もしイギリスがテムズ川のシンガポールになったら。 イギリスがEUとの交渉に失敗した時のイギリスの経済

The British economy if the country crashes out of the European Union
Jul 6th 2017, 12:14


crash out of A:⦅報道⦆A〈スポーツ大会〉で完敗する, 敗退する.

After crashing out of the European Union, Britain tries an alternative economic model. The experiment is proving painful

IT IS 2021 and Britain is out of the European Union. The two-year Brexit negotiations never really got going. Following the general election of 2017 the Conservatives, though the largest party, had no majority in Parliament. They struggled to formulate a coherent plan to present to the EU. The hardline fringe of the party promised to raise hell any time there was any suggestion of compromise with Brussels. The two sides did not get close even to a transitional deal. On March 29th 2019 Britain crashed out of the club. 

got going:動き出す
hardline fringe:〔社会・政治などの〕分派、非主流派、過激派グループ
raise hell:大騒ぎをする、わめき散らす

The immediate result was panic. British airlines were excluded from the EU’s common aviation area, so they were no longer allowed to take off in one EU country and land in another. Cars, Britain’s second-biggest goods export, faced a 10% tariff to enter the EU market. Exporters did not know how to navigate EU customs, prompting long delays. The pound plummeted. 


With bankers moving to Frankfurt and a severe recession looming, the Conservatives drew up a blueprint to keep the post-Brexit economy competitive. The plan called for low taxes and a small state. This was a renewed push in the direction taken by George Osborne, the chancellor in 2010-16, who reduced public spending as a share of GDP from 45% to 40% while cutting taxes on companies and the rich. 

The Tories dismissed the notion, touted by the tabloids, that Britain was turning into “Singapore-on-Thames”. They were wary of alienating left-leaning Brexiteers who had for the first time voted Conservative in 2017. Yet the plans were radical. They started by cutting the rate of corporation tax from 17% to 10% (a threat Britain made to its EU partners early in the Brexit negotiations). The higher rate of income tax was slashed from 40% to 25%. The government also tweaked Britain’s tax-secrecy laws. Bearer shares (almost universally outlawed because they confer anonymous ownership of a company) were reintroduced, having been abolished in 2015. 

bearer share:無記名株式

At first the plan seemed to have an impact. Spotify, a music-streaming app, moved its headquarters from Stockholm to London. The weak pound made British firms targets for foreign buyers. Unilever, one of the largest companies in the FTSE 100 and the producer of Colman’s mustard and Hellmann’s mayonnaise, was finally taken over by Kraft Heinz, an American firm, to form UniKraft. UniKraft is now a British firm for tax purposes but the big decisions are taken in America. 

Reality bites
Yet, beyond a brief uptick in GDP, all this has hardly helped the economy. It has also deprived public services of resources. 


Take the economy first. Cutting corporation tax and introducing loopholes may induce big firms to switch their tax domiciles, but it does little to encourage firms to create jobs or production in Britain. Even the most optimistic calculation from the government, which finds that higher investment leads to faster growth and a higher tax take, suggests that after 20 years just half of the lost receipts could be recouped. 

tax take:税金徴収

Overall, Britain remains far less attractive to foreign investors after Brexit than it was before. It is no longer in the EU's single market and, with immigration rules tighter, firms have trouble finding the right staff. UniKraft has saved a bundle on its tax bill but it also moved the Colman’s mustard factory from Norwich to Poland. 

Personal-tax cuts have had a similarly underwhelming effect. The 15-point cut to the higher rate has benefited only a small number of people: 15% of income-tax payers, according to official estimates. These folk are richer, so are more likely to save rather than spend any extra income. 


The tax cut has thus given growth only a marginal boost. It has been expensive. Estimates from the Institute for Fiscal Studies, a think-tank, suggest that each percentage-point cut in the higher rate of income tax costs the government about £1bn. The number of higher-rate taxpayers has declined as rich EU nationals quit the country. 

As the tax take fell, the government had to cut spending. The tabloids cheered the raid on the budget for overseas aid and the abolition of the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, seen as a waste of money. But all government departments needed to economise. 

economize :〈金時間物など〉を節約[倹約]する.

That proved particularly hard for the National Health Service. The austerity plan called for a decade-long cash-terms freeze in NHS spending, the biggest squeeze in its history (compared with an average real-terms increase in 1950-2010 of 4% a year). The exodus of foreign nationals also hurt; in the early 2010s one-third of doctors were immigrants. 

