉強会だ。ではまた明日。

swingby_blog at 22:29コメント(0) 

2017年08月16日

トランプは北朝鮮からの脅しにたいして、より激しい言葉の応酬をした。

Trump escalates rhetoric on threat from North Korea
August 10th 2017 Washington Post

トランプは北朝鮮からの脅しにたいして、より激しい言葉の応酬をした。

BEDMINSTER, N.J. — President Trump warned North Korea on Thursday that “things will happen to them like they never thought possible” should the isolated country attack the United States or its allies. 

Trump told reporters here that his Tuesday statement warning of “fire and fury” may not have been “tough enough,” but even as he continued his brinksmanship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, the president sought to reassure anxious people around the world that he has the situation under control. 

“Frankly, the people who were questioning that statement, was it too tough? Maybe it wasn’t tough enough,” Trump said. “They’ve been doing this to our country for a long time, for many years, and it’s about time that somebody stuck up for the people of this country and for the people of other countries. So, if anything, maybe that statement wasn’t tough enough.” 

stuck:鋭利なものを刺す

Asked what would have been tougher than “fire and fury,” Trump replied only, “You’ll see. You’ll see.” In Twitter comments Wednesday that were clearly directed at North Korea, he warned that the U.S. nuclear arsenal was “now far stronger and more powerful than ever before.” 

In his newest remarks, Trump would not say whether he is considering a preemptive strike on North Korea. He said he remained open to negotiating with Pyongyang, but that talks over the years had done little to halt the country’s nuclear program. 

“What they’ve been doing, what they’ve been getting away with, is a tragedy and it can’t be allowed,” Trump said. The nuclear crisis has left leaders and people around the world jittery, but Trump said it was North Korea that should be nervous. 

getting away with:悪事をしても罰を受けない

“The people of this country should be very comfortable, and I will tell you this: If North Korea does anything in terms of even thinking about attack of anybody that we love or we represent or our allies or us, they can be very, very nervous,” he said. “Things will happen to them like they never thought possible.” 

Trump’s Thursday comments came during a seven-minute news conference on the steps of the grand clubhouse of his private golf club here in Bedminster, N.J., where he is spending most of his 17-day working vacation. He was flanked by Vice President Pence, who nodded approvingly, but delivered no statement of his own. 

flanked:のそばに立つ

Trump and Pence were scheduled to attend a Thursday afternoon security briefing along with White House chief of staff John F. Kelly and national security adviser H.R. McMaster. The session comes after two days of mixed messages emanating from the Trump administration. 

emanating:から発する

On Tuesday, Trump delivered an unusually bellicose threat to North Korea, warning that further provocations from Pyongyang “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” His language was improvised, and had not been reviewed by his national security advisers or political aides. 

improvised:即興で作る

The North Koreans effectively laughed off Trump’s “fire and fury” threat, calling his statement “a load of nonsense.” And they also threatened to fire missiles over the waters off Guam, a strategically-located Pacific island and home to U.S. military bases. 

effectively:事実上
load:たくさんの 

Asked Thursday morning whether Trump’s thinking on the North Korean nuclear crisis had evolved in the wake of the threat to Guam, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the White House press secretary, said it had not. “Certainly nothing has changed in the president’s thinking,” Sanders told reporters. “He’s made clear how he feels on that front.” 

on that front:それについては

Following Trump’s original comments, senior administration officials sought to calm anxious world leaders as well as Americans. But statements from Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis and senior White House officials, including adviser Sebastian Gorka, varied in widely in tone and to some extent in substance. They ranged from sober and reassuring (Tillerson) to forceful yet measured (Mattis) to bellicose in the style of the president (Gorka). 

sober:まじめな・ありのままの
reassuring:安心させる

In separate remarks made late Wednesday but not released by the Pentagon until Thursday, Mattis emphasized that current U.S. policy is focused on diplomacy. “What we’re doing is a diplomatically-led effort that is succeeding in drawing the international community together,” including last weekend’s unanimous United Nations Security Council approval of new economic sanctions on North Korea. 

“Of course there’s a military option,” Mattis told a pool of reporters traveling with him to Seattle, where he planned to visit technology companies. But “we want to use diplomacy. That’s where we’ve been, that’s where we are right now and that’s where we hope to remain.” 

