金持ちへの課税 IMFはJeremy Corbynの案をあまり同意はしない。かなり、微妙な違いがあるからだ。

Taxing the rich
An IMF report does not really support Jeremy Corbyn's plans; it is more nuanced
Oct 12th 2017by Buttonwood

IMFはJeremy Corbynの案をあまり同意はしない。かなり、微妙な違いがあるからだ。

FOR once, the Daily Mail and the Guardian, British newspapers of the right and left, agree. In the former, Alex Brummer says “IMF's new line of thinking of tax should please Corbyn & co” while the latter says that the IMF “analysis supports tax strategy of Labour in UK”. Both are responding to the IMF's fiscal monitor which does indeed say that there would appear to be scope for increasing the progressivity of income taxation without significantly hurting growth for countries wishing to enhance income redistribution. 

For once I agreed with my mother.:私は1度だけ母親と意見が一致した
I'm trying to please everyone.:みんなを喜ばせようと努力している

The report details how income tax progressivity in advanced economies declined in the 1980s and 1990s and that the tax system has done little to reduce inequality in recent years 

Between 1985 and 1995, rising fiscal redistribution was able to offset about 60 percent of the increase in market income inequality. In contrast, average fiscal redistribution hardly changed between 1995 and 2010, while market income inequality continued to increase. As a result, average disposable income inequality increased broadly in line with market income inequality

But the report is about the west as a whole, rather than Britain in particular. When it comes to a specific tax rate, it says that 

Assuming a welfare weight of zero for the very rich, the optimal marginal income tax rate can be calculated as 44 percent 

and compares this with the average top tax income tax band in the OECD of 35%. So there is scope for many countries to raise income taxes rather than attempt (as is suggested in America) to cut them. 

a suicide attempt ≒an attempt at suicide:自殺未遂.

In Britain, however, the top tax rate is already 45%, almost exactly at the optimal level. Mr Corbyn and the Labour party want to increase this to 50% which the IMF report implies is sub-optimal. So not really support for Mr Corbyn at all. The recommendations are really aimed at other countries. 


When it comes to corporate tax, the IMF points out that tax levels can affect the return from income taxes. Richer people can decide to incorporate to avoid paying high marginal rates of tax. That might seem to support higher corporate tax rates. But the problem is that corporations are rather more mobile than people. 


Taxation influences the location of firms. Savings can be invested in foreign locations with lower tax rates, making it harder for home countries to enforce taxes. 

Labour plans to push up the rate of corporate tax to 26% when it takes office. But this is going against the trend. 

In recent decades, international tax competition—resulting from capital mobility—has led to a steady downward trend in corporate income tax rates. This trend reduces overall tax progressivity and may also put downward pressure on PIT (personal income tax) rates. International tax coordination could potentially address this problem but has proved very difficult to implement. 

Without this international co-operation, the risk is that Labour drives some businesses away at a time when, thanks to Brexit, the country will want to keep itself as attractive to international companies as possible. So the IMF doesn’t really back Corbyn in this area either. 

金持ちに対してイギリスの次期首相と目されているJeremy Corbynは所得税率をあげようとしている。ところがこうした金持ちは所得税を避けるために、企業にその利益を転嫁している。企業の税率をあげてしまうと、今度は企業が海外に逃げてしまう。だから、IMFはそうした意見に賛成できない。金持ちへの課税はそう簡単ではない。企業が国外に逃げてしまったら、課税しようがないからだ。


swingby_blog at 21:50コメント(0) 


Donald Trumpの健康法案は中間所得層と自営業のアメリカ人に損害を与える オバマケアでは資金が不足してしまうので、ホワイトハウスは政治的な賭けをしている

Donald Trump’s health-care orders will hurt middle-class, self-employed Americans
By starving Obamacare of cash, the White House is taking a political gamble
Oct 13th 2017by H.C. | WASHINGTON, DC

Donald Trumpの健康法案は中間所得層と自営業のアメリカ人に損害を与える

THE strange thing about Donald Trump’s new executive actions on health care is the identity of those who will suffer their consequences. On October 12th Mr Trump kicked off a deregulatory process to permit widespread formation of so-called Association Health Plans (AHPs), insurance policies run by groups of small firms. Then his administration announced that it would stop paying cost-sharing subsidies, payments to insurers to compensate them for lowering deductibles and other out-of-pocket costs for the poorest buyers. Both moves are likely to end up inflicting the most pain on self-employed, middle- to upper-income folk—in other words, on a Republican constituency. 

find out the identity of the stalker:そのストーカーの正体を見破る.

Like employer-sponsored insurance, AHPs would not be subject to many of Obamacare’s regulations. They could therefore entice young and healthy people away from Obamacare’s marketplaces. Depending on how easy it becomes to join an AHP, the effect would be more or less dramatic. In an extreme case, most healthy people could leave Obamacare’s exchanges. If any insurers stuck around—not a sure thing—the exchanges would come to resemble high-risk pools, where the ill go to buy subsidised coverage. 

entice away:おびき出す
stick around:⦅くだけて⦆その場でしばらく待つ, そのあたりにいる.

However, they would only function as such for those earning less than 400% of the poverty line (that is, less than $48,240 for an individual in 2017). Obamacare offers no subsidies for buyers at higher incomes, and premiums would rise too high to be affordable. In this world, you would not want to be high-earning self-employed person with a chronic health condition. 

AHPs will not pop up any time soon. The deregulatory process takes time, and could be delayed by legal challenges. By contrast, CSR payments were always at the discretion of the administration, and could stop immediately. Even the legality of the payments was doubtful. Congress has never authorised them as part of a budget, and during Mr Obama’s presidency, Republicans in the House of Representatives sued to stop them. A judge ruled the payments unconstitutional, but the ruling was delayed pending an appeal. 

