2017年06月06日

中国的な金融改革 習近平の経済改革

Financial Reform, With Chinese Characteristics
Xi Jinping's Economic Reforms(FRED DUFOUR)
May 8, 2017  Stratfor

中国的な金融改革
習近平の経済改革

China will prioritize streamlining and unifying the country’s financial regulatory framework, as well as cracking down on corruption in the sector, over liberalization.The mounting risk posed by local government and corporate debt will require more ambitious relief programs. Political sensitivities will delay implementation of certain regulatory reforms until after the pivotal 19th Party Congress, set for this October. 

streamlining:簡素化する
unifying:統合する
posed:危険をもたらす
relief:救済

Financial sector reform in China is gaining steam. A number of recent developments point to a renewed push to clean up the country's financial system by chipping away at a disjointed and outdated regulatory system and clamping down on corruption in the banking, securities and insurance industries. Simultaneously, programs aimed at helping local governments and businesses metabolize their enormous debts have expanded rapidly. 

steam:勢いを増す
chipping:少しずつ減らす
disjointed:バラバラな
metabolize:新陳代謝させる

But while these initiatives hint at a more comprehensive approach to financial reform, with efforts to manage past debts running in tandem with those to tamp down the unsustainable credit growth of recent years, they do not portend substantial liberalization of China's financial system in the near future. More likely, these are early steps in what Chinese authorities see as an incremental, carefully managed program to restructure and improve (but not dismantle) the country's heavily state-influenced financial and economic systems. 

tandem:同時に
tamp:叩いて詰める
portend:前触れとなる
dismantle:解体する

The Challenge of Reform in China
Financial reform has long been a stated priority of China's government. In practice, however, efforts to improve the sector's ability to assess risk and allocate capital efficiently – the crux of financial reform in a country where political imperatives weigh heavily on economic decision-making – have often taken a backseat to more pressing concerns such as maintaining stable employment. As a result, despite near continuous pledges by central authorities to rein in the worst excesses of China's post-2009 state-led investment boom, debt of all kinds – including local government, state-sector, private corporate and household – has continued to grow at an alarming pace. 

crux:核心
imperatives:責務・急務
backseat:二の次になる
pledges:公約

For example, outstanding local government debt has risen from 12 trillion yuan (around $1.75 trillion) to over 17 trillion yuan since 2012, equal to roughly 23 percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP) today. The growth has defied attempts by central authorities to rein it in by tightening controls on poorly regulated private entities called local government financing vehicles. 

outstanding:目立った
defied:を無視する

The scale of local government liabilities pales in comparison to that of corporate debt, which accounts for around 60 percent of China's total outstanding public and private debt load. As of 2016, unresolved corporate debt was equal to more than 165 percent of GDP, while total commitments are now nearly three times the country's annual economic output. (These ratios are comparable to levels in South Korea and Japan, though China's debt has grown at a far faster pace.) 

pales:と比べると見劣りする

Officially, nonperforming loans account for a low 1.74 percent of loans nationwide, while "special mention" loans, which are overdue but not yet considered non-performing, account for another 3.92 percent, according to official estimates. But many analysts believe China's real nonperforming loan ratio is closer to 10 or even 20 percent. (In Japan, this ratio is 1.5 percent.) Though Beijing has built in some safeguards for managing existing debts over the past year or two, it has done little to reform the incentive structure that generated China's explosive debt growth and capital misallocation in the first place. 

nonperforming:不良債権

かねてからわかっていることだが、中国の債務が急増している。地方政府の債務はGDPの23%だが、企業の債務はもっと大きい。政府は不良債権は1.74%だと言うが、実際には10%〜20%はあるだろう。こうした状況の中で政府は金融改革を行おうとしている。10月の人民大会までは政府は動けない。この急激に増大している債務を解消しなければ、経済が安定しないだろう。

水曜日。今日は海野塾がある。ではまた明日。

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海野 恵一
1948年1月14日生

学歴:東京大学経済学部卒業

スウィングバイ株式会社
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アクセンチュア株式会社代表取締役(2001-2002)
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