2017年05月28日

中国は北朝鮮問題の回答なのか?(2)

Same Goal, Different Motives
It isn't clear precisely what actions the United States will take against North Korea (whether unilaterally or through the United Nations), or by extension, what it will demand China do. That said, those demands will likely fall into two broad categories: stricter enforcement of U.N. Security Council trade resolutions, and the prevention of cross-border financial transactions and illegal arms smuggling. 

extension:更に言うと

No doubt, neither strategy will be easy to execute. For one, the U.N. resolutions banning imports of North Korean coal, copper, iron ore and fuel supplies make exceptions for "humanitarian purposes." Pyongyang has made liberal use of this loophole to skirt the sanctions and continue sending its commodities to countries such as Russia. For another, slapping secondary sanctions on China to ensure better compliance with sanctions regimes will likely have a minimal effect on the Chinese companies doing business with their North Korean counterparts, since they have little exposure to the U.S. financial system. The move, moreover, could risk backlash from Beijing if major Chinese banks are caught up in the sanctions net.

skirt:避けて通る
slapping:を課す
compliance :従うこと
caught up in the sanctions net:制裁の網に捕まってしまう。

China is North Korea's primary source of economic support, which means its participation in any sanctions against Pyongyang is critical to their success. Washington has long seen Beijing's lax enforcement of sanctions and exploitation of loopholes in previous sanctions regimes, as well as the access many Chinese banks and businesses maintain across the border, as acts of complicity in North Korean misdeeds.
maize:とうもろこし

China is North Korea's primary source of economic support, which means its participation in any sanctions against Pyongyang is critical to their success. Washington has long seen Beijing's lax enforcement of sanctions and exploitation of loopholes in previous sanctions regimes, as well as the access many Chinese banks and businesses maintain across the border, as acts of complicity in North Korean misdeeds.

complicity:共謀
misdeeds:不正行為

Given its desire to avoid antagonizing the United States, China may well be willing to more closely enforce existing sanctions — and comply with new ones — anyway. Yet even then, Beijing will only cooperate to the extent that it does not jeopardize the North Korean economy's survival in the process. China would almost certainly view a complete cutoff in Pyongyang's access to oil, food or international aid as a bridge too far, and a measure that would fly in the face of Beijing's own imperative to maintain stable buffer states on its borders. This need explains why, despite China's rising frustration with North Korea over the past few years, trade between the two has continued. (Even under the recent ban on coal imports, Beijing's purchases of North Korean iron and other minerals have climbed sharply to compensate for the cutbacks.) 

antagonizing:敵に回す
comply:要求に応じる
jeopardize:を危険にさらす
too far:到底しない
face:無視して行動する
imperative:責務
compensate:埋め合わせをする
cutbacks:縮小

One of the greatest challenges to adding sanctions against North Korea, then, will be the difference in Washington and Beijing's estimates of just how much pressure China can apply before North Korea collapses or lashes out. Of course, this also gives rise to a bigger question: Given the North Korean government's resilience, would new sanctions even be enough to persuade Pyongyang to set aside its nuclear program? Decades of sanctions have hiked up the costs of developing its arsenal, to be sure, but they haven't managed to halt or even slow its progress. There is also always the risk that exacerbating North Korea's economic problems would push Pyongyang away from its only ally — Beijing — and toward tactics of last resort. 

lashes:痛烈に非難する・襲いかかる
resilience:ショックからの回復力
hiked:引き上げる

アメリカは中国をけしかけて北朝鮮に対して制裁をかけさせる方法はなかなかうまくいかない。中国政府はそこまでの制裁はかけないだろうし、生活必需品ということで、制裁品目を絞れない。また、輸出の規制をすり抜けてしまうこともある。また、北朝鮮に制裁をかけても彼らに対して効果がどれほどあるのかははっきりしない。かえって、更に北朝鮮と中国の関係を悪化させてしまうかもしれない。

どうも制裁をかけるということは難しいかもしれない。日本から北朝鮮系の人たちがパチンコ経営の売上を北朝鮮に送金しているがそうした金も馬鹿にならないだろう。そうしたことをやめさせることはほとんど不可能だ。そうなると手段は限られてくる。いよいよ、対応が厳しいものになってきそうだ。

月曜日。今日は弁護士の先生との面談がある。ではまた明日。

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海野 恵一
1948年1月14日生

学歴:東京大学経済学部卒業

スウィングバイ株式会社
代表取締役社長

アクセンチュア株式会社代表取締役(2001-2002)
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