CSR:コスト・シェアリング・リダクション 保険加入者による自費払い分の医療費を引き下げる補助金制度。CSRは保険会社に給付されるため,保険会社に対する救済策と批判されるが,元々の目的は中低所得者保険料負担を軽減するために設けられたものである。

Now the legal issue is largely irrelevant. Yet the requirement that insurers offer discounts on out-of-pocket costs for the poor is written into law. They must continue to do so, but without recompense. (This is why Mr Trump’s argument that the funds are an “insurer bailout” is bunk; that the cash goes to insurers, rather than directly to poor buyers, is just an artefact of the law’s design.) Firms must still recoup their costs, so the result is higher premiums for everyone—20% higher, if the Congressional Budget Office is to be believed. Many insurers anticipated the end of the payments and so have already raised their prices for next year. 

recompense:償い, 賠償(金), 弁償; 報酬, 返礼
bunk:bunkum ナンセンス, たわごと.
recoup:…を差し引く, 控除する.

Poorer buyers are protected, because the tax credits they receive rise in tandem with premiums. (The CBO projects that outlays on tax credits will rise so much that scrapping the CSRs will end up costing the government money.) The people who will suffer are, again, those who earn more than 400% of the poverty line—in other words, the middle-class, usually self-employed Americans whom Republicans have always said they are trying to help by scrapping Obamacare. Many, particularly in states with fragile markets, are likely to forego health insurance in 2018. But that is not an option for those who have chronic medical conditions. 

in tandem:と同時に
CBO :アメリカ議会予算局
forego:〈楽しみなど〉を我慢する; …を差し控える, 遠慮する.

There are 9m Americans who buy coverage in the individual market but do not receive tax credits. Mr Trump is poised to cause a lot of pain to this group—a Republican-leaning constituency—in 2018, an election year. He is gambling that voters will continue to blame high premiums on Obamacare, not on the Republicans, and that Democrats will be spooked enough by the sorry condition of the market to start negotiations on health-care reform. But Democrats have never expressed much concern about these better-off, unsubsidised buyers, who have been suffering from high premiums for a while. Mr Trump’s gamble is a risky one. 




swingby_blog at 20:11コメント(0) 


イラン、トランプ そして核交渉をめぐる対応

Oct 10, 2017 | 20:50 GMT
Iran, Trump and the Art of the Nuclear Deal
By Matthew Bey
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor

イラン、トランプ そして核交渉をめぐる対応

the art of negotiation:交渉術

Iran, Trump and the Art of the Nuclear Deal

Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
Matthew Bey
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
The reactor building at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran.
(IIPA via Getty Images

Deep ideological differences and mutual mistrust have marred the relationship between the United States and Iran since the Islamic Republic replaced the nation's monarchy nearly four decades ago. But time has done little to heal the wounds that each country has inflicted on the other. Their enduring enmity will be on full display this week as U.S. President Donald Trump prepares to "decertify" the deal Iran has struck with global powers on its nuclear program by arguing that the agreement isn't in the best interest of U.S. national security. Though Washington will likely keep sanctions relief for Tehran in place for now, Trump's speech will trigger a 60-day review period during which Congress will have the power to reimpose them. 

The election was marred by fraud.:その選挙は不正行為によって台なしにされた.
inflict serious pain:大きな苦痛を与える
enmity: (長期にわたる)憎しみ, 憎悪, 敵意

Despite this apparent setback for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the prospect that the longtime adversaries will eventually set aside their grievances hasn't entirely dimmed. Because while political narratives come and go, the geopolitical forces that led to the nuclear deal's inception are here to stay, pushing the United States and Iran closer and closer to rapprochement. 

set aside:棚上げにする
dimmed:〈見込み希望気持ちなどが〉薄れる, 弱まる.
inception:⦅かたく⦆(組織などの)発足, 開始
Java is here to stay. : これからはJavaの時代です。

The President's Gamble
The current U.S. administration has placed far more emphasis on curbing Iran's activities throughout the Middle East than its predecessor did. Within the past year, the White House has tried to unite Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, into a coalition against Iran while stepping up its military aid and weapons sales to Sunni powers across the region. In all likelihood, Trump will steadfastly maintain this tough stance when he unveils his administration's policy on Iran later this week, announcing additional targeted sanctions against it. As long as the nuclear deal remains intact, though, the use of Washington's strongest tool against Tehran — wide-reaching sanctions — will be off the table. 

remain (largely) intact:(ほぼ)元のままである
off the table:提案されていない

By reopening the debate about the JCPOA with the threat of withdrawal, Trump hopes to either rein in Iran's regional meddling or persuade Tehran to broaden the deal to include restrictions on its ballistic missile program and on its support for militant groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas. The president's strategy, however, is not without risk. Any cracks that open within the JCPOA's framework could spread quickly, perhaps even leading to the deal's collapse. Trump's approach also relies on the assumption that Iran — a country with a precarious political balance to maintain within its borders — won't respond aggressively to provocation. 

a threat of pollution:汚染の恐れ.

Still, the president's gamble may not be as risky as it seems. We need only look at the forces that shaped the JCPOA's signing in the first place to see why. Over the past decade, the United States has searched for a way to reduce its presence in the Middle East and shift its attention to other parts of the world, including a resurgent Russia and a rising China. The solution it has settled on is to balance Middle Eastern powers — including Iran — against one another, forming a built-in check to prevent any one country from becoming too influential. But Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons program was something that neither the United States nor its European allies could allow. The JCPOA thus offered a means of halting the program's progress without risking the outbreak of war. 