The NHS found it hard to cope even with a fairly mild winter in 2020. Typically Britain sees around 30,000 excess deaths each winter, but that rose to 60,000. 

This hit the government’s popularity. Sensing their chance, a group of pro-EU MPs have formed a new party, Britain Up! It has nearly 100 MPs, defectors from Labour and the Liberal Democrats—plus a few Tories, whose defection has triggered an election. It is campaigning on a promise to hold a referendum on whether to reapply for EU membership. The rump of the Tory party insists Brexit means Brexit. The polls suggest the race is neck and neck. 




swingby_blog at 21:08コメント(0) 


パレスチナ人たちは和解しようとしている。 しかし最近の努力は失敗しているようだ。

The Palestinians try to reconcile
But the latest effort is likely to fail
Oct 5th 2017 | CAIRO


IT MUST have felt like deja vu for Rami Hamdallah, the Palestinian prime minister, as he crossed the heavily-fortified border into Gaza on October 2nd. It was his first visit in two-and-a-half years. There were speeches, rallies and lofty promises to end the schism that has paralysed Palestinian politics for more than a decade. It was like a replay of a trip he made in 2014 to inaugurate a new unity government— which fell apart within weeks. 

deja vu:既視感、既視体験〔見飽きた・聞き飽きたことなどによる〕単調、陳腐、退屈
paralysed: (一時的に)麻痺させる

The Palestinian territories split in 2007, a year after Hamas, the militant Islamist group, won a majority in parliament. It seized control of Gaza after months of bloody fighting with its nationalist rival, Fatah. Since then Hamas has run the coastal strip as a separate fief, with its own civil servants and police. The two parties have signed six reconciliation deals meant to end the split, but none held. Hamas was loth to give up its enclave. 

loth:することに気が進まない, …することをいやがる(reluctant).

Now it seems more amenable. It has agreed to cede control of the civilian ministries in Gaza. Over the coming year it will add 3,000 police officers from the Palestinian Authority (PA), which runs the West Bank and is dominated by Fatah. Yahya Sinwar, Hamas’s number two, said he would “break the neck” of anyone who opposes reconciliation. (That may not be an idle threat: in the 1980s his job was to kill Palestinians who collaborated with Israel.) 

amenable:すすんで受け入れて, 快く応じて[応える]

Hamas has few alternatives at this point. Life in Gaza has been grim for a decade, amid three wars and a blockade imposed by both Israel and Egypt. Conditions worsened further this spring when Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, slapped his own sanctions on the territory to press Hamas into a deal. Most of Gaza’s 2m people receive just four hours of electricity a day. Tap water is equally scarce and when it is available it is brackish and polluted. Nearly two-thirds of young people cannot find work. In dingy, crowded hospitals, basic medicines are in short supply. Hamas is keen to put someone else in charge of the misery. 

slap a heavy tax:重税を課す.
Tap water:水道水
dingy:薄暗い, 陰気な, みすぼらしい, 汚い, むさ苦しい

So are regional powers. Qatar, the main sponsor of Hamas, is under embargo by Egypt and three of its Gulf neighbours, which want the emirate to cut ties with Islamists. It has not halted aid to Hamas, but it has quietly urged the group to reconcile with Fatah. The United Arab Emirates has dangled the prospect of massive investment in a post-Hamas Gaza. It is working closely with Muhammad Dahlan, an ex-Fatah security boss who was banished by Mr Abbas and now lives in Abu Dhabi. 


The greatest pressure has come from Egypt, which controls Rafah, the sole border crossing accessible to most Palestinians. It has been largely closed since 2013. Egypt accuses Hamas of working with jihadists who are fighting a bloody insurgency in Sinai. Though the charges are exaggerated, Hamas has indeed allowed dozens of wanted Egyptian militants to seek refuge in Gaza. The generals in Cairo would be happy to see Mr Abbas’s men back on the border. 

exaggerated:を誇張する, おおげさに言う [考える]

Hamas has not agreed to that. It may let Mr Abbas run the schools and hospitals, but it will not give up a militia that boasts tens of thousands of fighters and a cache of rockets. “This will never be up for discussion,” says Moussa Abu Marzouk, a top Hamas official. So this effort is likely to fail for the same sorts of reasons as the past six. Mr Abbas cannot accept a well-armed group operating under his nose. It would be a threat to the unpopular president’s tenuous rule. 

