2017年04月18日

アジアの板挟み:中国のバターかアメリカの銃か? ナショナリズムが起こっているとしても、リスクよりもより大きな見返りがあるとしてグローバル化された世界をみている。

Asia's Dilemma: China's Butter, or America's Guns?
Geopolitical Weekly APRIL 4, 2017 | 08:00 GMT 
Trade is the lifeblood of the Asia-Pacific, and even as nationalism rises, the region still sees a globalized world as a greater reward than risk. (RODGER BAKER)
By Rodger Baker

アジアの板挟み:中国のバターかアメリカの銃か?
貿易はアジアパシフィックの重要事項だ。そして、ナショナリズムが起こっているとしても、この地域は依然としてリスクよりもより大きな見返りがあるとしてグローバル化された世界をみている。



Flying into Singapore's Changi Airport, one is struck by the fleet of ships lined up off shore, the tendrils of a global trade network squeezing through the narrow Malacca Strait. Singapore is the hub, the connector between the Indian Ocean, South China Sea and Pacific. Since the late 1970s, with little exception, trade has amounted to some 300 percent of Singapore's total gross domestic product, with exports making up between 150 and 230 percent of GDP. Singapore is the product of global trade, and the thriving multiethnic city-state can trace its trade role back centuries. 

struck:驚かせる
tendrils:巻きひげ・つる
squeezing:詰め込む

Having arrived in Singapore from Auckland, the contrast was stunning. It's not that New Zealand isn't heavily integrated into global trade networks — some 50 percent of its GDP is based on trade, and since its early days as a British colony it has been heavily dependent on distant trade partners. But whereas Singapore sits at the center of trade flows, New Zealand is at the far fringes, a remote outpost that has come to represent the leading edge of free trade agreements and calls for globally agreed-upon trade rules. 

stunning:衝撃的
whereas :であるがゆえに
 fringes:端
outpost:僻地にある小さなもの

Given the significance of trade to the two, it is perhaps no wonder that New Zealand and Singapore were both part of the P3 countries (alongside Chile) that initiated Pacific trade talks in 2002, which emerged three years later as the first iteration of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), adding Brunei as the fourth founding signatory. Only a decade earlier, in the 1990s, trans-Pacific trade had exceeded trans-Atlantic trade, marking a shift in global patterns established for several centuries. Trade is the lifeblood of the Asia-Pacific, and even with rising examples of nationalism, the globalized world is still seen here as a greater benefit than risk. Whereas colonialism was exploitative, globalism is seen as the provision of opportunity for growth and national strength. 

P3 countries:Pacific 3  New Zealand Singapore Chile
iteration:繰り返す
exploitative:搾取的
provision:対策

It is interesting that the theme of the "easternization" of the global system — the assertion that China is set to usurp the leadership role of an inward-turning United States — is not nearly as pronounced in the region as it is in the West. With regard to Singapore and New Zealand, one could argue that British heritage and history may play some role, but discussions with businessmen and policymakers from countries around the region seem less focused on the so-called Asian Century than on ensuring that global multilateral trade pacts remain the norm. Asia may trade primarily within Asia, but that doesn't mean it has any interest in being isolated from the rest of the world. And aside from assertions in some sectors in China (perhaps reminiscent of similar ideas espoused in Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s), there is little expectation that Asia is ready to take the lead, except perhaps in the promotion of open trade. 

usurp:奪う
pronounced:宣言する・断言する
ensuring:保証する
norm:標準・基準
aside:は別として
assertions:主張
reminiscent:思い出させる

Growing Angst in the Asia-Pacific
Perhaps the most common theme I encountered in discussions in New Zealand and Singapore, and with individuals from around the region, was the future of the global trade environment — specifically, the implications of a potential trade war (or even a minor spat) between the United States and China. Like many countries in the Asia-Pacific, both Singapore and New Zealand have adapted to a basic post-Cold War regional status quo, one where economics center on China and regional security centers on the United States. But with the Brexit underway, the TPP gone, the United States flirting with a more nationalist rather than globalist trade policy, and China expanding its military activity throughout the region, there is growing angst that this unofficial balance will no longer be sustainable. 

Angst:苦悩
spat:口論
flirting:軽々しく扱う
unofficial:非公式の

This is particularly pronounced among members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the 10 Southeast Asian countries (nearly all post-colonial entities) that have for decades sought to strengthen their hand internationally through cooperation and shared negotiations. Nearly a quarter of ASEAN trade is within the bloc, but better than 19 percent is with China and Hong Kong. Overall, Asia and the West Pacific account for more than 66 percent of ASEAN's total trade. 

Just 10 percent is with the European Union and 9.4 percent with the United States. While economics is regional, security looks abroad. Two ASEAN members, Thailand and the Philippines, are formal treaty alliance partners with the United States, and several others have established or developing defense relations. There is little real complaint from the ASEAN states (or from countries including South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) of the United States' unofficial role as guarantor of freedom of navigation in the seas in the region. But there are growing challenges with China's expanding military activity and evolving assertion of its own role as the rightful regional security hegemon. 

abroad:アメリカのことを指している。

So long as China was largely seen as a beneficial trading partner and a source of investment, but fairly innocuous when it came to involvement in local politics or security, the dualistic approach toward Washington and Beijing was seen as not only acceptable, but preferential. China's economic heft balanced the United States' military heft, and vice versa. A slight sense of competition for regional friends between Beijing and Washington could be exploited to ASEAN's benefit, and even South Korea, Australia and New Zealand — close U.S. partners — saw merit to the system. 

innocuous:差し障りのない
dualistic:二重の
heft:影響力
exploited:活用する

China would increase its offer of preferential investments or trade access, Washington would counter with offers of more trade but also keep China's broader regional ambitions in check. This semi-equilibrium has been breaking down over the past several years, with two apparent case studies being the Philippines and South Korea. 

counter:対抗する

この著者はNew Zealandの方のようだが、アジアの経済において、中国とアメリカの間でアジア諸国が今後、どのような経済活動をしていったら、いいのか悩んでいる記事だ。中国の経済力とアメリカの軍事力とのバランスが今後崩れてきう。そうした不安定な中で、TPPも含めてどうしたらいいのかという課題だ。

彼の意見は明日続けるが、そもそも今の現状を考えたら、TPPそのものに中国が入らないのは意味がない。ただ、中国もアメリカも二国間の協定を進めようとしているということはこのアジアの経済を彼らに優位なように支配したいからに他ならない。そうした動きに対して、アジアの諸国がどう対処するのか誰がそうした動きを阻止するのか。そうしたことができる経済力を持っている国は日本しかないのだが、はたして日本がそうしたリーダーシップを発揮できるだろうか。

私の友人が言うには欧米人は日本人に対してバイアスがかかっているので、彼らの言うことは真面目に聞かないと言っていたが、何かわかるような気がする。日本人は政治家も経済人も日頃から彼らと一緒に話したり、行動したりしていないので、日本人の言うことに対して構えてしまうのだろう。戦前から一緒だが、解決して行かなければならない日本の最大の課題だ。

水曜日。今日は長谷川さんと会食する。海野塾がある。今日はDemocracyの第二回目だ。ではまた明日。




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海野 恵一
1948年1月14日生

学歴:東京大学経済学部卒業

スウィングバイ株式会社
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アクセンチュア株式会社代表取締役(2001-2002)
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