The United States' pressing need to look beyond the Middle East persists to this day. In fact, if anything, it has become even more imperative: China's economy and military prowess are growing, the standoff between Russia and the West endures, and the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula has deepened. Reviving the nuclear ambitions of — and the threat of conflict with — Iran by abandoning the JCPOA would doubtless detract from the United States' ability to address these urgent needs in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific. It would also harden North Korea's belief (not to mention Iran's) that negotiation with the United States on nuclear issues is futile. 

to this day:今日に至るまで
if anything:どちらかといえば、それどころか
imperative:絶対必要で, 必須で; 緊急で
detract:〈価値名声など〉を落とす, 損なう

To make matters more complicated, Washington is alone in its newest strategy to contain Iran's influence. Unlike the United States, Europe considers Iran's regional ambitions to be separate from its nuclear activities, and the JCPOA to be pertinent only to the latter. The White House has blurred that distinction in a way the deal wasn't designed to handle. 

pertinent:(密接な)関係がある(relevant); 適切な, ぴったり当てはまる

This discrepancy is the reason that the rationale behind Washington's decertification of the accord is key: The United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agree that there is no evidence to suggest that Iran is not complying with the deal. And as long as Iran upholds its end of the bargain, the European Union will likely push back against any U.S. attempt to reinstate broad sanctions, which would damage several European companies. (The Continental bloc has already vowed to challenge the United States in the World Trade Organization if it tries to do so.) 

comply with the law [safety standard]:法に従う[安全基準に準拠する].
hold up one's end of the bargain:〔契約などで〕一方の当事者としての責任を果たす

All of these factors will make it difficult for Congress to put sanctions back in place against Iran. But perhaps that's exactly what the Trump administration is counting on. After all, the president derided the nuclear deal during his campaign for office. By punting the issue to Congress, where lawmakers will have a hard time resuming sanctions, Trump can wash his hands of the decision and gain the political cover needed to keep the agreement in place while adopting a tougher stance toward Iran. 

political cover:〔真の動機などを隠す〕政治的な口実、政策上の表向きの態度、大義名分
wash one's hands of:〜から手を引く、〜と手を切る、〜から足を洗う、〜との関わりをなくす、〜に見切りをつける、〜との関係を絶つ、〜に匙を投げる

Weighing the Cost of a Nuclear Weapon 
Of course, the United States is only half of the JCPOA equation. And though Iran is often portrayed throughout the West as an erratic and unreliable partner, the country — like all nation-states in the global system — is a rational actor whose moves reflect its constraints and imperatives. 

erratic:⦅通例けなして⦆〈行動人などが〉気まぐれな, とっぴな; 〈動きなどが〉不規則な, 不安定な.
rational actor:《a 〜》合理的行為者
imperatives:命令; 義務; 緊急になすべきこと, 急務

Chief among them, for the Islamic republic, is the simple need to survive. Throughout history, Iran has faced the threat of invasion from the west, first from powerful forces in Mesopotamia and then from the state of Iraq, particularly under the rule of Saddam Hussein. Seizing the chance that revolution afforded, Saddam invaded the Islamic republic not long after its establishment in 1979, prompting former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini to restart the deposed shah's nuclear weapons program in search of a credible deterrent against Iraq. Vital oil reserves along Iran's border with Iraq has only heightened its vulnerability in modern times. 


With Saddam's removal from power, Iraq presented more opportunity than risk to Iran, and Tehran began to exert influence over its neighbor's Shiite leaders. But Iraq's fate also served as a stark warning: The weapons of mass destruction that were once an asset for Saddam became the liability that led to his downfall. The message was not lost on Iran, which halted most of its nuclear weapons development in 2003, even as it used the facade of the program's progress to drive a grand bargain with the United States.

A stark reality hit him.:厳しい現実が彼を襲った.
facade:(実際とは異なる)外見, 体裁, 見せかけ

This strategy, though quite rational, backfired by encouraging the creation of a powerful sanctions regime that crippled the Iranian economy. Prior to 1979, Iran's economy was roughly the size of Saudi Arabia's; today it is only three-fifths as large. As a result, the Islamic republic has struggled to make good on many of the promises that brought it to power. And in a country with a lengthy history of revolution and political upheaval, the popular backlash that sustained hardship tends to generate doesn't bode well for the government’s self-preservation. 

bode well [ill] for A:A〈人物〉にとって良い[悪い]前兆である.

Iran's leaders, who lack the immunity to widespread discontent that North Korea's dictatorship enjoys, believe that the greatest threat to the nation's stability today comes from within. Countering it requires a stronger economy and the careful management of social and political discord — both goals that have reinforced the growing sentiment among Iranians that the pursuit of a nuclear weapons program isn't worth the steep cost of sanctions. Consequently, Iran is keen to avoid making any rash decisions about its nuclear weapons development. Rather than uniting the United States and its allies by restarting its shuttered program, Tehran will likely keep using the issue to drive the wedge between them even deeper. 

immunity:【義務税などの】免除, 免責
drive a wedge:【二者間の】関係を悪化させる, 仲を裂く ≪between≫ .

A Piece of a Bigger Puzzle
Iran will enter into any new negotiations over its nuclear program with an eye toward the rest of the international community as well. Iran has little incentive to remain a pariah state, given the extent to which that status has already devastated its economy, and a movement toward diplomatic moderation has blossomed among the country's leaders since the late 1980s. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani is now the standard-bearer for that movement, though the volatile nature of the nation's politics has hampered his attempts to act on that ideology so far. 

pariah:パーリア◆南部インドの最下層民  路上生活者
standard-bearer:旗手、旗頭 主唱者

Nevertheless, he and his contemporaries have the heft of geopolitics on their side. Though Iran's rhetoric has traditionally targeted the United States, it is Turkey and Russia that may be more likely to threaten Tehran's security interests, especially as Washington withdraws from the region. Iran is deeply concerned about Turkey's resurgence in the lands it previously controlled during the Ottoman Empire, including Iraq and the Levant. And Russia — a country with which Iran has fought numerous wars — has similarly increased its involvement in Tehran's backyard over the past decade. Detente with an external powerhouse like the United States would certainly improve Iran's position against both threats. 

powerhouse :強力な国

Saudi Arabia is another regional rival that Iran is sure to watch, particularly given the Sunni kingdom's close relationship with the United States. Despite that partnership, however, Washington's strategy of balancing power in the Middle East requires just that: balance. Saudi Arabia's influence could therefore wane in the coming decades, especially since its prominence is based in oil reserves and the wealth that comes with them. As the Saudi oil industry becomes less lucrative over time, it will call into question the kingdom's economic vitality — and by extension, its utility as the United States' most powerful Middle Eastern ally. 

a lucrative business:もうかる商売.