up for :賛成で

It could also bankrupt his government. Israel would probably withhold the tax revenue on which the PA depends, and some Western countries might suspend foreign aid. “If someone from Hamas has a weapon, I’ll put him in prison,” Mr Abbas told Egyptian television. He may not get the chance. 



swingby_blog at 18:51コメント(0) 


カタルーニャ地方の指導者は会談で独立が保留にされる。 独立宣言 名ばかりの。 

The Catalan leader puts independence on hold for talks
A declaration of independence, of sorts
Oct 10th 2017 | BARCELONA

独立宣言 名ばかりの。 

put on hold:《be 〜》〔電話で〕待たされる 保留[お蔵入り]にされる

THE formula seemed contradictory. On October 10th Carles Puigdemont, the president of Catalonia’s devolved government, told his parliament that he was “assuming the mandate” for Catalonia to become an independent republic and thus leave Spain. But he asked the parliament to “suspend the effects of the declaration of independence” to allow for negotiations. 


This followed an unconstitutional referendum on independence held on October 1st in which, his administration says, 2.3m (around 43% of the electorate) voted, 2m of them in favour. For many of the thousands of flag-waving demonstrations outside the parliament, that was enough to declare independence straight away, and many were deflated. But business leaders and opposition politicians in Catalonia warn that Mr Puigdemont is propelling the region towards a costly political void. By suspending independence, he is trying to play for time. 

deflated:自信をなくした, がっかりした
propel :を推進する

All eyes now turn to Mariano Rajoy, Spain’s conservative prime minister. He has rejected negotiation while Catalonia’s government continues to act unconstitutionally. He is under pressure to invoke Article 155 of Spain’s democratic constitution which allows the government to “compel” a region to fulfil its constitutional obligations and give it direct orders if it does not. Never tested, politicians assume this would allow the prime minister to suspend self-government in Catalonia, and call a regional election. 

invoke sanctions:制裁措置を講じる.

Mr Rajoy told El Pais, a Madrid newspaper, that he would act to keep Spain together “at the right time”. In Catalonia, one of Spain’s richest regions with 7.5m people, the independence movement gained allies after the Spanish government’s mishandling of the referendum, during which police baton charges left several hundred people injured, according to the Catalan authorities. The region was paralysed by a protest strike on October 3rd. 

gain someone as one's ally:(人)を自分の味方に付ける
baton charge:⦅主に英⦆(警察による)警棒での攻撃.

That may come to be seen as a high watermark for the drive for independence. The past few days have delivered a sharp reality check, contradicting the claims of the ruling coalition in Barcelona, Catalonia’s capital, that independence would be painless and is the demand of a united people. 

high watermark:高水位線

Most damagingly, since October 1st a score of the largest companies in Catalonia have started to move their legal domicile to other parts of Spain. Thousands of savers have moved their accounts. On October 8th some 400,000 people marched in Barcelona for the unity of Spain. It was the first time that the silent majority opposed to independence found its voice. No European government has shown the least sign of interest in Mr Puigdemont’s pleas for mediation; France’s Emmanuel Macron, for one, has bluntly rejected it. 


Mr Puigdemont heads a diverse coalition which may now fracture. Moderates, silent for the past few months, have emerged to push for delay. On the other hand, the CUP, an anarchist group which wants immediate independence, did not join the applause for Mr Puigdemont’s speech. It may now withdraw its support, depriving his administration of its working majority. “I don’t think he can last a month without calling an election” in Catalonia, says a moderate politician in his party. That would do Mr Rajoy’s job for him. One way or another, Catalans may be asked to vote, legally this time. That would at least allow everyone to draw breath. 

deprive A of B:〈人物事が〉A〈人物〉からB〈(重要な)物事〉を奪う
draw breath:一息入れる



swingby_blog at 19:19コメント(0) 



Oct 3, 2017 | 09:00 GMT
Against North Korea, Deterrence of a Different Kind
By Omar Lamrani


On paper, deterrence is fairly straightforward concept. But in practice, the policy can look quite different depending on the nations implementing and being targeted by it.

