2015年09月19日

アメリカの対中国総合戦略の見直し(19)

Moreover, it is likely that Beijing would continue to cooperate with the United States in areas that it thinks serve China’s national interests—on the global economy, international trade, climate change, counterterrorism, the Iranian nuclear weapons program, North Korea, and post-2016 Afghanistan. Put differently, we do not think the Chinese leadership in a fit of pique—hardly in China’s strategic tradition— would act in ways that damage its policy purposes and its reputation around Asia. In short, this strategic course correction in U.S. policy toward China would certainly trigger a torrent of criticism from Beijing because it would begin to systemically address China’s goal of dominating Asia and produce a more cantankerous PRC in the UN Security Council, but it would not end many aspects of U.S.-China international collaboration based on compatible national interests. Although there are risks in following the course proposed here, as with most fundamental policy departures, such risks are substantially smaller than those that are increasing because of an inadequate U.S. strategic response to the rise of Chinese power.

in a fit of pique:腹立ち紛れに
a torrent of:の連発
cantankerous:喧嘩腰の
compatible:仲良くやっていける
departures:逸脱

グローバル経済、国際貿易、気象変動、テロ対策、イラン核兵器プログラム、北朝鮮、2016年以降のアフガニスタンのような中国の国益に関する領域には中国政府はアメリカと協力していけそうだ。

In any case, there is no reason why a China that did not seek to overturn the balance of power in Asia should object to the policy prescriptions contained in this report. And which of the policy prescriptions would those who wish to continue the current prevailing U.S. approach to China—that is, cooperation—reject? In short, these measures do not “treat China as an enemy” as some American analysts rightfully warn against; rather, they seek to protect vital U.S. and allied national interests, a reasonable and responsible objective.

今までの総合戦略は中国を敵国とみなしてはいないし、むしろ中国はアメリカとその同盟国の国家的な利益を守ろうとするだろう。

Washington simply cannot have it both ways—to accommodate Chinese concerns regarding U.S. power projection into Asia through “strategic reassurance” and at the same time to promote and defend U.S. vital national interests in this vast region. It is, of course, the second that must be at the core of a successful U.S. grand strategy toward China.

accommodate:配慮する
reassurance:安心感

In this same sense, there is no real prospect of building fundamental trust, “peaceful coexistence,” “mutual understanding,” a strategic partnership, or a “new type of major country relations” between the United States and China. Rather, the most that can be hoped for is caution and restrained predictability by the two sides as intense U.S.-China strategic competition becomes the new normal, and even that will be no easy task to achieve in the period ahead. The purpose of U.S. diplomacy in these dangerous circumstances is to mitigate and manage the severe inherent tensions between these two conflicting strategic paradigms, but it cannot hope to eliminate them. Former Australian Prime Minister and distinguished sinologist Kevin Rudd believes the Chinese may have come to the same conclusion: “There is emerging evidence to suggest that President Xi, now two years into his term, has begun to conclude that the long-term strategic divergences between U.S. and Chinese interests make it impossible to bring about any fundamental change in the relationship.”

In this same sense:同じ意味で
prospect:可能性
restrained:節度ある
predictability:予測
strategic paradigm:戦略的な枠組み
intense:極度の
divergences:不一致

これからは intense U.S.-China strategic competitionである。アメリカと中国との国家的な利益の不一致はその関係においていかなる基本的な変化もたらすことはできない。

The Obama administration has clearly pursued a policy approach far different than the one recommended in this report. To be clear, this involves a more fundamental issue than policy implementation. All signs suggest that President Obama and his senior colleagues have a profoundly different and much more benign diagnosis of China’s strategic objectives in Asia than do we. Like some of its predecessors, the Obama administration has not appeared to understand and digest the reality that China’s grand strategy in Asia in this era is designed to undermine U.S. vital national interests and that it has been somewhat successful in that regard. It is for this overriding reason that the Obama team has continued the cooperate-but-hedge policy of its predecessors, but with much greater emphasis on cooperating than on hedging. Many of these omissions in U.S. policy would seem to stem from an administration worried that such actions would offend Beijing and therefore damage the possibility of enduring strategic cooperation between the two nations, thus the dominating emphasis on cooperation. That self-defeating preoccupation by the United States based on a long-term goal of U.S.-China strategic partnership that cannot be accomplished in the foreseeable future should end.

benign:悪意のない
diagnosis:診断
digest:消化する
overriding:最も重要な
omissions:欠落
offend:の気分を害する
self-defeating :自滅的な
preoccupation:気がかりな状態

cooperate-but-hedge policyが大事だが、守るよりも協力の方に力点がある。中国の気分を害するのではないというような気の引けた態度で戦略の手抜きをしてはいけない。

The profound test that the rise of Chinese power represents for the United States is likely to last for decades. It is unrealistic to imagine that China’s grand strategy toward the United States will evolve in a way—at least in the next ten years—that accepts American power and influence as linchpins of Asian peace and security, rather than seeks to systematically diminish them. Thus, the central question concerning the future of Asia is whether the United States will have the political will; the geoeconomic, military, and diplomatic capabilities; and, crucially, the right grand strategy to deal with China to protect vital U.S. national interests.

linchpins:要

土曜日。今日はこれまで。これでアメリカの中国に対する総合戦略の論文は終了する。昨日の昼は化粧品販売の堀本さんとの会食。午後は荒木さんが来社。今日は海野塾だ。今日から5連休だ。ではまた明日。


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海野 恵一
1948年1月14日生

学歴:東京大学経済学部卒業

スウィングバイ株式会社
代表取締役社長

アクセンチュア株式会社代表取締役(2001-2002)
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