Asked whether Trump’s “fire and fury” comments had caught him by surprise, Mattis said that “The rhetoric is up to the President,” he said. “This is my rhetoric.” 

Gorka, asked Thursday by BBC News about the apparent divergence between Trump and his senior Cabinet advisers, said “You should listen to the president.” It was “simply nonsensical” that Tillerson, who had emphasized building diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea, “is going to discuss military matters,” Gorka said. 

nonsensical:ナンセンスな

“North Korea has said they wish to annihilate the United States and use nuclear weapons,” he said. “Sooner or later, somebody should take them seriously. Clinton and Obama did not do so...that stopped on Jan. 20,” when Trump was inaugurated. 

annihilate:全滅させる

“We are not giving in to nuclear blackmail any longer,” he said. Asked about critics such as Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who called Trump’s rhetoric provocative, Gorka replied that “there is only one person in this great country that controls our nuclear arsenal, and it’s not John McCain.” 

giving in:屈服する

At the State Department Thursday, spokeswoman Heather Nauert responded sharply. “I can say that I speak for Secretary Tillerson and this building....Our secretary has been very clear, as has been Secretary Mattis, that our diplomatic and military means are both strong and capable.” 

Asked whether Tillerson was being listened to, Nauert said “he’s a cabinet secretary, he’s fourth in line to the presidency, he carries a big stick.” Tillerson, who returned Wednesday from a lengthy Asian trip where he sought to build support for full implementation of the new sanctions, made no public appearance. 

久しぶりのワシントン・ポストの記事だが、盛んに軍事ではなく、外交政策で北朝鮮に対処していくように言っている。あまりに強調するので、軍事行動の可能性が逆にあるのではないのかと疑っている。この結論は8月に北朝鮮がグアム周辺にミサイルを撃ってくるかどうかだろう。撃ってきたら、どうなるかわからない。中国は躍起になってそのミサイルの動きを阻止しようとしているだろう。

木曜日。ではまた明日。

swingby_blog at 22:49コメント(0) 

2017年08月15日

中国は結局北朝鮮のことでアメリカと一緒に行動することになるのかもしれない。

Aug 4, 2017 | 20:34 GMT Stratfor
China May Finally Be Ready to Work With the United States on North Korea

中国は結局北朝鮮のことでアメリカと一緒に行動することになるのかもしれない。

On July 28, however, North Korea tested its second ICBM, ratcheting up pressure on China to act.
On July 28, however, North Korea tested its second ICBM, ratcheting up pressure on China to act.(JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images)


The United States and China appear to have reached accord over a draft U.N. resolution on fresh sanctions against North Korea. Anonymous diplomatic sources say that the United States aims to hold a vote Aug. 5. This has been the U.S. and Chinese approach for some time — to first engage in bilateral dialogue before formally proposing sanctions measures to the broader U.N. Security Council. 

hold a vote:投票する

Washington handed over a new draft sanctions resolution to China shortly after an emergency July 5 U.N. Security Council meeting in reaction to North Korea's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test. The United States insisted that it wanted to avoid the watered-down sanctions leveled in the past, a specific allusion to China's pattern of playing defense in the United Nations to ensure that sanctions do not go too far in destabilizing North Korea. 

watered-down:骨抜きにした・水で薄めた
allusion:ほのめかすこと

Shortly after the July 5 meeting, China's U.N. Ambassador Liu Jiey cautioned against rushing the measures and said an improvement of the situation might reduce the urgency, specifically noting his desire for further North Korean tests to be prevented by diplomatic means. On July 28, however, North Korea tested its second ICBM, ratcheting up pressure on China to act. The following week, the U.S. announced it would launch new investigations into Chinese trade practices — a sign that it will no longer allow hoped-for cooperation to limit it from firm action. The investigation could allow the U.S. administration to eventually unleash a slate of retaliatory trade measures against China — a prospect very much on Beijing's mind as it decides how to proceed regarding North Korea. 