Since the turn of the millennium, war between nuclear powers has never loomed so near. As North Korea sprints toward the finish line in its race to build a credible nuclear deterrent, the window of opportunity to stop it is shrinking. With time running out, the United States may yet launch a preventive strike against Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, convinced that military intervention is the only way to halt its smaller adversary in its tracks. 

turn of the millennium:千年の変わり目
minimum nuclear deterrent:最低限の核抑止力
become more and more convinced:ますます確信を深める.

Within this narrow time frame, the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula will spike as the United States weighs the costs and benefits of attacking a country whose arsenal is already formidable. But should Washington opt against a preventive strike, or put off the decision for too long, the few options before it will be reduced to one: deterrence. 

opt:(他よりも) ≪…の方を/…する方を/…しない方を≫ 選択する, 決める ≪for/to do/against≫
put off:延期する
stifled for too long:《be 〜》あまりにも長い間抑圧される

Armed and Dangerous
On paper, deterrence is a fairly straightforward concept: One country uses the threat of retaliation to stave off the attacks of another. But in practice, deterrence can look quite different depending on the nations implementing and being targeted by it. The circumstances that gave rise to the very concept of nuclear deterrence — the United States' Cold War-era showdown with the Soviet Union — are radically different than those Washington now faces as its standoff with Pyongyang grows tenser by the day. And in many ways, deterring North Korea would be far trickier than deterring the Soviet Union ever was. 

stave A off:A〈人物〉を(一定期間)阻止する

The most pressing danger the United States would have to worry about is miscalculation. Though North Korea's development of a fully functional nuclear weapon and delivery arsenal would take the option of a preventive strike off the table, it wouldn't preclude a pre-emptive strike aimed at stopping an imminent attack. In fact, because North Korea would have the ability to inflict catastrophic damage in a single go, the United States, South Korea and Japan would have even more reason to try to detect and block an attack by Pyongyang before it happens. 

preventive strike:敵軍で予想された攻撃性を思いとどまらせるために行われる打撃
inflict serious pain:大きな苦痛を与える
single combat:一騎打ち.

South Korea has already taken steps to improve its response time. Under its "proactive deterrence" strategy, Seoul has compressed its military chain of command to speed up decision-making, while with the still-developing Kill Chain program it aims to be able to detect and pre-empt any North Korean missile launch before it occurs. These programs are only a small part of the broader strategies that the United States, South Korea and Japan will put in place against North Korea. But the ability to act faster comes with its own dangers as well. Under pressure to issue a quick and overwhelming response ahead of a seemingly imminent nuclear attack — or, from Pyongyang's perspective, a strike meant to decapitate the government of Kim Jong Un — parties on each side could easily trigger a devastating conflict on the basis of false intelligence or a simple misunderstanding. 


A Race With No Winners
At the same time, the current strategic balance among the world’s biggest nuclear powers would begin to break down. The United States would inevitably ramp up its ballistic missile defense development, which would spur other nations to respond, perhaps in kind, or by adjusting nuclear posture or abandoning arms agreements. Already, the United States has a foundation of operational missile defenses to build on, ranging from regionally focused systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), to strategic systems with the ability to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense. 

break down:〈機械システム車が〉故障する.〈交渉計画結婚などが〉失敗する, うまくいかない(fail).
ramp A up:A〈生産など〉を増やす.
in kind:同じように

This gradual buildup of U.S. missile defenses will meet vehement opposition from China and Russia. After all, a reliable anti-ballistic missile network could rob Beijing and Moscow of their own strategic deterrents, enabling Washington to launch a devastating first strike before intercepting and destroying any Chinese or Russian missiles that survive for use in a retaliatory strike. It came as no surprise when China pushed back against the recent deployment of the THAAD system to South Korea, or when Russia did the same in response to the United States' plans to bolster Europe's missile defenses. Any U.S. strategy of deterrence against North Korea that centers on missile defense would thus have wider global consequences, creating fertile ground for renewed rivalries and weakening the arms control regimes already in place. 

rob A of B:A〈人銀行など〉を襲ってB〈金財産など〉を奪う, 奪い取る

All for One, and One for All
North Korea's newfound capabilities would also raise questions among the United States' allies about the reliability of extended deterrence. Under this policy, the United States has tried to ward off attacks against South Korea and Japan by vowing to come to their defense, regardless of whether North Korea could target U.S. cities with nuclear weapons. But would the United States truly be willing to risk Los Angeles to save Tokyo or Seoul? As Washington's partners ask themselves this question, the prospect of "decoupling" — the breakdown of an extended deterrence umbrella as once-protected partners hedge their bets by seeking out their own defenses — will become all the more likely. 