Of course, Iran's economy relies on oil, too. But it is far more diversified, which suggests that it will fare better in a world where oil no longer reigns supreme. Moreover, Iran has the advantage of strategic location. As China works to build land routes through Asia to Europe, it will have to choose whether to pass through Iran or Russia — a decision that Beijing's natural rivalry with Moscow will make easy. With a quick glance at the map, it is clear how Iran's position on China's newest Silk Road would give Washington plenty of opportunities to counter both China and Russia if Tehran were its partner. 

A Partnership Checked by Politics
The slow-moving undercurrents of geopolitics can take years to shape domestic policy. In the meantime, Iran and the United States will continue to display their mutual animosity at home. Iran's powerful hard-line groups, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, have staunchly opposed negotiation with the United States. Trump's recent actions have only reinforced their belief that Washington cannot be trusted, and if Rouhani's administration offers to discuss scaling back its conventional weapons program, as some have suggested it might, their objections will only grow louder. Until Iran takes true strides toward a more moderate foreign policy, its conservative groups will continue to disrupt any agreement with the United States that stretches beyond its nuclear program. 

undercurrents:(感情思想などの)底流, 暗流.
animosity:(激しい)敵意, (強い)憎しみ; 反目
reinforce を:強化する, より強固にする

Back in the United States, Iran's support for Middle Eastern militant groups and threats to the Persian Gulf have slowed Washington's attempts to pull back from the region. The reputation Iran has gained among the American public hasn't made things any easier: Many of Iran's current leaders were visible figures during the Islamic Revolution, the subsequent hostage incident at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the talks regarding Iran's nuclear program, all events that painted a picture of an untrustworthy nation. That paint will only start to chip away when the next generation of political leaders rises to power in both countries. 

chip away:なし崩しにする

For now, Iran and the United States have reached a crossroads in their relationship. Many of their long-term imperatives have begun to align. But it remains to be seen how quickly they will override the more immediate national and regional problems that each state now faces. And should the nuclear deal collapse, it could push back the lasting relationship that Iran and the United States have begun to build by another decade. 


Matthew Bey is an energy and technology analyst for Stratfor, where he monitors a variety of global issues and trends. In particular, he focuses on energy and political developments in OPEC member states and the consequences of such developments on oil producers and the international oil market. Mr. Bey's work includes studies on the global impact of rising U.S. energy production, the recent fall in oil prices, Russia's political influence on Europe through energy, and long-term trends in energy and manufacturing. 



swingby_blog at 20:38コメント(0) 


南スーダンは内部崩壊しているので、アメリカはこの体制を支援しようか採光している アメリカ当局は暴力的で、イカサマな政府の嘘にうんざりしている

As South Sudan implodes, America reconsiders its support for the regime
American officials are fed up with being lied to by a violent, crooked government
Oct 12th 2017 | JUBA


be fed up (with [of] A):⦅くだけて⦆(Aに)うんざりしている 
crooked:〈人などが〉不正な, いんちきの, 詐欺の.

IT IS not as bad in South Sudan as people think, insists Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, the petroleum minister. The UN may claim that a third of the population have fled their homes, but that is an exaggeration, says the sharp-suited former diplomat. 

sharp-suited:抜け目のない; 頭のよく働く.

Why, then, does he think the refugee camps are so full? Some people go there for the services, such as free food, he explains. Others have been scared by fake news, peddled by insurgents. “People are saying: ‘The Dinka [the largest ethnic group in South Sudan] are coming to kill you. You must leave!’” Seated in his plush office in Juba, the capital, Mr Gatkuoth scoffs that, when he was a rebel during South Sudan’s long war to break away from Sudan, his comrades used similar propaganda, telling people that the Arabs were coming to burn their villages and rape their children. “It was very effective,” he recalls. 

scared:ということを恐れる, …ではないかとびくびくする
peddled:⦅けなして⦆〈うわさ誤った情報など〉を言いふらす, 広めて回る
insurgents:反乱者, 暴徒(rebel)
plush:くだけて 豪華な.

At camps for displaced people near Wau, one of South Sudan’s largest cities, no one agrees with Mr Gatkuoth’s account of current events. All describe, not rumours of massacres heard on social media, but actual massacres that they saw with their own eyes. The perpetrators, they say, were Dinka marauders wearing blue and Dinka soldiers in uniform. 

account:(事件体験などの)報告; 話, 供述, 記述
perpetrators:⦅かたく⦆悪事を行う人, 犯人.
marauders :⦅文⦆略奪者.

“I saw my son shot in front of me. He fell and I was holding him. I survived, maybe because the killers thought we were both dead,” says Pascalina, a fugitive. “They took my sister and raped her,” says Anyor, a mother who hid in the bush with her nine children as the attackers killed the men in her village, looted everything of value (“goats, chickens, sorghum”) and kidnapped young women. 

fugitive:逃亡者; 避難者, 亡命者
looted :〈金物など〉を略奪する

The spoils of oil
South Sudan, the world’s newest country, is like a jigsaw puzzle that has been broken apart, soaked in petrol and set alight. It will not be easy to put back together. It seceded from Sudan in 2011, after half a century of on-off rebellion and a peace deal in 2005. In a referendum, 99% of South Sudanese (who are mostly black and non-Muslim) voted to separate from the Arab, Muslim north. Sadly, clashes between different ethnic groups within South Sudan began almost immediately after independence. 

a city soaked in culture:文化にあふれた都市.
set ~ alight:〜に火を付ける、〜に放火する
put back:再開する
on-off relationship:断続的な[別れたりくっついたりの・別れてはまたよりを戻すという]関係

Full-blown civil war erupted in 2013, after President Salva Kiir (a Dinka) sacked Vice-President Riek Machar (a Nuer). A truce in 2016 lasted less than four months. It ended with gun battles in Juba and Mr Machar fleeing to South Africa, where he remains under house arrest. 