rushing:せきたてる
slate:slate of director 《経済》指名経営者、招聘経営者 株主がコントロールできる人を経営者に据える

According to anonymous U.N. diplomats, the U.S.-proposed sanctions would stop countries from increasing the number of North Korean workers they accept and from engaging in new joint ventures with the country. They would also ban coal, iron, seafood and lead exports with the goal of reducing North Korea's export income by a third. In the bilateral talks ahead of the most recent June 2 U.N. sanctions on North Korea, China balked at broader proposals and instead agreed only to limited measures on individual entities. In early 2017, however, Beijing took some limited steps in terms of banning coal and cutting some humanitarian programs as well as a moderate curb of oil exports. 

balked:躊躇する

To come into force, the resolution would need the approval of nine U.N. Security Council member states. It would also have to avoid a veto from permanent members. The veto is the biggest worry for the United States, given that Russia has the power to block the resolution. Moscow shows every sign that it is willing to act as a spoiler in the U.S. strategy to contain the North Korean threat, questioning the assessment that North Korea test-fired ICBMs and stepping in with fuel exports to North Korea. 

come into force:施行される

The question now becomes whether Russia will pull the trigger on a veto, or whether it will allow the U.N. measures to proceed with the intention of undercutting them in practice — as it has done before. Moscow's incentive to act as a spoiler has only become greater since new U.S. sanctions on Russia were signed into law Aug. 2. The raft of measures also included enhanced sanctions on North Korea, with provisions specifically aimed at targeting Russian energy shipments to the North — something Russia is increasingly doing under the radar in case further sanctions are implemented. Russia's new ambassador to the U.N. met with his Chinese counterpart Aug. 3 and cautioned that a bilateral agreement between the United States and China was by no means universal. 

undercutting:じゃまする
raft:多数の
universal:全体の

Russian pushback on sanctions could, however, work to China's advantage by giving the country what it wants but can't actually work toward. With the United States showing every sign of stepping up trade pressure and sanctions targeting Chinese entities doing business with North Korea, Beijing has every reason to cooperate on U.N. sanctions. During the closed-door talks between China and the United States, China worked closely with Moscow as well, and the ball is now in Russia's court. 

pushback:反対

アメリカが301条を中国に適用しようとしているので、中国はアメリカの北朝鮮制裁の国連決議に賛同しようとしている。国連はロシアの反対があったら、否決されてしまうので、ロシアと中国との話し合いがどうなるのか次第だ。中国としてはアメリカが北朝鮮に強行な手段で望まないほうが良いと思っているので、アメリカの要望を飲むことになるだろう。

水曜日。今日は海野塾がある。ではまた明日。

swingby_blog at 22:01コメント(0) 

2017年08月14日

最悪の事態がアメリカの外交政策にやっていている。(2)

Rather than basing this assessment on the deal's actual terms, the president and his allies have founded their position on the United States' other grievances with Iran, including its weapons testing and support of regional militant groups, as well as a general belief that Tehran should be treated as an axis of evil. But does it make strategic sense to abandon the agreement, when doing so will renew the prospect of a military confrontation in the Persian Gulf and when the United States lacks the European support needed to keep effective sanctions in place against Iran? 

Or will Washington take into account that the Iranian government will not be easily uprooted by force, is serious enough about keeping the nuclear deal in place and already has its hands full in competing with its neighbors for influence? If the United States' goal is to avoid further destabilizing the Middle East while it has so many other foreign policy conundrums to grapple with, then relying on the more subtle tools of covert intelligence to maintain oversight of Iran's nuclear program while playing off existing tensions between Iran and the Middle East's major Sunni powers may be a more effective way to keep Tehran's ambitions in check than single-handedly reigniting a nuclear crisis that could easily consume the United States' military capacity. 

uprooted:根絶する
subtle:巧妙な
covert:密かな
play off :巧みに利用する
single-handedly:独力で
reigniting ;再び火をつける

When It Comes to Russia, Proceed With Caution
Meanwhile, for all the recent drama surrounding the U.S.-Russia relationship, Washington's policy toward Moscow is fairly straightforward. Aware of the internal issues it faces in the coming years, the Kremlin is trying to reach an understanding with the United States and the West at large that recognizes Russia's sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. For instance, by trying to draw the line at NATO's expansion and persuade the West to lift its sanctions, Moscow hopes to insulate itself from the United States and its allies while it is still powerful enough to do so. 