ward A off :A〈病気危険悪霊など〉をかわす, 避ける
decoupling:を切り離す, 分離させる
hedge one's bets via outsourcing arrangement with:〜との外注契約によって丸損することを防ぐ、〜への外注を手配することによって損失を避ける
all the more:いっそう

Of course, the United States could ease their fears somewhat by deploying tactical nuclear weapons to the region (most likely to South Korea). U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis recently discussed this possibility with South Korean Defense Minister Song Young Moo amid polls that showed nearly 70 percent of South Koreans support the move. If the talks result in action, it would place U.S. nuclear weapons directly in the line of fire, reducing the need for Seoul or Tokyo to create their own nuclear deterrents. It would also fortify the United States' extended deterrence policy by giving Washington and its allies more options: Rather than having to resort to strategic nuclear weapons, they could respond to North Korean chemical or nuclear attacks on the battlefield with the less drastic option of tactical nuclear weapons — at least, in theory. The actual fallout of introducing tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula would likely be much messier, dimming any prospect of someday denuclearizing the region while ratcheting up the risk of a wider nuclear war. 

tactical (nuclear) weapons:(近距離)戦術(核)兵器.

The United States has tried to reassure its Asian allies in more conventional ways as well. Washington recently agreed to lift the traditional payload limit in place on South Korean ballistic missiles, and it offered to sell both partners more advanced military equipment. But even as these moves shore up the United States' alliances in Northeast Asia, they will reduce Washington's ability to dictate the pace and outcome of events in the region, as South Korea and Japan expand their capabilities. And if either country, more emboldened and more powerful than ever, initiates its own offensive against North Korea, it could drag the United States into a war that was not of its choosing. 

payload:(ミサイルなどの)爆弾量; 弾頭.
shore:〈組織人など〉を支える, 下支えする; (さらに悪化しないように)…を持ちこたえる(up).
dictate the outcome of:〜の結果を決定する
emboldened:〈人〉を勇気[元気]づける, 励ます 

Perils Proliferate
A policy of deterrence against North Korea would carry new concerns for proliferation, too. Not only could South Korea and Japan seek out their own nuclear weapons, but North Korea would also set a troubling precedent for other nations: So far it is the only country to have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty before subsequently withdrawing to pursue nuclear weapons. Moreover, there is a chance that North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile technology could spread to other countries. Though Pyongyang wouldn't be eager to undermine its deterrent by selling nuclear weapons technology, it's possibile that the cash-strapped and isolated government would sell missile development technology to longtime partners such as Iran. 

a nuclear deterrent:核抑止力.

While the precarious world of deterrence is certainly preferable to nuclear war, it comes with its own problems and perils. And given the particularly high level of mistrust and risk of miscalculation on both sides of the dispute over North Korea’s nuclear program, the next era of nuclear deterrence may well be the most dangerous the world has witnessed yet. 

precarious:〈状況立場などが〉不安定な, 危うい(uncertain, unstable).

Omar Lamrani focuses on air power, naval strategy, technology, logistics and military doctrine for a number of regions, including the Middle East and Asia. He studied international relations at Clark University and holds a master's degree from the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, where his thesis centered on Chinese military doctrine and the balance of power in the Western Pacific. 



swingby_blog at 21:22コメント(0) 


Oct 7, 2017 | 15:06 GMT stratfor
Turkey Poised to Roll Into Syria


poised:〖be 〜〗 ≪…の/…する≫ 用意[覚悟]ができている ≪for/to do≫ ; 今にも動き出す姿勢でいる.
The car rolled along [past].:その車は進んで行った[通りすぎた].

Turkey Poised to Roll Into Syria

Turkish-backed Syrian rebel fighters advance toward jihadist-controlled Idlib province along the Syria-Turkey border on Oct. 6.
Turkish-backed Syrian rebel fighters advance toward jihadist-controlled Idlib province along the Syria-Turkey border on Oct. 6.(NAZEER AL-KHATIB/AFP/Getty Images)

Weeks after Turkish forces started to deploy in large numbers along the border with Syria, adjacent to the province of Idlib, Ankara appears to be on the verge of launching yet another significant military operation into the war-torn country. Unlike Operation Euphrates Shield, which targeted lands occupied by the Islamic State, the upcoming operation into Idlib will be directed toward lands occupied by Syrian rebels. As befitting a convoluted conflict such as Syria, Turkey's advance into Idlib will be assisted by other Syrian rebel groups trained over time by Turkey in neighboring Aleppo province. And according to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's latest statements, they will be supported by Russian aviation. 