call [declare, announce] a truce:休戦を宣言する

The mayhem is now many-sided. The other tribes (of which the country has about 60) accuse Mr Kiir of funnelling government jobs and cash to Dinkas, and of using the national army to assert Dinka supremacy. Terrified non-Dinkas have formed armed groups to defend their homes, land and cows—and sometimes to raid the neighbouring villages. The government sees these groups as rebels to be exterminated, and tacitly encourages the ethnic cleansing of areas thought to support them. All sides slaughter civilians. 

mayhem:大混乱, 騒乱; 傷害[破壊]行為.
funnelling:〈人物〉をじょうご(のように狭い所)に通すように流す[注ぐ, 進める]
Dinka:ディンカ族 南スーダンのナイル川流域のバハル・アル・ガザール地方を中心に居住する民族。
tacitly :暗黙のうちに

In Wau, Dinkas walk in the streets without fear (except at night, when robbers prowl). Meanwhile, tens of thousands of non-Dinkas huddle in tented camps nearby, guarded by UN peacekeepers. The non-Dinkas say they are too scared to return home. Many report being raped if they venture out to collect firewood. “Now it is death for anyone who is not a Dinka. If you can’t talk like a Dinka, if you don’t have the right [ritual] scars, they shoot you, no questions asked,” says Abdullah, a farmer. “They want to clear the other groups and take control of everything. They kill you and take your land to graze their cattle on.” 

huddle for warmth:体を寄せ合って暖め合う.

Out of South Sudan’s pre-war population of 12m, the UN estimates that 2m have been displaced internally and another 2m have fled abroad. So bad is the violence that some flee into the war-ravaged Central African Republic, or into Sudan’s troubled region of Darfur. Though South Sudan is fertile, more than half of its people face hunger. A famine earlier this year was averted by food aid. Diarrhoea, cholera and malaria have spread rapidly, along with kala-azar (a deadly parasitic disease carried by sandflies). 

His face was ravaged.:彼の顔はやつれはてていた.
narrowly avert a disaster:大惨事を間一髪で回避する.
have (explosive) diarrhea:(激しい)下痢である.
a parasitic disease:寄生虫病.

The economy is a disaster. The state depends on oil, which is 95% of exports. Not only has the oil price fallen by more than half since 2011, but output has collapsed in the fighting. The IMF guesses that real income has been cut in half since 2013. Inflation is over 300% a year. The government is short of cash. Unpaid soldiers rob civilians with impunity. 

with impunity:何のとがめもなく.

Much of the budget is stolen. Absurdly, half of the government’s net oil revenues are spent on petrol subsidies—the government insists that fuel should be sold for far less than it costs. As a result, petrol stations have run dry. Outside each one, black-market traders sell fuel in water bottles for more than ten times the official price. The finance minister says fuel subsidies should be scrapped, but faces resistance from those who pocket them. 

absurdly cheap:うそみたいに安い.
run dry:〔資源などを〕使い尽くす〔資源・資金・アイデアなどが〕枯渇する

The government says it welcomes the foreign aid groups who provide most of South Sudan’s public services. In practice officials often obstruct them. Aid workers are regularly barred from delivering food and medicine to rebel-held areas. Dozens have been murdered. Many roads are impassable because gunmen patrol them, stealing aid supplies and killing drivers. Bureaucrats constantly demand new fees and permits. (Your correspondent was barred from an internal flight over a missing piece of paper which, once he had obtained it, no official asked to see again.) 


Mr Kiir’s government came to office on a wave of international goodwill. Both the Bush and Obama administrations included close personal friends of the plucky rebels who liberated South Sudan from the Islamist tyranny of Khartoum. But Donald Trump’s White House has no such sentimental ties, and America is rapidly losing patience with Mr Kiir. Three South Sudanese officials have been sanctioned by America’s Treasury for alleged corruption. More may follow. 

plucky:勇気のある(brave), 大胆な.

Last month Mark Green, the head of USAID, America’s government aid agency, visited South Sudan. Mr Kiir is said to have told him that there was no systemic insecurity in the country, that what violence did occur was the opposition’s fault, and that aid workers could do their jobs unhindered. Mr Green was shocked to be lied to so brazenly. He promised a “complete review” of American policy towards South Sudan. This month America’s ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, will visit Juba, hoping to revive peace talks. President Trump, however, may be inclined to cut South Sudan loose. That is risky. “If we disengage, people will starve to death,” laments an American official. 

insecurity:不安定さ, 保護[保障]のないこと, 危なっかしさ.
brazenly:恥ずかしげもなく, しゃあしゃあと.
cut loose:関係を断つ



swingby_blog at 20:50コメント(0) 

規制緩和に於けるホワイトハウスの進展の評価 トランプは安々と新たな規制を阻止してきている。以前の規制を廃止するのは難しいだろう。

An assessment of the White House’s progress on deregulation
Donald Trump has blocked new regulations with ease. Repealing old ones will be harder

Oct 14th 2017 | WASHINGTON, DC


DEREGULATION, along with tax cuts and trade reform, is one of the three pillars of President Donald Trump’s economic agenda. Republicans promise that, freed of red tape, American firms will invest more and unleash faster economic growth. And while Mr Trump has yet to unite his party around a major piece of legislation, the White House has plenty of sway over regulatory policy. For a start, the government agencies Mr Trump commands can regulate and deregulate on their own (subject only to the instructions that Congress has given them in the past). How much red tape have they managed to tear down since Mr Trump took office? 

Don't be swayed by what other people say.:他人が言うことに左右されてはいけない.