at large:全体
insulate:絶縁する

To this end, Russia has devoted a considerable amount of energy to inserting itself into conflicts where the United States has a vested interest. There, Moscow believes, it can build a collection of carrots and sticks that it can use to steer Washington toward more fruitful negotiations. The United States isn't pitted against Russia in an ideological war, as it was during the Cold War, and there is certainly room for cooperation between them in some areas of mutual interest. But Russian concessions — even on tactical matters — often come with hefty price tags attached, and selling out European allies on Moscow's doorstep is simply too steep a cost for Washington to pay. 

pitted:戦わせる

Even without the immense complications created by Russia's information operations against the U.S. administration and by Congress' growing compulsion to check the president's influence over Washington's Russia policy, Moscow and Washington will remain fundamentally at odds with each other on several fronts. Nevertheless, the United States will need to stay alert to areas of emerging conflict where Russia will attempt to throw a wrench in Washington's plans — not least of which is North Korea. 

immense:とてつもない
complications:厄介な問題
compulsion:衝動
at odds:争って
throw a wrench:わざと邪魔をする

The Real Fight Is in Asia
When it comes to Venezuela, Iran and Russia, the United States still has options in how it chooses to proceed. Depending on how carefully it weighs the implications of its own actions, it can either exacerbate or temper the threats stemming from each country. North Korea, on the other hand, leaves the United States with dangerously little room to maneuver. 

temper:抑制する

Pyongyang and Washington have passed the point of viable negotiation. North Korea is on track to develop a nuclear deterrent, and as it nears the point of possessing a reliable nuclear weapon and delivery system capable of striking the continental United States, Washington will be compelled to seriously consider military action against it. That decision will fall to the Trump administration, perhaps within the next 18 months. In trying to forgo military action, the United States will be forced to rely on China's and Russia's cooperation in sanctions or covert action intended to destabilize the North Korean government and thwart its nuclear ambitions. 

forgo:我慢する
covert :密かな
thwart:阻止する

Yet even as Washington pursues this policy out of diplomatic necessity, it knows it is unlikely to bear fruit. Because as much as they dislike the idea of a nuclear North Korea on their doorstep, China and Russia do not want to face the broader repercussions of an unstable Korean Peninsula or open the door to a bigger U.S. military footprint in the region. 

bear fruit:実を結ぶ
repercussions:悪影響
footprint:足跡

And so, the two states will try to get as much as they can out of negotiations with the United States as they try to push Washington toward inaction. Unable to rely on the clout of China and Russia to moderate North Korea's behavior, the United States will resist their demands to curb its military presence in the Asia-Pacific as the North Korean nuclear threat mounts. Washington's need to address the North Korean threat will thus clash with Beijing's own imperative to consolidate its maritime sphere of influence, raising the stakes in an increasingly complicated conflict zone. 

The beat of the war drums in Northeast Asia is deafening compared with the low rumble emanating from Venezuela, Iran and Russia. But it is the confluence of these crises — some of which are more avoidable than others — that risks creating a foreign policy cacophony that even the political squabbles in Washington won't be able to drown out in the months to come. 

deafening:耳をつんざくような
rumble:ゴロゴロ鳴る
emanating:発する
confluence:結合・集合
cacophony:不協和音
squabbles:口論
drown:かき消す

Reva Goujon is a leading global strategic analyst who keeps her finger on the pulse of emerging trends across the world. Ms. Goujon leads Stratfor's team of analysts and plays an integral role in applying a forward-looking, strategic lens to Stratfor's coverage of global events. She is also a prominent speaker, regularly addressing executives and investors at events across the world in a variety of industries, including energy, finance, commercial real estate and agriculture. 

いまアメリカが直面している課題の中で、ベネズエラ、イラン、ロシアとそれから北朝鮮がある。前三者に比べると北朝鮮は喫緊の課題だ。ロシアと中国はアメリカに自制しろと促すが、北朝鮮の過激な行動が果たして収まるのだろうか。その恫喝にアメリカはどう答えるのだろうか。フセイン、カダフィ、アサドに対するアメリカの過去の動きを見ていると攻撃しか思いつかない。それがいつかだろう。トランプは金正恩の出方を待っている。

火曜日。ではまた明日。

swingby_blog at 20:58コメント(0) 
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海野 恵一
1948年1月14日生

学歴:東京大学経済学部卒業

スウィングバイ株式会社
代表取締役社長

アクセンチュア株式会社代表取締役(2001-2002)
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