Given that Turkey has for years directly supported rebel factions in Idlib in their fight against Russian- and Iranian-backed loyalist forces, the prospect of Turkish forces advancing into Syria under Russian air cover appears jarring at face value. The signs of a significant shift in direction by Turkey on Syria, however, have been visible for some time. The first indication was the Turkish abandonment of the rebel defense of Aleppo in favor of Operation Euphrates Shield in late 2016. 


This occurred amid steadily improving ties between Ankara and Moscow despite both sides maintaining opposite positions on the Syrian civil war, at least in principle. There were also increasing signs throughout 2017 of a significant drop in the flow of Turkish supplies to key rebel factions in northern Syria, particularly in Idlib. Turkey instead focused its resources on developing the capabilities of its Syrian rebel proxies that were directly under its management as part of Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Aleppo province.

The biggest shift in Turkey's stance, however, came through the Astana process, where Turkey negotiated at length with Russia and Iran in a number of negotiation rounds in the Kazakh capital on the setup of "de-escalation" zones in Syria. These talks enabled the establishment of a "de-escalation" zone in Idlib, on whose borders Turkish troops are now poised alongside their rebel allies from Operation Euphrates Shield.

A map of Syria showing de-escalation zones and zones of influence 
Turkey's shifting position over the past 18 months that is now culminating with a military operation into rebel-held lands can be explained by three overarching factors. The first is the dawning realization in Ankara that the rebels it supported were on the losing end of a conflict with Iran- and Russia-backed loyalist forces. Every major loyalist victory that bolstered Syrian government control in northern Syria, in turn, diminished Turkey's ability to influence events in the country. 


The second factor was the growing power of independently minded rebel groups such as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in northern Syria, particularly in Idlib province. As rebel forces suffered successive defeats and despaired from ever receiving enough external support to match the level of direct backing Iran and Russia gave loyalist forces on the battlefield, they became increasingly prone to defect and turn to the better resourced and organized hardline groups such as the al Qaeda-linked Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. 


This trend has only accelerated in recent months with the end of the CIA program that supplied rebel groups in Syria with key weaponry such as anti-tank guided missiles. Unlike the Syrian groups supported by Turkey — and previously by the United States — in northern Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has no compunction in upholding its own interests over Ankara's. Indeed, in recent months, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has even monopolized control over Idlib province by cracking down on Turkish-backed rebel groups. For Turkey, the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib threatens to entirely remove what little influence it has remaining in the province.

have no compunction about (doing) A:A(すること)をちっとも悪いと思っていない.

Finally, and most important, Turkey has consistently prioritized its goal of undermining and pushing back against Kurdish empowerment in Syria over its desire for regime change in Damascus. Before the United States started to provide significant support to the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces in 2015, and before the loyalists started to regain momentum in the conflict that same year, Turkey could undermine the Kurds and pursue regime change in Damascus through its support of rebel forces. 

However, as the U.S.-backed Kurdish forces spread their control over northern Syria and as the rebel hold was reduced through consecutive loyalist offensives, Turkey could no longer rely on weakened and distracted rebel forces to act as a bulwark against the Kurds, much less topple the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. To that end, Ankara has increasingly prioritized an improved relationship with Moscow in the hopes that the influence leveraged through that relationship would allow it to counter the emboldened Kurds. For instance, Turkey still can hope to translate a cooperative mission in Idlib with the Russians into an opening for a subsequent operation against the Kurdish forces of the People's Protection Units (YPG) in Afrin canton, which are thus far insulated by a Russian presence. 


A Turkish operation into Idlib province is nevertheless not without considerable risk. Indeed, there is even a possibility that it could backfire on Ankara. First, there is still no guarantee that such an operation would translate into increased Russian assistance against the YPG and predominantly Kurdish Syria Democratic Forces. Moscow, after all, has maintained its ties with the Syrian Kurds and has even blocked Turkish operations against the Kurds in the past. Further, Turkey and its local rebel allies may find themselves going up against very determined resistance from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham fighters, many of whom are locals, and operating in terrain that is geographically more challenging than that faced by Turkey and its proxies during Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey, however, appears determined to tolerate the risks as it seeks to expand its presence and control in Syria in pursuit of its greater objectives. 