Regulation is difficult to measure precisely, but the long-term trend towards excessive rulemaking has been obvious. In 1970 there were about 400,000 prescriptive words such as “shall” or “must” in the code of federal regulations, according to the Mercatus Centre, a libertarian-leaning think-tank. Today there are 1.1m (see chart). Wonks of many stripes agree that this is far too many and that the rule book must be shortened. Agencies have rarely combed over old edicts to see whether they are worth keeping. The problem predated Barack Obama’s administration; both Republicans and Democrats have presided over regulatory expansions. That said, Mr Obama was an unusually prolific rule-writer, because for much of his presidency a hostile Congress meant that regulation was often his best tool. 

prescriptive:規範的な 慣習[慣例]で認められた.
Wonks:がり勉, 仕事の虫.
combed:〈不要な物人〉をはずす, 整理する.
edicts:(王政府による)(時に不当な)勅令, 命令
prolific:多作の; 〈経歴などが〉功績の多い; 〈植物が〉実りの多い

Against this backdrop, the impact of the Trump administration has been dramatic. The flow of new rules is suddenly a dribble. Since Mr Trump was inaugurated the number of regulatory restrictions has grown at about two-fifths of the usual speed. In the last year of the Obama administration, the federal government wrote 527 regulations deemed “significant”. Mr Trump’s bureaucrats have penned only 118. And even that number is artificially high, because many of those edicts served only to delay or weaken Mr Obama’s rules. Examples of genuinely new regulations are few and far between. The White House has acknowledged only one—a rule aimed at reducing the amount of mercury dentists discharge into sewers, which went into effect in July. 

penned:〈動物〉をおりに閉じ込める(in, up).
far between:極稀である

Mr Trump has slowed rulemaking in two main ways. First, on coming to office, he ordered government agencies not to impose any net new regulatory costs on companies, regardless of the benefits of doing so, and said that in order to write any new rules they would have to repeal two old ones. Because it takes time to unearth and discard dud rules, the practical effect of this has been to put a brake on new issuance. 


Second, Mr Trump has signed 14 bills stopping rules that were issued late in the Obama administration, and were therefore still subject to review by Congress, from going into effect. Not only were those regulations blocked (by means of the Congressional Review Act, or CRA); agencies will never again be able to write replacements that are “substantially the same” without lawmakers’ express approval. Before 2017, Congress had exercised its power to review regulations only once: in 2001, after George W. Bush came to office, it blocked a set of standards for chairs and desks aimed at stopping office workers getting back pain. 

Yet wielding CRA as a deregulatory weapon has its limits, for Congress can review only rules issued during its previous 60 days in session. Tackling the bedrock of regulation is far harder. Three approaches are possible: later implementation of newish rules, looser enforcement of existing ones, and formal rollbacks of others. 

wield political power:政治力を行使する.
in session:開会中
rollbacks:(政府の統制による)物価[賃金, 税金]の引き下げ.

Make America wait again
The first tactic, delay, is being used with abandon. For example, the Labour Department is trying to stave off parts of a new “fiduciary rule”, which requires investment advisers always to work in the best interests of their clients. (This requirement, like many seemingly simple rules, has somehow spawned hundreds of pages of legalese.) The fiduciary rule came into partial effect in June, but the administration is trying to postpone enactment of the remainder, which would give the edict teeth, by 18 months, to July 2019. 

stave off :〈人物〉を(一定期間)阻止する
give ~ teeth:〜に効力のある執行手段を持たせる
put off the date by __ months:日程を_カ月ずらす[延ばす・繰り下げる]

Delays do not always work. When Scott Pruitt, a sceptic on climate change who heads the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), tried to put off a regulation aimed at curbing emissions of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, from oil and gas wells, a federal court found the decision to be “unreasonable”, and blocked it. “I can’t tell you how illegal that proposal was,” says Bill Pedersen, an environmental lawyer. 

The second method—enforcing rules lightly, if at all—can be implemented through handy budget cuts. For example, Mr Pruitt has proposed slimming the agency’s budget by almost a third, though the idea met a frosty reception in Congress. 

if at all:仮に[たとえ]あった[そうなった・そうである]としても
frosty reception:凍りつくような受け入れ

But it is the final approach, rescinding a regulation altogether, that is the trickiest to pull off. The EPA hopes to repeal the two main Obama-era environmental regulations: the Clean Power Plan, aimed at reducing carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants, and the Waters of the United States (WOTUS) rule, which expanded the scope of federal regulation of waterways. Neither has ever come into effect, because both have been delayed by lawsuits brought by states and affected firms. Some such challenges to Obama-era rules have ended successfully. A court in August struck down a Labour Department rule that greatly expanded the number of workers eligible for overtime pay. 

pull off:〈事〉を苦労して成し遂げる.
struck down:撤廃する

Unless courts invalidate a regulation, though, undoing it is “like turning a battleship around”, says Steven Silverman, a lawyer who worked at the EPA for almost four decades. Agencies must start a fresh regulatory process, consult interested parties and show why their old cost-benefit analysis was wrong—a procedure itself vulnerable to legal challenges. While those play out, the Democrats could win back the White House and change course again. 

legal challenge:法的な異議申し立て
play out:展開する

For now, the administration’s tactic has been to try to stall the court cases, to keep the rules from taking effect, while they prepare replacements. But the administration may eventually have to convince judges that Mr Obama’s numbers were wrong. That will be easier in some cases than in others. Mr Obama’s administration often cast around for additional benefits to justify new rules. Sometimes, its methods were unprecedented. For example, the administration included the boon to foreign countries when totting up the value of reducing carbon emissions. The proposal to withdraw the Clean Power Plan, which was released on October 10th, shows that Mr Trump’s regulators have ditched that calculation. They have also taken a harder stand on so-called “co-benefits”, the positive side-effects of regulations. 

stall:〈エンジン車〉を止める; 〈飛行機〉を失速させる.
boon:有益な[役に立つ]物, 恩恵, 利益
totting:を加える, 合計する(up).
side-effects:(予想外の)副産物, 結果.

The question is how fast the Trump administration will run in the exact opposite direction. The White House is focused on reducing costs to companies; wider benefits barely seem to enter its thinking. This particularly threatens environmental regulations, which tend to have the biggest costs, but also the largest benefits (see chart 2). In reassessing the economic impact of WOTUS, the EPA took just a few short sentences to dispense with at least $300m in annual benefits to wetlands that had been included in the agency’s 2015 analysis. The Clean Power Plan replacement disregards entirely the effect that cutting carbon would have on reducing other noxious emissions that cause premature deaths—an omission that will surely invite a legal challenge. 

premature death:早死.

Yet in other areas the administration seems more thoughtful than zealous. Take financial deregulation. In January Mr Trump made a crude promise to “do a big number” on Dodd-Frank, Mr Obama’s financial law, which has spawned thousands of pages of associated rules. Yet the two reports the Treasury has published on the subject have been detailed and rigorous. The first, on banking, contained a variety of relatively moderate proposals, such as raising the threshold above which banks must carry out “stress tests” from $10bn of assets to $50bn, and excluding cash and Treasury securities when calculating banks’ leverage. 

stress test:ストレステスト、健全性審査◆急激な景気低迷などに対して金融機関が経営に耐えられるかどうかを調べる金融機関監督当局による審査。

The second report, released on October 6th, concerns capital markets. Equity markets do not seem to be doing their job well, it says, as seen by a fall in the number of public companies, possibly because of regulatory complexity. But elsewhere it warns of the risks that Dodd-Frank funnelled towards so-called “clearing houses”, such as LCH.Clearnet and Intercontinental Exchange. The Treasury argues that clearing houses should be subject to “heightened regulatory and supervisory scrutiny”. 

funnelled:〈人物〉をじょうご(のように狭い所)に通すように流す[注ぐ, 進める]
clearing houses:商品取引における清算業務を専門に行う欧米の会社

Those are not the words of an administration bent on wanton financial deregulation. Instead, figures such as Jay Clayton, the new chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and Randal Quarles, whom the Senate confirmed on October 5th as the Federal Reserve’s vice-chairman for (bank) supervision, are likely to prune existing regulatory structures. In September the Fed and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) gave a taste of what is to come. They said banks may now be allowed to refile their “living wills”, which set out how they could be dissolved in a crisis, every two years rather than annually, so long as their business had not changed materially. This is hardly revolutionary, yet it is important to banks. 

living will:リビングウィル、生前遺言◆自分の尊厳死を守るため、医師による治療の制限を宣言しておくこと。例えば、自分への延命措置(人工呼吸など)を禁止するなど。

Some rulemaking is beyond the administration’s reach. On October 5th the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) said it would require payday lenders, who offer short-term loans at very high interest rates, to carry out new affordability checks before advancing credit. The agency will also limit lenders’ access to borrowers’ bank accounts. The CFPB can keep regulating in defiance of Mr Trump because—like the SEC—it is independent, meaning the president cannot dismiss its leadership without good reason. 

payday lender:《a 〜》給料担保金融業者◆次の給料日までの短期小口融資を高利で行う金融業者。
defiance:〈規則人など〉を無視して, Aに逆らって

Alternative facts
There can be little doubt that fewer federal regulations are in place today than would have been were Hillary Clinton president. But until many more rules face the chop, companies are unlikely to benefit all that much. Few mentioned deregulation in their second-quarter earnings calls this summer. When economists at Goldman Sachs, a bank, surveyed their stock-pickers in May, regulation was not considered the key policy issue in a single sector. Analysts emphasised tax reform instead. 


The exceptions were watchers of technology, media and telecoms firms, who emphasised the importance of antitrust regulation. The Trump administration’s attitude towards consolidation in those industries, most notably a proposed merger between AT&T , a wireless giant, and Time Warner, a content empire, is unclear. Internet service providers (ISPs) would also get a boost if the Federal Communications Commission succeeds in loosening Obama-era rules on “net neutrality” (the principle that different sorts of web traffic should be treated equally). 


Despite the lack of much true deregulation, the new approach in Washington does seem to have boosted business confidence. The “tone” of federal regulators has changed, notes one senior Wall Street executive, and slowing the flow of new rules has reduced regulatory uncertainty. Parts of Main Street agree: the percentage of small firms reporting regulation as their biggest concern has fallen slightly, from 20% a year ago to 16% today. Another sign, perhaps, is that the overall optimism of small businesses surged after the election to close to an all-time high, and has yet to fall back much. 

Whether deregulation translates into faster economic growth will only become clear over time. The range of estimates regarding how much regulation affects growth is wide, while the quantity of evidence is thin. Economists at the White House point to a study by Mercatus which argues that if regulations had been frozen at their 1980 level, growth would have been 0.8 percentage points higher per year. Critics say that this actually implies a rather small growth effect, given that Mr Trump is taking aim at a relatively small number of Obama-era rules. The study also seems, implausibly, to blame regulation for a fall in investment after the financial crisis. 

Ultimately, whether or not such claims are put to the test depends on whether the Republicans keep the White House in 2020. If they do, Mr Trump will have time to overcome the inevitable legal challenges to his agenda. America would probably see a large-scale deregulatory experiment. If they do not, the current period will look more like a regulatory hiatus than the beginning of a reversal. 




swingby_blog at 08:58コメント(0) 


習近平はDonald Trumpよりも影響力を持っている。世界は警戒するべきだが、習近平が良い方向に、中国を変えるとか世界を変えるとかは期待してはいけない。

Xi Jinping has more clout than Donald Trump. The world should be wary
Do not expect Mr Xi to change China, or the world, for the better
Oct 14th 2017

習近平はDonald Trumpよりも影響力を持っている。世界は警戒するべきだが、習近平が良い方向に、中国を変えるとか世界を変えるとかは期待してはいけない。

AMERICAN presidents have a habit of describing their Chinese counterparts in terms of awe. A fawning Richard Nixon said to Mao Zedong that the chairman’s writings had “changed the world”. To Jimmy Carter, Deng Xiaoping was a string of flattering adjectives: “smart, tough, intelligent, frank, courageous, personable, self-assured, friendly”. Bill Clinton described China’s then president, Jiang Zemin, as a “visionary” and “a man of extraordinary intellect”. Donald Trump is no less wowed. The Washington Post quotes him as saying that China’s current leader, Xi Jinping, is “probably the most powerful” China has had in a century.

awe :畏れ, 畏敬の念, 畏怖(fear)
fawning :へつらう[媚(こ) びる]ような.
flattering:実物以上に良く見せる, 引き立たせる.
wowed:〈観衆など〉に大受けする ≪with≫ .