この地域は極めて複雑だ。トルコはクルドを滅ぼしたいが、アメリカもロシアもそうは思っていない。一方で、トルコはロシアと手を組むことにした。ところがロシアとかイランが支援しているシリア反乱軍がトルコが支援している反乱軍に対して、優勢になってきている。さらに土着のHayat Tahrir al-Shamの勢力も無視できない。ここに軍を進めることはかなりリスクが高い。トルコのさらなる野心をエルドアンは抑えきれないようだ。


swingby_blog at 07:55コメント(0) 


ケニヤの選挙のポーカーゲーム Raila Odingaはケニヤの選挙をボイコットするぞと脅すことによって勝負をかけている。 最初の投票は無効になった。二回目はひどく混乱するかもしれない。

Kenya’s electoral poker
Raila Odinga takes a gamble by threatening to boycott Kenya’s election
The first poll was annulled. A second may be violently disrupted
Oct 11th 2017 | NAIROBI

Raila Odingaはケニヤの選挙をボイコットするぞと脅すことによって勝負をかけている。


IN THE rickety wooden markets in Nairobi, where traders flog old books, second-hand clothes and kitchenware, walking away is a buyer’s last negotiating ploy. If he is lucky, he will be chased down the street and offered a better price. Raila Odinga, Kenya’s softly-spoken opposition leader, seems to be hoping a similar strategy may rescue his electoral chances. 

ploy:(だますための)策略, 手

On October 10th Mr Odinga withdrew from a re-run of the presidential election scheduled for October 26th, arguing that if it went ahead then it would not be free or fair. Courts had already annulled the presidential part of a wider set of elections held on August 8th, after finding problems with the way in which it was run. But no reforms have been made to the electoral process since then, he argued. 

It had already been clear for several weeks that Mr Odinga did not plan to contest the election. His coalition of parties, the National Super Alliance (NASA), had been running a bare-bones campaign. The candidate himself had made plans to travel to Britain and possibly America two weeks before the vote—prime campaigning time—presumably to drum up international support for his withdrawal. 


Yet the announcement still contained a surprise. This is because instead of proposing a straightforward boycott, Mr Odinga seems to be hoping that by standing down he will force the courts to halt the election altogether and order a new one in the future after the parties have nominated new candidates. 

standing:職[地位, 候補]から身を引く 

Under the original Supreme Court ruling that annulled August’s election, the electoral commission has until November 1st to organise a new one. If that deadline is missed then Kenya will be plunged into a constitutional crisis. It is unclear how that would be resolved. Those in the camp of the incumbent president, Uhuru Kenyatta, want an election to be held no matter what. Some hardliners want him simply to be declared president. In parliament MPs pushed through an amendment to the electoral law that automatically awards victory to the remaining candidate if one of them withdraws from a re-run of a presidential election. 

Yet the real crisis is one of legitimacy, not law. Should the courts and electoral commission go ahead with a vote that is not contested by Mr Odinga, his supporters will surely try their best to disrupt it, says Michael Chege of the University of Nairobi. In their strongholds, principally in Western Kenya and certain Nairobi slums, they could prevent the electoral commission from holding a vote that would satisfy the courts. 

hold a vote:投票する、投票を行う

By walking away, Mr Odinga seems to be gambling on his ability to threaten chaos to push Mr Kenyatta to negotiate. But the trouble with that strategy, points out Murithi Mutiga of the International Crisis Group, a think tank, is that Mr Odinga is running out of money. And although protests occasionally gum up the centre of Nairobi, even his most partisan supporters will not stay on the streets indefinitely. The worst outcome, for Mr Odinga and Kenya, is that his bluff is called and the election goes ahead without him. Mr Kenyatta might remain president, but a large proportion of the population would not recognise his right to rule and would feel left out of the political system. 

gum:(ゴム状のもので)A〈機械など〉を固めて動かなくする; (失敗して)A〈仕事など〉を台なしにする
call someone's bluff:〔人のはったり・こけおどしなどに対して〕やれるものならやってみろと挑む
feel left out of:無視すると感じる



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