Mr Trump may be right. And were it not political suicide for an American president to say so, he might plausibly have added: “Xi Jinping is the world’s most powerful leader.” To be sure, China’s economy is still second in size to America’s and its army, though rapidly gaining muscle, pales in comparison. But economic heft and military hardware are not everything. 

pales:(ほかと比べると)色あせる, 見劣りする

The leader of the free world has a narrow, transactional approach to foreigners and seems unable to enact his agenda at home. The United States is still the world’s most powerful country, but its leader is weaker at home and less effective abroad than any of his recent predecessors, not least because he scorns the values and alliances that underpin American influence. 

enact :〈法律〉を制定する, 〈法案〉を法律にする
Ann scorned the proposal.:アンはその申し入れを受け入れることを拒んだ.

The president of the world’s largest authoritarian state, by contrast, walks with swagger abroad. His grip on China is tighter than any leader’s since Mao. And whereas Mao’s China was chaotic and miserably poor, Mr Xi’s is a dominant engine of global growth. His clout will soon be on full display. On October 18th China’s ruling Communist Party will convene a five-yearly congress in Beijing (see Briefing). It will be the first one presided over by Mr Xi. Its 2,300 delegates will sing his praises to the skies. More sceptical observers might ask whether Mr Xi will use his extraordinary power for good or ill.

full display:全画面表示

World, take note
On his numerous foreign tours, Mr Xi presents himself as an apostle of peace and friendship, a voice of reason in a confused and troubled world. Mr Trump’s failings have made this much easier. At Davos in January Mr Xi promised the global elite that he would be a champion of globalisation, free trade and the Paris accord on climate change. Members of his audience were delighted and relieved. At least, they thought, one great power was willing to stand up for what was right, even if Mr Trump (then president-elect) would not. 

voice of reaso:理性の声

Mr Xi’s words are heeded partly because he has the world’s largest stockpile of foreign currency to back them up. His “Belt and Road Initiative” may be puzzlingly named, but its message is clear—hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese money are to be invested abroad in railways, ports, power stations and other infrastructure that will help vast swathes of the world to prosper. That is the kind of leadership America has not shown since the post-war days of the Marshall Plan in western Europe (which was considerably smaller). 


Mr Xi is also projecting what for China is unprecedented military power abroad. This year he opened the country’s first foreign military base, in Djibouti. He has sent the Chinese navy on manoeuvres ever farther afield, including in July on NATO’s doorstep in the Baltic Sea alongside Russia’s fleet. China says it would never invade other countries to impose its will (apart from Taiwan, which it does not consider a country). Its base-building efforts are to support peacekeeping, anti-piracy and humanitarian missions, it says. As for the artificial islands with military-grade runways it is building in the South China Sea, these are purely defensive. 

on maneuvers:大演習中で.
far afield:はるかに離れて.

Unlike Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, Mr Xi is not a global troublemaker who seeks to subvert democracy and destabilise the West. Still, he is too tolerant of troublemaking by his nuke-brandishing ally, North Korea (see Schumpeter). And some of China’s military behaviour alarms its neighbours, not only in South-East Asia but also in India and Japan.

subvert :覆す

At home, Mr Xi’s instincts are at least as illiberal as those of his Russian counterpart. He believes that even a little political permissiveness could prove not only his own undoing, but that of his regime. The fate of the Soviet Union haunts him, and that insecurity has consequences. He mistrusts not only the enemies his purges have created but also China’s fast-growing, smartphone-wielding middle class, and the shoots of civil society that were sprouting when he took over.

purges:追放, 粛清.
shoots:新芽; 若葉; 若枝
sprouting:発芽する; 〈葉などが〉生え始める

He seems determined to tighten control over Chinese society, not least by enhancing the state’s powers of surveillance, and to keep the commanding heights of the economy firmly under the party’s thumb. All this will make China less rich than it should be, and a more stifling place to live. Human-rights abuses have grown worse under Mr Xi, with barely a murmur of complaint from other world leaders. 

stifling:〈雰囲気状況などが〉重苦しい; 窮屈な.

Liberals once mourned the “ten lost years” of reform under Mr Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao. Those ten years have become 15, and may exceed 20. Some optimists argue that we have not yet seen the real Mr Xi—that the congress will help him consolidate his power, and after that he will begin social and economic reforms in earnest, building on his relative success in curbing corruption. If he is a closet pluralist, however, he disguises it well. And alarmingly for those who believe that all leaders have a sell-by date, Mr Xi is thought to be reluctant to step down in 2022, when precedent suggests he should. 

mourned:〈失われたことなど〉を悲しむ, 惜しむ
in earnest:本格的に
closet pluralist:It means in the context of this article that Mr. Xi is the leader of an authoritarian state, and he acts like one. Pluralism is the idea that many kinds of voices and differing ideas are valid or at least could be valid- it's a cornerstone of what might be said to be modern liberal thought. The article suggests that if Mr Xi holds any of these ideas, he is careful not to express them in public. He is keeping those ideas "in the closet. "
alarmingly:驚く[気がかりな]ほどに; 憂慮すべきことに.
sell-by date:《a 〜》〔食品・製品などの〕販売期限◆通常、消費期限より少し前。

Reasons to be fearful
Mr Xi may think that concentrating more or less unchecked power over 1.4bn Chinese in the hands of one man is, to borrow one of his favourite terms, the “new normal” of Chinese politics. But it is not normal; it is dangerous. No one should have that much power. One-man rule is ultimately a recipe for instability in China, as it has been in the past—think of Mao and his Cultural Revolution. It is also a recipe for arbitrary behaviour abroad, which is especially worrying at a time when Mr Trump’s America is pulling back and creating a power vacuum. The world does not want an isolationist United States or a dictatorship in China. Alas, it may get both.

unchecked:抑制されない; 野放しの
arbitrary :専制的な・独断的な



swingby_blog at 08:28コメント(0) 



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